Hi Maurice, and as I said before, Russia will be back, stronger than ever, maybe:
stratfor.com
Putin Proposal Would Absorb Belarus Into Russia
16 August 2002
Summary
Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed that Russia should, in essence, absorb its neighbor Belarus. Regardless of the plan's success or failure, Putin has managed in one fell swoop to build a small mountain of political capital that will serve him well.
Analysis
Russian President Vladimir Putin engaged in talks in Moscow Aug. 14 with Belarusian counterpart Alexander Lukashenko to outline his vision for a union state between the two countries. As presented, Putin's proposal amounts to a total absorption of Belarus into Russia. The move will help Putin deflect charges that he has sold out his country to Western interests and will ingratiate him to Belarus' oft-annoyed neighbors.
Lukashenko has in the past viewed the union state as an ideal vehicle for expanding his power. He assumed that although a Russian leader would be in charge of the overall union, he could slide into the number two spot -- his logic being that it is better to be the second-most important person in a country of 153 million than the top dog in a country of only 10 million.
This idea was especially attractive during the Boris Yeltsin years, when the former Russian president was flitting in and out of major heart surgery, raising the possibility that Lukashenko could inherit the leadership of both states. An additional clause in Lukashenko's proposals would guarantee political equality between Belarus and Russia, which would greatly increase his role in any future state.
But Putin poured cold water on this dream at the last meeting between the two presidents in St. Petersburg in June, when he scoffed at the idea of equality between the states and left Lukashenko fuming.
At the most recent meeting this week, Putin called for the creation of a joint state based on the Russian Federation's constitution and expressed his desire to use the Russian ruble as a joint currency beginning in January 2004. Implementing such a plan would amount to a de facto Russian annexation of the far smaller and weaker Belarus. The "new" nation would encompass Russia's existing 89 regions as well as Belarus' seven.
Putin's timetable for the merger is an aggressive one. Both states would hold referendums in March 2003, and a vote on a joint president would occur in 2004. Not coincidentally, Putin is up for re-election in 2004.
Lukashenko was understandably put off by the proposal and said so upon his return to Minsk. However, if the union state is to actually go anywhere, it will do so on Russia's terms. Moscow is not only the senior partner in terms of economic, population, political and military heft, but it also subsidizes Belarus' energy consumption and overall economic well-being.
In the arena of domestic politics, Putin's plan is a masterstroke. The president's bold pro-Western policies have stirred significant resentment in Russia from nationalists, and there are concerns that a red-brown (Communist and nationalist) coalition might be able to challenge Putin and his Unity party in parliamentary and presidential elections in 2003 and 2004.
On the whole, Russians would jump at the chance to expand their country; most still feel the old Soviet borders are Moscow's natural right. Therefore, even talk alone of annexing Belarus could be sufficient to guarantee Putin and Unity's success at the polls. It also will boost the president's credibility while he pushes for controversial -- and painful -- economic reforms to ensure Russia's accession into the World Trade Organization.
Discussion of a merger also would prove popular abroad. Europe is critical of Belarus' shoddy human rights record, and the country has almost been kicked out of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development due to policies that practically suffocate the private sector. Washington fumes at Minsk's ties to Baghdad, and its closest neighbors complain of everything from unpaid energy bills to archaic customs procedures.
Even the mechanics of preparing for an annexation of Belarus could reinforce Putin's position. Constitutional revisions would be required that the canny Putin would almost certainly use to correct a wide array of flaws within the existing constitution and to tinker with an equally large number of other provisions. Examples include strengthening the role of the federal government verses the regions, unifying presidential control over Russia's various as-yet-unprivatized corporations or formally turning developing economic reforms into constitutional law.
But for Lukashenko, the future is much less certain. Putin is already maneuvering to discredit and oust the Belarusian president. Now he has figured out a way to do so that will keep Russia united behind that goal. Lukashenko's foreign policy ever since his inauguration has been simply loyalty to Russia. Both he and Belarus have no other friends or power groups to whom they can look for assistance now that Putin has turned on them, leaving Lukashenko in political limbo, where the only bright spot is the exit sign. |
