CHECK THIS 1996 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HAASS
  "On balance, Saddam gained more than he lost. Indeed, September 1996 was Saddam's best month since March of 1991 when he was able to put down the Shia and Kurdish uprisings and deflect opposition stemming from his catastrophic handling of the Gulf War. To some extent, these gains were the inevitable consequence of Kurdish infighting and the opportunity it created. But U.S. foreign policy also contributed.
  Several things could and should have been done differently. The first was coalition maintenance. The anti-Saddam consensus had been allowed to weaken. In diplomacy, neglect is almost never benign. The United States did precious little during the past few years to keep the coalition intact and robust.
  I'm sorry but are you this naive? This is exactly what I am talking about........to keep a group as disparate as this so called coalition was is an absolute exercise in futility.  Its why I would never have gone for a short sighted weapons inspection agreement. You wanted the Saddam problem solved, you took him out in 1991, not ten years later. 
   The policy of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran gave us a slogan when what we needed was a strategy and sustained efforts to implement it. This applies to Turkey, the Arab governments, the Europeans, and Russia. Furthermore, the lack of U.S. reaction to Turkish and Iranian incursions into northern Iraq only increased Saddam's incentive to act at the same time it increased the odds that a move on his part would be accepted by his Arab neighbors. 
  The problem with the US is that it changes allegiances as fast as a who' changes hair color. We gave arms to the same Afghans we attack 20 years later. We covertly support Iraq against Iran when it suits our purposes. We love the Saudis even though they have a repressive gov't and would quickly change our tune if they cut off their oil. We have turned convenient diplomacy into an art form. Why would anyone respect a coalition we put together.
  The second principal error involved the use of force. The U.S. action--using cruise missiles to destroy a number of Iraqi air defense sites--was too small and too remote. To be sure, there was coalition resistance to using military force against Saddam at this time, a view that reflected a lack of sympathy for the Kurds and concern over Iranian behavior. But the United States will only have a limited number of occasions to use force against Iraq and it must make the most of them--even if it means placing U.S. pilots at some risk or causing some collateral, that is, unintended, damage to people and sites in Iraq. Despite these setbacks, it would be wrong to conclude that the U.S. position is irretrievably damaged. The weakness of the coalition in responding to Saddam's actions inside his country should not be interpreted as its demise. A good deal of consensus continues to exist, enough so that keeping the sanctions in place and preventing Iraq from again becoming a strategic threat to its neighbors should be possible. "
  Aaaaaahhh, now the truth comes out..........it was the coalition that convinced Bush Sr. not to take out Saddam. You want to blame the people in this country when they had little say.........Bush Sr. caved to coalition opposition.
  These are brief, but telling examples of "what is different".
  Telling what..........Bush Sr. was the consummate politico who was afraid to rile "the coalition"? Well, at least we know now why Saddam is still in power.
  Bush Sr.'s popularity at the time was running high.....not as high as Bush Jr. but high.
  Actually, Bush 41's popularity was far higher than that of Bush 43. 
  Check your sources...........when Bush Jr's popularity was at 90%, he was the most popular president since WW II, I think. However, his father's popularity was high and confirms what I said earlier..........it wasn't this country's affirmation he needed to take out Saddam, it was the coaliton's.
   
     
       Enter symbols or keywords for search:        QuotesStock TalkChartsNewsPeople   Symbol Lookup Subject Titles Only Full Text      Go to Top     
  Terms of Use
  Got a comment, question or suggestion? Contact Silicon Investor. |