Hi Maurice, But, first, the deck chairs on the boat must be rearranged, possibly affecting my investments in PetroChina and SinoPec for what they are doing in Sudan, as observed from Hong Kong, but not Boston:
stratfor.com
Tensions Surface in U.S.-Egyptian Relations
16 August 2002
Summary
The Bush administration has announced that it is withholding further aid to Egypt. The move is highly unusual because Egypt is such an important Arab ally, and it may have been triggered by tensions over Sudan or the lack of progress on a free trade agreement.
Analysis
The U.S. government announced Aug. 15 that it is withholding new aid to Egypt to protest the conviction of Saad Eddin Ibrahim on charges of embezzlement, receiving foreign funds and damaging Egypt's reputation. The U.S. position is that Ibrahim, a university professor who holds an American passport, was imprisoned because of his human rights activities.
The decision does not affect the $2 billion in annual military and economic aid that Egypt already receives from the United States, but it does limit any new funding.
There are two things that make this story remarkable. First, Egypt is the foundation of Washington's strategy in the Arab world. It is the largest Arab country in the Middle East, and during a period in which the United States is becoming increasingly estranged from the Arab world over its Iraq policy, maintaining good relations with the Egyptians would seem a top priority. In addition to providing the United States with a reliable ally in the Arab world, Egypt's peace treaty with Israel is also the foundation of Israeli security policy.
Second, such a decision is inconsistent with current White House policy. Under the Clinton administration, geopolitical considerations occasionally took a backseat to human rights issues. But the Bush administration, due to both predilection and circumstances, has consistently made national security its top priority. Publicly hammering a key ally over the imprisonment of a single individual has not thus far been a hallmark of its operating methods.
What is particularly striking is that the U.S. government did not actually cut off aid or stop any other sort of cooperation. Its announcement was a purely symbolic act. A logical audience for such a gesture would be the international human rights community, but the Bush administration is not particularly sensitive to its feelings, and if it were, Egypt is probably the last country it would make an example of at a time when an attack on Iraq may be in the works.
Clearly something has gone wrong in U.S.-Egyptian relations. Washington is signaling to Egypt that Cairo is not indispensable, or at the very least, that Cairo is pushing the limits of its relationship with the United States. A public scorching of a key ally is not done without due consideration and careful planning. The only thing missing is the explanation: What has Cairo done to so upset the United States that it would take this step? Sending Ibrahim to prison for seven years would not seem grave enough to elicit this response.
It is also unlikely that Egypt's behavior toward Israel is the cause. Egypt has criticized Israel during the most recent violence with the Palestinians, but it has not broken diplomatic relations or abrogated the Camp David accords. Within limits, Egypt has played a relatively constructive role.
Cairo opposes a U.S. invasion of Iraq, but then again so does the entire Arab world. Egypt would not play a strategic role in any war with Iraq for geographic reasons. Washington may have been asking for port facilities in Alexandria or for airfields, and Egypt could have refused. But even if this is the case, the United States does not need Egyptian facilities, especially not enough to jeopardize the stability of President Hosni Mubarak.
Moreover, by all accounts Egypt has been working against al Qaeda effectively and enthusiastically. The Egyptian roots of al Qaeda threaten Mubarak as much as they threaten the United States.
A story circulating in the Middle East says that a rift has formed between the United States and Egypt over Sudan. On July 20 a treaty was signed in Nairobi between the Sudanese government and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army, a southern group that has fought a long civil war with Khartoum. The treaty attempts to end the war by giving the Christian and Animist south autonomy from the Muslim north, paving the way for eventual independence. Washington helped negotiate the agreement and supported it.
Egypt was not included in the negotiating process, in spite of its position that it has special interests at stake in the future of Sudan. Egypt does not support the division of any Arab country because of the precedent it might set. In addition, such a splitting of Sudan would put the flow of the Nile in the hands of a new country over which it has little influence.
Thus, there is a feeling in Egypt that the United States has pushed it out of an area that is properly in Egypt's sphere of influence. Egyptian newspapers have speculated that Washington's motives in excluding Cairo from the Sudanese negotiations involved a desire to control newly discovered oil in Sudan.
Another area of contention may be inaction over a free trade agreement between Washington and Cairo. Egypt has been expecting to receive the preferential trade status accorded other Middle Eastern allies like Israel and Jordan for some time, but so far the United States has held back on offering the deal. In early June U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick visited Cairo, and despite reports in the Egyptian press that his visit signaled an imminent FTA, such a deal did not materialize.
Both issues might explain why the Egyptians have been prickly with the United States. But they do not explain the massive public rebuke from the United States. There is a missing piece. If it is true that Egypt is deeply upset over Sudan, then Cairo must have quietly signaled Washington that it was going to limit its support of a vital U.S. issue.
The nature of the threat remains secret, but Washington -- knowing it was coming -- might have tried to warn the Egyptians of the consequences. By announcing the withholding of aid, the Bush administration chose to take a very public step. But while it showed Cairo that the United States was prepared to risk its relationship with Egypt, the move has no immediate consequences and gives both sides room to maneuver.
But what could Egypt have been threatening? It is not in a position to do anything about Iraq. It cannot limit its own war on al Qaeda. The only other issue that is of great importance to Washington is Israel.
In the end it might simply have been that the Bush administration, deeply offended by the jailing of Ibrahim, decided that it could not remain silent, regardless of strategic and national security interests. But somehow that just doesn't ring true. What does appear to be the case is that both of the pillars of U.S. Middle East policy -- Saudi Arabia and Egypt -- are weakening. |
