Worth reading is the text of the July 1998 report from the IAEA to the UN concerning nuclear monitoring.
fas.org
These points are IMO the worthwhile ones:
35. As previously recorded, there are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance, nor any indication Iraq has acquired or produced weapon-usable nuclear material other than the nuclear material verified by IAEA and removed from Iraq in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991).
36. Although there are no indications of Iraq having achieved its programme's goal of producing nuclear weapons, it is clear that Iraq had made significant progress in weaponization technologies before April 1991. It is also clear that there remains in Iraq a considerable intellectual resource in the form of the cadre of well-educated, highly experienced personnel who were employed in Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme.
37. The progress report of 8 October 1997 to the Security Council (S/1997/779) recorded that some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical verification process that aims to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or activities. This inherent uncertainty is compounded by Iraq's lack of full transparency in the provision of information, which has resulted in uncertainties regarding the extent of external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme and Iraq's actual achievements in some aspects of that programme.
38. This uncertainty, discussed in paragraphs 7 to 10 above, is factored into the IAEA OMV plan, which takes fully into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding the production of weapon-usable nuclear material, and is predicated on the assumption that Iraq has the knowledge and the technical capability to exploit, for nuclear weapons purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may gain access in the future.
39. While no indications of the current existence of proscribed equipment or materials in Iraq have been found, IAEA, despite its extensive inspection activities, cannot, for the reasons previously described, provide absolute assurance of the absence of readily concealable items, such as components of centrifuge machines or copies of weapon-related documentation. Similarly, it should be recognized that OMV measures cannot guarantee detection of readily concealable or disguisable proscribed activities, such as computer-based weaponization studies or small-scale centrifuge cascade development. Furthermore, Iraq's direct acquisition of weapon-usable nuclear material would present a severe technical challenge to OMV measures and great reliance must be placed on international controls.
40. In order to further strengthen the overall capability of its OMV plan, IAEA is currently in the process of expanding and consolidating a number of its activities into a wide-area environmental monitoring programme.
41. Effective ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, as required by resolution 687 (1991), must be comprehensive and rigorous and, as a result, is intrusive. The effectiveness of the implementation of the IAEA OMV plan is critically dependent upon the full exercise of the rights of access enshrined in the plan. Any diminution of, or interference with, those rights would greatly reduce the value of the assurance provided through its implementation.
42. With regard to the responses provided by Iraq to the remaining questions and concerns about its clandestine nuclear programme, IAEA holds no evidence to confirm or refute that Iraq did not take advantage of any offers of external assistance to its clandestine nuclear programme other than that recorded in its Full, Final and Complete Declaration or that no other relevant documentation exists to support Iraq's stated abandonment of its clandestine nuclear programme, its timing and modalities. |
