Senate Testimony: Phebe Marr - Part 1
foreign.senate.gov
Testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Thursday, 1 August
IRAQ AFTER SADDAM
Dr. Phebe Marr
(Author, Specialist on Iraq)
The purpose of my testimony is to provide a snapshot of what we can expect in Iraq after Saddam, should the US be successful in achieving his fall. Obviously, the means and manner of removing the regime will affect the aftermath: a relatively quick transition with a minimum of bloodshed and destruction will provide one set of circumstances; a more prolonged and destructive military operation will produce a less favorable outcome. It also matters whether the change is accomplished from within, by Iraqis, or requires a direct US military effort. Rather than dealing with the means, however, which is not my area of expertise, I would like to focus on a general political and social picture of Iraq; what we should be prepared to find in Iraq the day after, and, in particular, two key issues that will be critical for US policy and planning in post-Saddam Iraq. The first is the potential for fragmentation or fracturing, once Saddam's regime is decapitated, and, along with it, the potential for outside interference from Iraq's neighbors. The second is the issue of providing alternative political leadership for Iraq, the nature of that leadership, and the implications of the choice for Iraq's future and US policy aims.
Replacement of Iraq's leadership is a serious and ambitious project. It is a difficult foreign policy decision for the US, in part, because its potential benefits, both to Iraqis at home and to the security of the region, are high. But so, too, are the possible costs as well as unintended consequences which cannot be calculated. If the US embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to fulfill its responsibilities, and see it through to an acceptable outcome, including a potential long-term military and political commitment to assure a stable and more democratic government. If it is not prepared to do so, the intended benefits could vanish.
Fragmentation
Iraq is a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian country, with boundaries imposed by foreign powers at the time of its formation in 1920. Its three main demographic components, the Kurdish speaking population in the north (c. 17 percent); the Arab shi'ah population in the south (c. 60%) and the Arab sunnis in the center (c.15-20%) have coexisted over the past 80 years, and, to varying degrees, have participated in the process of building both a state and a nation. As with most such states, that process, while well underway, is still incomplete. Under the current regime, the state is controlled by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, using the mechanism of repression to enforce its rule over all communities, except for a portion of the Kurdish population in the north, where its rule does not run. Hence the fear that if the regime is removed, the country will fragment into its ethnic and sectarian components. How accurate is that assessment?
First, it is very unlikely, indeed inconceivable, that Iraq will "break up" into three relatively cohesive components: a Kurdish north; a shi'i south; and an Arab sunni center. None of these three communities is homogenous or shows any ability to unite under any leadership. Second, there is substantial mixture of these communities in many cities--especially in Baghdad and the center--but also in other cities in the north and south, making separation difficult. In some areas, other minorities such as Turcomen and Christian communities form substantial components of the population. Third, while some Kurds may have aspirations for independence, they are unlikely to achieve it, and many others would be comfortable in a more democratic Iraqi state. The shi'ah have never expressed separatist aspirations. Indeed, both Arab shi'ah and Arab sunnis, as well as some Kurds, have a strong desire the keep the state together and to profit from its ample resources.
However, the removal of the current regime in Baghdad, under certain circumstances, could result in a "break-down" of the central government, and its inability to exercise control over the country; to maintain law and order; and to move the country and its institutions in the direction desired by the US. There are two dangers here. The first is short term. If firm leadership is not in place in Baghdad "the day after" Saddam is removed, retribution, score settling, and bloodletting, especially in urban areas, could take place. For example, the shi'ah in the poor Baghdad townships of al-Thawrah and al-Shu'alah, recent migrants from the south and over a million strong, could cross the Tigris and attack the more affluent sunni districts, such as al-'Adhamiyyah, a fear often expressed by the sunni residents of Baghdad. One a broader scale, without firm government, parochial interests could take over, both in the north and south and in the center. The Kurds, for instance, could seize Kirkuk, with its oil fields, establishing a new reality in the north. Arab sunni clans, who control military units, might struggle for power in Baghdad. The shi'ah party, SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), located in Tehran, could send units of its Iraqi Badr brigade across the border and attempt to seize the initiative in southern shi'i towns, repeating the mistakes made in the 1991 rebellion. Such a collapse of authority could trigger interference from neighbors. Turkey could intervene in the north to prevent refugee flows and to exert control over events in Kurdistan. Iran, through proxies, could follow suit. There could be a reverse flow of refugees, as Iraqi shi'ah exiles from Iran return home in the tens of thousands, destabilizing areas of the south.
`Over the longer term, if a new government in Baghdad fails to take hold, if it is not more inclusive of Iraq's communities, and more acceptable to its population; if a uniform rule of law cannot be established, Iraq could slip into the category of a failed state, unable to maintain control over its territory and its borders. The situation in the north of Iraq is an example. The Kurdish area is not unified; it is divided between the two major Kurdish parties. Neither has real control over its borders, and in the northeast, one party has lost control of an enclave along the Iranian border, dominated by Islamist parties and penetrated by Iran and other influences, possibly including terrorists. While the situation is not yet a serious problem, it serves as a metaphor for what could happen to Iraq as a whole, in the absence, over the long term, of a stable, legitimate government in Baghdad.
Iraq has been a state for over 80 years and for most of that time has had a tradition of strong, central government. The chief thrust of every government since its founding has been state formation and the creation of a nation from the diverse elements within its boundaries. In the process, a sense of Iraqi identity has developed among the majority of its population, particularly in relationship to their neighbors; most Iraqis, with the possible exception of some of the Kurdish population, want the unity and territorial sovereignty of their state maintained. At various times within Iraqi history, the central government has been more inclusive of its various communities, with a better balance among ethnic and sectarian components. But that sense of identity has eroded under the Ba'th, particularly since the rebellion of 1991, which was a defining moment for Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities. The sense of Iraqi identity is still there today, but it is weaker than at any time since 1945. (See attached map)
The Kurds: The Kurdish community in the north has been governing itself for a decade, in an arc of territory which runs from Zakhu in the north to Hajj 'Umran in the east to Sulaymaniyyah in the south. Much, but not all, of this territory is protected by US and UK overflights in the No Fly Zone north of the 36th parallel. (Kurdish self-rule is also due to the withdrawal of Iraqi government troops and administration from the zone.) While the Kurdish leadership is realistic about its prospects for independence (they are nil) and willing to live within Iraq under a federal arrangement which gives them a large measure of autonomy, their aspirations for self-government and their Kurdish identity have increased over this period. In the post Saddam period, it will be more difficult to integrate the Kurdish community into Iraq. For example, Kurdish, naturally enough, is now the language used in administration and taught in schools in the north. As a result, the Kurdish facility in Arabic, taught as a second language in the schools, has weakened among the younger generation and may make it more difficult for them to participate in national life. Despite numerous trials and tribulations, the Kurds have managed to establish a fairly respectable level of government in the north, far freer than that which exists in the south. But they have not done so without consistent support, intervention, and prodding from the West, and Western military protection.
Moreover, the problems of the Kurds may provide a metaphor for Iraq as a whole after Saddam. After Saddam's withdrawal from the north in 1992, the Kurds held a relatively free election with a view to establishing a unified regional government in the north. As is well known, the Kurdish movement was dominated by two major parties, with well established leadership and organization: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under Mas'ud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani. There were other political parties, including some Islamic groups (most notably the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), as well as strong tribal elements (such as the Baradostis, the Surchis, and others) who competed for a share of leadership. The Kurdish region also included a substantial Turkish speaking population (Turcomen), some 500,000 and smaller groups of Christians who sought representation. But the political process was dominated by the two main parties, who between them split the vote almost evenly. (The KDP won two seats more in parliament.) But the election result was finally decided in a personal power sharing agreement between the two leaders. The power sharing arrangement was a formula for stalemate and eventually broke down. By the mid-1990s, both parties were engaged in a virtual civil war, which lasted for several years, resulted in several thousand deaths, and substantial displacement of the local population. The conflict ended by splitting the area they governed in two. Indeed, the intervention of the US was required to end the fighting. The KDP is now in control of the north western region, with its headquarters in Irbil; the PUK in the southeastern portion, with its headquarters in Sulaymaniyyah. Both have weak--almost non-existent--control over their borders with Turkey and Iran. In the interim, the more radical PKK (Kurdistan Workers party), the Kurdish nationalist movement of Turkey, intruded its presence into Iraq along the northern frontier with Turkey, forming a force hostile to Turkey, as well as the KDP. While the activism of the PKK has subsided since the imprisonment of its leader, "Appo" Ocalon, Turkish military incursions across the Iraqi border, have been frequent, and sometimes massive and prolonged, over the past decade. Indeed, Turkish political intrusion into northern Iraq, and its manipulation of the Iraqi Turcomen community, as well as other Kurdish groups, indicate Turkish concern for the Kurdish issue and its ability and willingness to intervene to protect its interests. Meanwhile, the east, the PUK has been challenged by various Kurdish Islamic groups, especially the IMIK, who had established a foothold in territory along the Iranian border, particularly in the towns of Halabjah, and Panjwin. These groups fought with the PUK, which was eventually pushed out of this territory. It is this area which has recently been in the news as a "no man's land", home to newer Islamic fundamentalist groups, such as the Jund al-Islam, which have been accused of ties to terrorist groups and of recent attacks on the PUK leadership. The absence of firm PUK control over this territory, on the border with Iran, provides a sanctuary for forces hostile to the Kurds--and the West--as well as for Iranian meddling. Like Turkey, Iran has intervened across the border on numerous occasions in the past decade. It has supported the PUK, with forces, in its struggle with the KDP, including the conflict which resulted in an attack by Saddam Husayn on the north (in support of the KDP) which helped put an end to the INC stronghold in the north. It has supported Islamic groups in the border areas and elsewhere in the north.
The two Kurdish parties are reconciled to coexistence, at the moment, but this could break down in the future under pressure. In the absence of clear direction from outside, or from Baghdad, competition for resources and power could invite conflict, with potential for intrusion once again from Turkey and Iran. It should be noted that there are other potential political players in the north, including some tribal leaders, who were once part of Saddam's militia. Recently some have formed a loose alliance with Arab tribes in and around Mosul, with a view to helping in regime replacement. The Kurds also have a professional middle class, capable of administration, but without clear direction in terms of where the Kurds are going in the future, the parties have not been able to entice their exile community home. In fact, there has been a considerable brain drain. Moreover, although the Kurds have a local militia, the peshmerga, possibly numbering from 50,000 to 70,000, they cannot maintain border security, or defend against Baghdad or their neighbors. They are dependent on the restraint of their neighbors and protection, ultimately, from the US. The Kurdish model in the north, while containing many salutary features, has succeeded only where the US has been willing to intervene and exercise some responsibility. When the US has stepped back, the Kurdish experiment has faltered. |
