Bush Throws Gauntlet at Saudis With Middle East Plan
Summary
The Bush administration's new Middle East peace plan will allow
the United States to pursue its primary mission: hunting al Qaeda
in the Gulf states. However, it will also strengthen Palestinian
leader Yasser Arafat and widen the split with the Saudis, who
will be forced to seek closer ties with Iran and Iraq.
Analysis
U.S. President George W. Bush threw down the gauntlet June 24,
when he outlined the new U.S. plan for peace in the Middle East
and specifically set the terms for dealing with the Palestinians.
The president called on Palestinians to reform and promised that
when -- and by implication only when -- "the Palestinian people
have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements
with their neighbors, the United States of America will support
the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders, and certain
aspects of its sovereignty, will be provisional until resolved as
part of a final settlement in the Middle East."
By demanding that the Palestinians essentially replace Yasser
Arafat, Washington has substantially improved Arafat's position.
Anyone within the Palestinian community who now demands Arafat's
resignation is open to the charge of collaborating with the
Americans.
The United States is aware of the consequences of its demand. By
making reform and new leadership prerequisites for further
American participation in a peace process, the United States has
created the framework for its withdrawal from that process.
Bush in effect is washing his hands of trying to solve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Washington's challenge, however, is
not aimed at the Palestinians but at the country that pushed for
greater U.S. involvement in the peace process: Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh tried to shift U.S. attention from its war against al
Qaeda by making resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a
key prerequisite for Saudi cooperation on hunting Osama bin
Laden's associates and financiers. Bush's speech warns the Saudis
that Israel and the Palestinians will no longer serve as a
distraction.
This means that a Saudi-U.S. confrontation may be on the horizon.
By no longer taking responsibility for the Palestinians,
Washington is affirming its goal of destroying al Qaeda. To do
this, it must strike at the network's center of gravity: Saudi
Arabia. In response, the oil-rich kingdom will now seek to create
alliances to resist American pressure. Worried about U.S.
military deployments in Yemen and the surrounding Gulf states and
unable to trust U.S. ally Jordan, Riyadh likely will move to
strengthen ties with the two countries bent on resisting U.S.
dominance: Iran and Iraq.
From the Palestinians to Riyadh
Saudi Arabia inserted itself in the peace process when Crown
Prince Abdullah used a column by New York Times writer Thomas
Friedman earlier this year to publicize his own Middle East peace
proposal. Abdullah offered Israel complete normalization of ties
with all the Arab states in exchange for the Jewish state's
complete withdrawal to its 1967 borders. Though this was a
promise Riyadh actually could not deliver, the tactic worked to
buy time and direct the U.S. focus away from Iraq and al Qaeda.
On its surface, Bush's new Middle East policy makes Washington
appear eager to expand its involvement in the Middle East
conflict. The president promised that the United States would --
along with the international community -- help organize and
monitor fair, multi-party local elections by the end of the year
and also help reform and develop the Palestinian economy.
But these promises are superficial. The Bush administration will
not be able to achieve any reforms unless the Palestinians are
willing to work with Washington. At the same time, by stating
that "peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership,
so that a Palestinian state can be born," Bush ensured that no
Palestinian politician or security chief would be able to
cooperate with Washington without appearing to the Palestinian
public to be a U.S. stooge.
By making unrealistic demands and ensuring that no partners can
be found who are credible, Bush has in effect ended Washington's
responsibility for solving the conflict.
The United States isn't able or even interested in completely
disengaging from the Middle East conflict. It will no doubt
continue to chair security meetings between Israel and the
Palestinian security forces and maybe even send U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell to promote cease-fire negotiations.
Bush has indicated that although Washington will continue to be
engaged, its focus will change. Specifically, the Bush
administration will try to segment its Middle East policy,
placing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a box to free itself
to pursue its primary Middle Eastern goals: destroying al Qaeda,
trouncing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and containing Iran.
Saudi Arabia - The Road from Ally to Adversary
The single-most important piece of any strategy aimed at
annihilating bin Laden's terrorist network will require the
United States to do something about Saudi Arabia. Since Riyadh
has until now been a key U.S. ally in the Gulf, where the other
two regional powers Iran and Iraq are decidedly anti-American,
Washington has resisted laying the blame for Sept.11 squarely on
the Saudis.
Yet there can be little doubt that the key components of al Qaeda
derive direct support -- financial, moral and perhaps even
intelligence -- from the desert kingdom. The group's leader is
himself a Saudi from one of the country's richest and most
powerful families. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were allegedly
Saudis, and though there is no direct evidence yet, logic
suggests that much of al Qaeda's financing comes from
sympathizers there.
By taking the Palestinian question off the table, Washington
signals to Riyadh that it will now expect full cooperation. The
difficulty lies in Saudi Arabia's inability to do what the United
States wants.
From Riyadh's standpoint, there is little to gain and a lot to
lose by helping Washington. First, the Saudis do not want a U.S.-
friendly regime in Iraq, which has the second-largest proven oil
reserves in the world. American control over Baghdad would
considerably lessen U.S. strategic reliance on the Saudis. More
immediately, the ruling House of Saud cannot risk a domestic
political backlash by moving against politically powerful patrons
of al Qaeda.
Before Abdullah's conversation with Thomas Friedman, the United
States and Saudi Arabia seemed on a collision course over al
Qaeda, Iraq and what it means to be allies. The Saudi peace
proposal provided a detour that gave both sides time to reflect
on their positions and affirm the alliance -- as Abdullah's visit
to Crawford, Texas, in April demonstrated. But the fundamental
divide driving the dispute remains in place. Al Qaeda, though so
far silent, continues to exist, and too many arrows point toward
Saudi Arabia.
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