Pollack does a good job of trying to substantiate point 1, but reasonable people can still disagree about it.
Re point 2, he does an excellent job on the diplomatic side, going through every player and explaining just what their interests are and what their likely course of action would be. This is the kind of thing where inside diplomatic experience and judgment is indispensable, because it's very hard for outsiders to gauge accurately how other countries will behave in the crunch. Insiders, who know all the hidden things, can at their best be a surer guide to this aspect.
Re 3, this is pure speculation and opinion on everybody's part--both what needs to be done, what the administration is likely to do, and how things will play out. I think everyone can agree, however, on two points: first, that toppling Saddam and recreating Iraq afterwards are two separate things, with the former being of value in and of itself; and second, that the follow-on stuff will almost cetainly be more difficult and less satisfying than the war itself.
tb@asNeilSedakasaid,moppingupishardtodo.com |
