Cordesman testimony, part one
dry but encyclopedic...
Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Iraqi War Fighting Capabilities:
A Dynamic Net Assessment
Testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies
July 31, 2002
Any effort to provide an assessment of Iraq’s military capabilities involves a wide range of challenges. The uncertainties and “intangibles” affecting any assessment of Iraq’s military capabilities -- and any war that has not yet been fought -- are at least as important as the hard data on its force strength and order of battle.
There is reason for modesty in any form of military analysis, and above all in speculating about future wars. The proper rules for such analysis were laid out over two millennia ago by Thucydides in writing his History of the Peloponnesian War, (c. 420 BC): “…I did not even trust my own impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible.” These are tests no one can meet in talking about Iraqi ability to fight a war that has not happened.
I have been asked today to talk about Iraq military capabilities, but this is in some ways of very limited value unless the discussion focuses on capabilities in a given contingency. As a result, I would like to submit a detailed report for the record that provides a fully net assessment of the possible wars that can take place, and how Iraq might fare against given threats and opposition forces.
I would also note that in some ways we are already at war. Iraq has been involved in a political struggle against the US and its neighbors ever since the ceasefire in the Gulf War that is an extension of war by other means. The course of this “war of sanctions” can sharply alter its military capabilities over time. While current attention focuses on US military efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq may become involved in a wide range of conflicts, many of which may take on a number of different forms and become asymmetric in character. Iraq’s continuing efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems compound both the uncertainties in assessing its military capabilities, and the uncertainties as to how it would behave in given contingencies.
Nevertheless, a great deal is known about Iraq military capabilities and probable behavior, as well as about the military capabilities and behavior of its potential enemies. The list of potential contingencies is limited and there are often severe constraints on the options available to Iraq and its opponents. As a result, it is possible to make educated “guesstimates” as to Iraq’s capabilities relative to most key scenarios, and about the strengths and weaknesses of its position in most contingencies.
Iraq’s Current Military Forces
It is relatively easy to estimate the total size of Iraqi military forces, and to comment in broad terms on their capabilities. Although Iraq’s forces have many serious defects, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf, despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle. Iraq still has armed forces with around 424,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. As weak as many aspects of Iraq’s forces may be it is a major military power by regional standards and has at least some chemical and biological weapons. Iraq must be taken seriously both in regional terms and in any military effort to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein.
The International Institute of Stategic Studies estimates that the Iraqi army still can deploy some 375,000 men, organized into seven corps, with two Republican Guards corps and five regular army corps. These forces include six Republican Guards divisions (3 armored, 1 mechanized, and 2 infantry) plus four Special Republican Guards brigades. The regular army has some 16 divisions, and while 11 are relatively low-grade infantry divisions, 3 are armored divisions and 3 are mechanized divisions. The regular army also has five commando and two special forces brigades.
While these units lack modern training and the regular army units are heavily dependent on conscripts, over one third are full time regulars or long-service reservists,US experts estimate that Iraqi divisions differ significantly by unit, but have an average authorized strength of about 10,000 men, and that about half of the 23 Iraqi divisions have manning levels of around 8,000 men, and “a fair state of readiness,” Although at least half of the regular army has manning levels of about 70% of authorized strngth or lower, and some infantry units have very poor manning levels, and are heavily dependant on Shi’ite, Kurdish and Turkoman conscripts,
Republican Guards Divisions have an average authorized strength of around 8,000 to 10,000 men, and seem to average at least 80% of authorized strength. Brigades average around 2,500 men -- the size of a large US battalion. Both sets of estimates give Iraq a total force, today, of approximately 20-23 division-equivalents, versus 35-40 division-equivalents in the summer of 1990, and 67-70 division-equivalents in January 1991 -- just before the Coalition offensives began in the Gulf War. Iraqi manning levels are, however, uncertain. There are many reports of badly undermanned units, but Iraq has also carried out a number of reserve call ups in 2002.
The Iraqi Army relies on large numbers of combat-worn and obsolescent weapons, but it does have some 700 relatively modern T-72 tanks, 900 BMP-series armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), 150 self-propelled artillery weapons, and 200 multiple rocket launchers. It has extensive stocks of AT-3, AT-4, Milan, and High-subsonic Optically Teleguided (HOT) anti-tank guided weapons, and roughly 100 attack and 275 utility/transport helicopters. The mobile elements of Iraq’s 17,000 man Air Defense Command can deploy large numbers of manportable surface-to-air missiles, plus SA-7, SA-8, SA-9, and Roland vehicle mounted surface-to-air missiles. Iraqi logistics are weak, subjecgt to political controls to prevent coup attempts, and limited by sanctions that have prevented most arms imports for over a decade. Iraqi combat engineering and bridging however, is good.
Iraq also has extensive internal security and paramilitary forces. The entire police and law enforcement system performs internal security functions, and there are parallel internal security services with units in virtually every town and city. The Republican Guards and Special Republican Guards units are specially trained for urban warfare and security operations, as well as conventional military operations, and there are three paramilitary forces. The security troops have some 15,000 men, the border guards around 9,000, and Saddam’s Fedayeen consist of 18,000 to 20,000 men.
The Iraqi Air force has around 30,000 men. It still has some 316 combat aircraft, although only about 50-60% are servicable. Senior pilots still fly 60-120 hours a year depending on the aircraft, but junior pilots fly as few as 20.
The IISS estimates that the air force has 6 obsolete H-6D and Tu-22 bombers, and 130 attack aircraft. These include Mirage F-1EQs, Su-20s, 40 Su-22s, 2 Su-24s, and 2 Su-25s. Iraq still has extensive stocks of short-range air-to-ground missiles and cluster bombs. It also has 180 air defense fighters, including 12 MiG-25s, 50 Mirage F-1EQs, and 10 MiG-29s, plus 5 MiG-25 reconnaissance aircraft. Additionally, the air force has extensive stocks of MiG-21s, training aircraft, and drones, and has experimented with using them as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). It stlll has 2 IL-76 tankers and large numbers of transport aircraft.
Jane’s provides a different estimate with the following key combat types; the number estimated to be in service are shown in parenthesis: 40(0) F-7, 30 (13) Mirage F-1EQ, 36 (15-25) Mig-21, 35 (15-20) Mig23, 6 (3-6) MiG-25, 17 (1) Mig-29, 33 (15-18) Su-20/22, 21 (6-11) Su-25, 2 T-22, and 3 Tu-16.
Air Force air-to-air and air-to-ground training is limited and unrealistic. In the past, command and control has been over-centralized and mission planning has often set impossible goals. The two No Fly zones have further limited air training and comat experience. There are no modern airborne sensor, command and contgrol, or intelligence capabilities, other than a small number of UAVs. Air control and warning is still heavily dependent on outdated ground-based intercept capabilities. The Air Force has, however, practiced penetration raids by single low-flying aircraft, and has shown that it can conduct independent offensive operations at the small formation level.
The heavy surface-to-air missile forces of the Air Defense Command are still organized into one of the most dense defensive networks in the world. There are four regional air defense centers at Kirkuk (north), Kut al Hayy (east), Al Basra (south), and Ramadia (west). Major command facilities are underground and hardened. Additionally, there is a network of redundant radars and optical fibre command links. Reports differ over the extent to which China has helped Iraq create a modern and highly survivable optical fibre command net. There are unconfirmed reports of more modern radars being smuggled in from the Ukraine.
The system is backed by extensive low-altitude anti-aircraft (AA) guns, and SA-8b, SA-11, and SA-13 short and medium range missiles. The Sterla 2 and 10 (SA-7 and SA-10) are used for terminal defense of key buildings. Iraq has learned to rapidly move its fire units and sensors, use urban cover and decoys, use “pop-on radar” guidance techniques, and optical tracking. Its mix of SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s is badly outdated, but some modifications have been made.
Iraq has learned a great deal about land-based air defense operations from the gulf war and more than ten years of operations against the US and British aircraft enforcing the “No Fly Zones”. Iraq provided significant aid to Serbia in air defense tactics during the fighting in Kosovo, and helped Serbia make effective use of decoys, “pop-on” and remotely linked radar activity, various ambush tactics, and the use of deployments in civilian areas to limit NATO will ingross.
Iraq is certain to have developed contingency plans to move and disperse its land-based air defenses in the event of a major US-led attempt to overthrow the regime, and to try to concentrate such defenses to protect the regime and try to use them to partially compensate for the lack of an effective Iraqi Air Force.
To strike, Iraq has developed some countermeasures to US anti-radiation missiles since the Gulf War, and has recently begun to get significant equipment through Syria.
The 2,000 man Iraqi Navy has never been an effective force and was devastated during the Gulf War. It now has only 6 obsolete Osa and Bogomol guided missile patrol craft, and three obsolete Soviet inshore minesweepers. Iraq does, however, retain all of the shore-based Silkworm and other anti-ship missiles it had at the time of the Gulf War, and extensive stocks of mines -- some of them relatively modern and sophisticated. (The US never succeeded in targeting land-based Iraqi anti-ship missiles during the Gulf War, and the US and British Navies entered Iraqi mine fields without detecting their presence.)
It is difficult to generalize about Iraqi forces where each land and air unit has such different levels of effectiveness and where political and internal security considerations are so important however, Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It also has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces.
Sanctions and the impact of the Gulf War have also had a major impact on Iraqi war fighting capabilities. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. Iraq’s inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is now obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers, and then sustain coherent operations.
Iraq has, however, maintained much of the clandestine arms purchasing network that it set up during the time of the Iran-Iraq War. It has prior experience in buying from some 500 companies in 43 countries, and has set up approximately 150 small purchasing companies or agents. Intelligence experts feel that Iraq also has an extensive network of intelligence agents and middlemen involved in arms purchases. Iraq has probably obtained some air defense equipment from countries like the Ukraine and China, and may have been able to smuggle in some spare parts through Syria, Turkey, and Jordan.
Deliveries through Syria have become significant since mid-2001, and include parts and weapons assemblies for MIG and Shukoi aircraft, armor, and land-based air defenses. Nevertheless, Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force restructure to compensate for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not visibly deployed any major new weapon system since 1991, or been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure.
Key Problems in Assessment
Wars and battles are rarely decided by “tangible” factors, like manpower and equipment numbers, quantifiable aspects of sustainability, or other measures of effectiveness. One historical case after another, shows the real world outcome of war has been determined by “intangibles,” where various experts differ sharply over the relative capability of each side. Today some experts find it very easy to assert that Iraq’s major combat units will fight with loyalty and determination because of their privileges, dependence on the regime, and nationalism. Others find it equally easy to assert that Iraqi forces they will rapidly collapse or defect because the regime is an unpopular tyranny.
In practice, Iraq’s performance in past wars has shown that many aspects of its military behavior cannot be predicted until a war starts, and that these uncertainties interact with the uncertainties affecting any predictions about the military performance of Iraq’s opponents. The following “intangibles” and uncertainties regarding Iraqi warfighting capability affect any dynamic net assessment of Iraq:
· Real world popularity and unpopularity of the regime among the various elements of the armed forces and in areas of military operations. Loyalty may vary across different force elements, such as Republican Guards, Special Republican Guards, regular army with regular manning, and regular army with largely conscript manning.
· Real-world impact of repression and tyranny versus incentives, nationalism, and propaganda in determining popular support for the regime or active opposition. The impact of issues like ethnic divisions, UN sanctions and the oil for food program, and backlash from the Second Intifada.
· Willingness of various Kurdish factions to participate in a conflict or ride one out; loyalty of various Shi’ite elements versus uprisings and resistance.
· Efficacy of the regime’s bribes and incentives in buying loyalty.
· Impact by combat element of more than 10 years without open access to world arms market, along with limited discretionary funding for force maintenance and modernization; and limited ability to smuggle in parts, weapons, and munitions.
· Uncertain sustainability of current stock of munitions and spare parts.
· Quality of training, and leadership experience by unit and force element.
· Reliance on a rigid logistic system, emphasizing “flood forward” techniques to make up for a lack of response to the needs of commanders and the tactical situation, by moving supplies forward in large amounts, regardless of the immediate need.
· Progress in reducing the past rigidities and over-centralization of the command system, and its failure to allow for independence of action.
· Real-world ability to execute urban warfare and military operations in built up areas; also, the ability to shelter in populated areas, and use human shields, without popular uprisings or action. Impact of ethnic divisions, tribal loyalties, etc. in given areas.
· Level of improvement in air operations and in ability to conduct effective air-to-air and air-to-ground combat using dispersed forces capable of independent operations.
· Efficiency of dispersal techniques and human shields, plus decoys and deception, in limiting the efficacy of US intelligence and strategic reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, and air strike capabilities.
· Ability to make effective use of water barriers and earth barriers; ability to tie combat engineering to real world military tactics in the face of US airpower and helicopter mobility.
· Ability to effectively deploy and concentrate air defense assets for tactical purposes, versus exploit largely fixed SA-2/ SA-3, and SA-6 system.
· Short and medium-term wartime survivability of heavy surface-to-air missile defenses.
· Current status of joint warfare and combined arms expertise, and improvement in such expertise, if any.
· Cohesive maneuvering capability and ability to use helicopters to overcome water barriers and to reinforce.
· Since 1991, improvements in artillery tactics and methods to acquire long-range targeting capabilities and manage and switch fires.
· Planning and real-world capability to execute asymmetric warfare, covert warfare, and use terrorist proxies.
· Effectiveness of the security and paramilitary forces in the face of any serious popular opposition.
· Size and effectiveness of Iraqi opposition forces, if any.
· Size and effectiveness of current holdings of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and missiles, and other delivery systems. Possible possession of a biological or nuclear weapon so lethal that it could inflict massive damage or casualties and make a major change in the level of deterrence or war fighting capability
· Existence of preplanned launch on warning (LOW), launch under attack (LUA), and retaliatory strike capability to deliver CBRN forces; deployment of covert and terrorist proxy capabilities.
It is easy to guess at -- or to assert -- some judgment about Iraqi capability in any of the above areas. It is certainly true that little about Iraqi military behavior since 1991 implies that Iraq will suddenly achieve dramatic degrees of surprise and innovation in military operations, however this can scarcely be ruled out, and the key issue in war fighting is often one of marginal or relative efficiency.
In a contingency, like a US-led invasion to overthrow Saddam, Iraq may have enough war fighting capability to require a very significant US and allied response. In many other contingencies, the weaknesses in Iraqi forces may not be critical relative to similar or different weaknesses in Iranian and other Gulf forces.
Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iraq has a much more serious history of exploiting proliferation than Iran. It has seen proliferation as a counter to conventional superiority since the late 1960s. It sought weapons of mass destruction long before the Gulf War showed it what the "revolution in military affairs" and US conventional superiority could accomplish. Since 1991, Iraq has been unable to obtain significant imports of conventional weapons, and it is incapable of producing its own. As a result, it is scarcely surprising that Iraq sees proliferation as its key potential method of countering the US advantage in conventional forces and has been willing to pursue such options in the face of massive economic costs, UNSCOM and IAEA efforts to destroy its remaining capabilities, and the extension of UN sanctions.
Iraq continues to work on its Samoud ballistic missile systemand other similar systems that supposedly have a range of less than 150 kilometers -- although none of these systems are believed to be deployed, and lack the range for effective strikes on most foreign cities and facilitiesIraq ikely has at least 12-25 surviving Scud missile assemblies, however, and could have in excess of 40.
UNSCOM inspectors note that UNSCOM’s claims to have identified 817 out of 819 Scud imports are extremely soft and may well have an error of 60 weapons, and that no accurate count exists of Iraqi produced components. This could give Iraq a range of 20-80 operational Scuds and Iraq has shown in the past that it can produce its own TEL launchers. Iraq also continues development work on shorter range missiles since missiles with ranges of 150-kilometers or less are permitted under the terms of the ceasefire. UNSCOM made it clear in all of its reports, up through the final expulsion of its inspectors from Iraq, that Iraq was concealing the nature of its chemical and biological weapons effort and had systematically lied in every major disclosure report it had submitted to UNSCOM from the start to the end of the inspection effort. (cont.) |
