I thought Carter's piece was somewhat biased, unfortunately. First, 41's pressure involved potentially withholding new aid rather than threatening to cut off pre-existing aid already in the pipeline--so it was really more of a conditioned inducement (do what we want and you can get more aid) than a threat (do what we want or we'll penalize you). That's more defensible, and might be more of what I'd try: "here, if you do what we want (give up settlements) we'll give you X." Second, it's hardly Israel alone that's the problem. The flaws are even worse on the Palestinian side, and among the other Arabs who egg on the situation. So pressuring them--seriously--would have to be a major part of the deal as well. Finally, all this is politically quite unfeasible at the moment, and I'm not sure that even if it was, and we tried it, it would work. The time for such policies should really have been years ago; now it's a bit late in the game.
So--I think the piece by Malley & Agha in the new FA is pretty sensible in terms of what it suggests, but unrealistic in expecting anything like that to happen. That's why at the end of the day I'm pretty pessimistic and numbed by the bleak prospects of the situation, and think that unfortunately more bad stuff will probably have to happen.
tb@notveryhelpful,Iknow,butsuchislife.com |
