It's gut-check time in the war on the war on terrorism. If Bush buckles to Abdullah's pressure, the administration will continue in the mire it has been caught in over the last month, trying to "peace process" in the Middle East rather than pursuing our strategic goals (the foremost of which, at the moment, is toppling Saddam).
Instead, Bush has to present Abdullah a version of the choice that was presented to President Musharraf twice, once before the war in Afghanistan, the second time after the attack on the Indian parliament: Join the militants, or join the civilized world.
The Saudis warn of a "strategic debacle for the Untied States." Bush needs to emphasize that it is the other way around.
There is no doubt that the Saudis hold cards in the short-term. If the Saudis are serious about using the "oil weapon," as floated in the New York Times, they can disrupt the U.S. recovery. But, as the Cato Institute's Jerry Taylor has tirelessly argued, the "oil weapon" is not as fearsome as it seems.
The Saudis will have to sell oil again eventually, and probably sooner rather than later. It is true that Saudis' generally low-price policy benefits the U.S., but it also benefits the Saudis, since they are low-cost producers who gobble up market share when the price is low.
That this threat (partly, no doubt, intended to panic the panicky Europeans) is even being discussed shows the urgency with which the U.S. should foster the Russian, and — after toppling Saddam — the Iraqi oil industry.
Also, there should be no mistake about what is happening here — an "ally" is threatening the conduct of our war on terrorism, diplomatically, logistically (the Saudi bases we won't be able to use), and now economically. Bush should make it clear to Abdullah that an oil embargo against us during a time of war would be considered a hostile act.
What the Saudis don't realize is that they have much more at stake than we do. The Saudi monarchy has always depended on foreign sponsorship, first British, then America. Without it, there is a question about its ultimate ability to survive.
The Saudis have been here before in almost exactly similar circumstances. In the 1920s, Abdul Aziz was having trouble controlling radical Islamic militants with whom he had conquered the Arabian Peninsula. They were taking the jihad too far, attacking the British in Iraq, and thus threatening Abdul Aziz's relationship with a superpower.
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