| Over time, the effect of overgrazing is not fractional, because eventually there will be no pasture left. Thus, there is, in fact, an incentive for regulation and some degree of compliance. The problem is that there is an incentive to cheat, and to rationalize it on the assumption that all are not cheating, and thus the negative consequences are not so grave. Thus, there has to be enforcement. Since one might very well keep the commons from extinction under an imperfect regimen, a reasonable commitment to enforcement might suffice. Other expedients would be to grow the commons, for example by cultivating seed on a new patch of land, or searching for a new clearing. In the case of fisheries, taking some fish to raise on farms in order to replenish the stock periodically might work. A further expedient might be to parcel out land, so that each has a stake in its maintenance, with a clear responsibility, thus eliminating the commons. This is difficult in the situation of the sea, but since fishing tends to be territorial, rather than in the middle of the ocean, assigning specific responsibility to different nations for the regulation of their fishing banks might help. Then, they can be held responsible for enforcement of international agreements....... |
