Interesting analysis of Israeli military actions:
Intelligence-driven operations – and some less intelligent options
By ERAN LERMAN
Sunday's suicide bombing in Netanya and even the horror in Rishon Lezion two weeks ago cannot obscure the new IDF policy of preemptive action. Something is going on.
It should be obvious by now it is certainly obvious to Palestinian terrorists that IDF incursions, such as last weekend's re-entry raid into Jenin, are driven by highly accurate intelligence and in turn help produce even better information.
Indeed, more than ever, recent IDF operations conform to the modern concept of a "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) a doctrine developed by Soviet military planners who never had the means to realize their vision, and later energetically endorsed by the US military.
RMA implies the application of superiority in knowledge (and information technology) to the "domination of the battlespace" and the conduct of combined-arms operations. The Americans in Afghanistan came close to full application of this concept, with remarkable results; today the IDF replicates this effort in the PA areas.
Incidentally, it should be noted that almost no action of this kind is required in areas which are not under full PA control giving the lie to the idea that we are facing a "popular uprising" against "the occupation." Plans for terrorism are not hatched in areas B or C let alone in east Jerusalem. Rather, the terrorist infrastructure which sends the bombers on their missions is almost entirely located in the territories Israel transferred to full Palestinian control. It is in these areas alone that the Palestinian political leadership has the ability to incite, mobilize, equip, and deploy the bombers. But today, in the aftermath of Operation Defensive Shield, their ability to do so has been vastly circumscribed. Today, the PA cannot act openly without leaking vital intelligence, which the IDF is quick to act on.
The exact nature of the new, preventive synergy between IDF intelligence and field operations is highly complex and therefore does not lend itself to easy description. This is partly because of the sensitive nature of the operations.
Generally, these operations are the direct result of continuous work, conducted simultaneously by several agencies. A single, and at times crucial, "thread" of information may come the old-fashioned way, through dramatic exploits of agents and their runners, or the heroic work of a spy behind the lines. However, such invaluable contributions (for which the anonymous operators of the Shin Bet and other human intelligence gatherers deserve our collective gratitude) acquire meaning only as part of the whole tapestry of intelligence, woven from many sources and collated with painstaking care by the women and men of the research units like those of the Directorate of Military Intelligence.
The more detailed the "bigger picture," the better the chances of timely and successful preventive actions. In turn, the more effective these actions, the more likely they are to produce additional intelligence, not least because of information provided by those now detained.
This preventive aspect of Defensive Shield and the pattern established in its aftermath ties in with two other elements evident in the new balance created by the IDF, the reemergence of Israeli deterrence, which was severely eroded in recent years, and the dynamics of political change set in motion within the PA.
As Sunday's attack in Netanya bitterly reminded us, none of this is any guarantee against all attacks at all times. As with other issues such as the complex needs of defense against future missile attacks a multilayered system is necessary. In counter-terrorism, these layers range from the razzle-dazzle of intelligence-driven preemptive actions to the mundane business of around-the-clock protection of possible targets. Complacency will not be an option any time soon.
Still, for those not blinded by non-military considerations, one conclusion stands out. While the current mode of IDF action is not a perfect solution, it is far superior to less thought out options, ranging from large-scale, punitive, and therefore practically "blind" actions advocated by some Israeli "hawks," to replacing the IDF with a foreign force, favored by three out of the four "quartet" partners and even by some voices in the Bush administration. Anyone who thinks that in the face of hatred, incitement, and the willful intent to kill, such a force lacking the IDF's will, intelligence, and operational skills would do better than the IDF, has apparently decided not to think this through at all.
The writer is a former IDF intelligence officer and currently director of the Israel-Middle East Office of the American Jewish Committee.
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