I've now read the Phebe Marr testimony before the Senate committee. It's quite interesting and well worth a very careful read. But it is important to note that she does not address the question of whether an attack against Iraq should be mounted. She focuses her testimony, rather, on the question of the importance of the governing institutions that follow, and the dangers of various courses of action.
The information she offers is essential information. And since, apparently, unlike admin members, she comes with no agenda save presenting her information, she seems more reliable.
Here are a chunk of quotes that most interested me:
1. First, she wishes to make the point that whatever benefits the Bush admin may anticipate from a "regime change" in Iraq, they can come to naught if care is not taken with what follows. And she argues that managing the "what follows" is no easy matter. Here's a paragraph from her opening remarks which make this point, strongly.
Replacement of Iraq's leadership is a serious and ambitious project. It is a difficult foreign policy decision for the US, in part, because its potential benefits, both to Iraqis at home and to the security of the region, are high. But so, too, are the possible costs as well as unintended consequences which cannot be calculated. If the US embarks on this project, it needs to be prepared to fulfill its responsibilities, and see it through to an acceptable outcome, including a potential long-term military and political commitment to assure a stable and more democratic government. If it is not prepared to do so, the intended benefits could vanish.
2. The middle section of her presentation is a pointed overview of the prospects of the "day after" given the three regions of the country. She works her way through a very speedy but essential political morphology of the north, south, and central. I found no summary statements here which would help.
3. Her final section is a series of bullet recommendations. I'm going to copy them here, though they appear in the text already among our posts. But if you are as lazy as I am, it will help to have those recommendations here. There are two which interest me. First, that the preferred military action of a coup (preferred in the sense that it places the fewest US troops at risk) is the least likely to produce a stable future. Second, that the only way long term stability arrives is with a long term commitment, even occupation, by US troops which, in turn, runs the risk of being labelled and attacked as occupiers.
This brief survey on what we can expect in Iraq the day after, leads to the following conclusions, albeit tentative:
O In the past decade, Iraq's sense of national identity has eroded, but it has not disappeared. Kurdish aspirations for self government, shi'ah self-awareness and even Arab sunni identity have increased. In any new political order, few Iraqis will be willing to tolerate a continuance of rule by a narrowly based Arab sunni minority, like the present regime. The good news is that after years of repression, Iraqis are ready for change; they seek preservation of their state and its future development as a nation. However, they have had no experience of democracy; only of a mukhabarat (secret police) state, which has created distrust, corruption and bitterness among communities. The building blocks of democracy will have to be created, including a reorientation of attitudes and practices, and this will take time.
O Without firm authority at helm the "day after", and a clear enunciation of future constitutional procedures pointing to new directions, retribution and a struggle for power are likely in the short term. Erosion of the central authority could, in a worst case scenario, allow parochial interests to emerge in the north and the south. This will induce meddling and interference from neighbors, most likely Iran and Turkey.
O Providing alternative political leadership, and the process by which it is installed, is the most critical and difficult problem faced by the US as an outside power.
O A "coup" or change of government from within--absent US forces on the ground--is the scenario most likely to be destabilizing. While this is the least expensive option for the US in terms of troops and political investment, it could lead to a struggle for power in Baghdad and the erosion of central control, and a gradual "break down' of national unity. Inside leadership is most likely to move against Saddam if it decides the US is serious about occupation but it will need US support to prevent fracturing.
O If the US is unsure of the new leadership or unsatisfied because it appears too close to the previous regime, a period of probing and exploration could ensue, during which the US will have to make demands before providing support and recognition. In the interim the US could lose control of the situation. Identifying potential inside leaders and making US requirements clear and public, before hand, would help avoid this slippery slope.
O Introducing the outside opposition as alternative leadership would produce the most change inside Iraq in the direction the US desires. But this is the most difficult and most costly option. This opposition lacks clear indigenous support; the US would have to be prepared to install and support this opposition with troops, over a considerable period of time.
O If the US finds itself in occupation of Iraq, it will have the best opportunity, in the short term, to provide law and order, prevent retribution; and begin the processes by which Iraqis (both those outside and those inside) can refashion their political system and move toward democratic reforms. Most Iraqis would welcome that prospect, but it represents an expensive, long term commitment by the US over several years, and some troops on the ground, preferable in conjunction with allies. And before too long, if the US is not careful, it will be viewed as a foreign occupier by those inside and outside. Thus, the institution of new leadership and the procedures for establishing a new government, need to be fairly expeditious. After a short period (six months) a US--even and international presence--could be greatly reduced. Nonetheless, if the US is determined to replace the regime, it is better that it take a firm hand in the beginning to help in providing the building blocs for a new, more democratic regime; support its efforts; and plan to keep some forces and a strong advisory team in place to assure the new regime gets a solid footing.
O Among the steps needed will be:
Removal of the of security system and the training of a new police force
Establishing a new system of justice
Re-education and redirection of the bureaucracy
Assembly of a constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution
Developing the building blocks of civil society (a free press, civic
Institutions, reform of education)
O Iraq has a military and a bureaucracy on which the US can rely to provide defense and help develop the country, but as this list of tasks indicates, it will require considerable effort to reorganize and reshape Iraq's institutions in the desired direction. This is no small, or short term task. If the US is going to take the responsibility for removing the current leadership, it should assume that it cannot get the results it wants "on the cheap". It must be prepared to devote some troops on the ground, advisors to help create new institutions, and above all time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end. |
