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Afghanistan: U.S. Planners Facing Stark Choices
20 August 2002
Summary
Top U.S. officials continue to emphasize that the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan will be a long one. As the difficulties of maintaining a stable Afghanistan grow clearer by the day, strategic planners may be left with two choices: either increase the U.S. presence to back the current Afghan government, or look for more creative solutions, such as a formal balkanization of the country.
Analysis
Top U.S. officials over the past few weeks have stated repeatedly that American forces will remain in Afghanistan for a long time. Both Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, have said such a presence will remain important, and Rumsfeld recently added that the priority in Afghanistan was shifting from hunting remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban to strengthening and supporting the new Afghan government.
Although the short-term goal of tracking down al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden requires a certain amount of cooperation in Afghanistan, the broader U.S. mission -- preventing the country from reverting to a haven for al Qaeda or other anti-U.S. militant groups -- requires the United States to ensure Afghanistan's long-term stability.
Yet as the ethnic rivalries, drug trade and arms proliferation increasingly reveal the difficulties inherent in Washington's long-term goals, U.S. policymakers will be faced with a stark choice. They could continue to back a not-altogether-popular central government by supplying money, food and military personnel -- and risk being drawn ever deeper into Afghanistan's age-old internal conflicts -- or they could look for a more creative solution, such as formal balkanization.
Rumsfeld recently emphasized the need for stability, calling the support of the fledgling Afghan government the priority of the international community and urging international donors to make good on promises of aid to Kabul. But nation building has rarely been seen as an American strong suit, and in Afghanistan the difficulties of such a task are growing more apparent by the day.
There have been numerous skirmishes in recent weeks between U.S. and suspected al Qaeda and Taliban forces, coming after reports that al Qaeda and Taliban tactical commanders were shifting their focus away from the government of Hamid Karzai and more toward attacking U.S. and coalition forces. But Afghan forces have not remained outside the fray as regional ethnic and clan rivalries resurface across the country.
The government in Kabul has made little headway in reining in various warlords or disarming the civilian population. This task has been made even more difficult by the delicate relations U.S. forces have maintained with many warlords, whose support -- and weapons -- are valuable in the ongoing al Qaeda hunt. BBC recently reported that a senior U.S. military commander in Kabul said many of the warlords could not be disarmed as long as the war against terrorism was still going on.
Ethnic conflicts continue to strain the central government itself as well, with numerous reports of tensions among top national leaders. Most recently, Tajik Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim held a press conference Aug. 17 to deny rumors of a rift between him and the Pushtun Karzai, the New York Times reported.
In addition, a U.N. agriculture expert told Agence France-Presse over the weekend that recent rains in Afghanistan will cause a bumper opium poppy crop this year, with 60,000 hectares of opium already being harvested and another 23,000 hectares being planted. The potential profits from this boom will exacerbate the country's internal rifts even further. The U.S. military has vowed to stay out of crop eradication programs, despite concern in Washington that drug profits will continue to fund al Qaeda at worst or internal ethnic conflicts at best.
The Karzai government's tenuous hold on central power has drawn U.S. attention, with Washington announcing that U.S. soldiers would replace Karzai's mainly Tajik Afghan bodyguards after the assassination of one of his vice presidents, Abdul Qadir, July 6. Although U.S. military and government officials try to put a bright face on the situation, the fulfillment of the two key goals of U.S. forces in Afghanistan -- hunting al Qaeda and stabilizing the government -- require a more clear-cut strategy.
On one hand, Washington can continue to back the Karzai government. But Karzai has limited popularity, being seen both as a Tajik or a U.S. tool by his fellow Pushtuns and as weak by Tajiks and others. Despite serious warnings, he has been unable to demonstrate his strength in showdowns with warlords in the eastern provinces.
Such weakness has most clearly been seen in the refusal of Pushtun warlord Pacha Khan Zadran to surrender to the government after twice trying to recapture the capital of Paktia province by force. The central government replaced Khan as governor of the province earlier this year due to pressure from local tribal leaders.
Even if Karzai did try to launch a force against such rebellious warlords, it could counter Washington's near-term interests in maintaining close ties with local ethnic leaders who assist in the search for al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.
But if the United States decided to firmly back the Karzai government, it would likely find itself slipping deeper and deeper into internal Afghan rivalries -- and with the Karzai government possessing only the rudiments of a military, U.S. forces may be called upon to provide more than a bodyguard detail for the president. The intense involvement in settling decades-old, if not centuries-old, internal conflicts and trying to exert a single centralized government over Afghanistan could leave Washington in the same position in which the British or the Russians once found themselves in the Central Asian state.
The alternative, though not necessarily the first choice for those concerned about the international impression, is to accept the internal divisions in Afghanistan and reshape the nation's future through them. Washington's tactical goals in the anti-terrorism war and its strategic goal of preventing any group from ever again using Afghanistan as a safe haven often come into conflict because U.S. and international forces continue to work with local warlords separately from the central government.
But by ignoring the central authority, Washington may strike several smaller deals with regional leaders. Such a balkanization of Afghanistan along ethnic and clan lines could keep the country from falling into chaos without requiring a significant military commitment. Similar to the current situation in Bosnia, operations in Afghanistan would be focused more on keeping the individual enclaves from fighting one another. This strategy has been somewhat successful in stabilizing Bosnia.
But this is not an altogether politically viable option, as Washington's intervention in Afghanistan would be portrayed as the dismemberment of the country and could eventually lead to a backlash from the individual regional leaders or other Islamic nations.
With the security situation in Afghanistan growing more tenuous by the day, Washington will risk a meltdown in the country if it continues to delay rectifying its tactical and strategic operations. Further U.S. support for Karzai's government is the most likely option, but it is one that may require more and more direct U.S. involvement, dragging Washington deeper into the swamp. |
