And this is how the "dangerous and no fun" mess spreads ...
stratfor.com
Afghanistan's Pacification Proving Impossible
20 August 2002
Summary
A top U.S. military official recently said that al Qaeda continues to operate in Pakistan, prompting a rebuke from Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf that such a threat is greater in Afghanistan. Musharraf is worried about his position and wants Afghanistan to be pacified, but it is not clear that the United States can do this.
Analysis
With attention currently riveted on Iraq, it is easy to forget that the Afghan-Pakistani region remains far from pacified. A few days ago, two U.S. special operations soldiers were wounded while gathering intelligence in central Afghanistan, indicating that forces hostile to the United States are continuing with at least low-intensity attacks.
The basic dynamic of the region has remained intact since the end of Operation Anaconda in March. The United States still is dependent on forces controlled by regional warlords to maintain territorial control, with U.S. soldiers being reserved for operations against al Qaeda forces.
The authority of Afghan President Hamid Karzai's regime is minimal at best. The frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan remains porous. And the ability of the Pakistani government to exert control in these regions also is still low.
The frustrations and tensions inherent in this situation showed themselves when Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill, commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, told Agence France-Press that al Qaeda continues to operate in the tribal areas of Pakistan along the frontier.
"I think in Afghanistan they probably still exist, they could number in the hundreds. I think just outside Afghanistan's borders … their numbers could be in the hundreds, maybe even a thousand," McNeill said, although he added that he had no substantive information to back up his figures.
McNeill's motive in making the statements seems odd, except that he complained that coalition forces did not have the right to conduct operations inside of Pakistan. Although U.S. intelligence has in fact operated inside of Pakistan, McNeill's complaint generally was accurate in the respect that major deployments inside that country are not permitted.
All of this points to the core unsettled issue in the region: Al Qaeda forces retain sanctuary in Pakistan, and pressing the Pakistani government to permit U.S. operations inside of the country is an explosive issue, dangerous to President Pervez Musharraf's survival.
By the weekend, a tribal gathering of the Afridis tribe in the Barrar Khyber district had assembled to protest McNeill's charges. The group's leader said, "We by ourselves will punish al Qaeda if we find them; we do not need America in our territory." Pakistani army spokesman Maj. Gen. Rashid Qureshi later added that "when people say (the tribal people) have sympathy for al Qaeda, it's not 100 percent true."
In short, whatever the sympathies of the Afridis and other tribes may be, they do not want American forces there, but they are not likely to deal with al Qaeda themselves. The Pakistanis are unlikely to move, and therefore the region is in a kind of stalemate. Musharraf fired back at McNeill's statement by telling Agence France-Presse that al Qaeda and Taliban forces are regrouping in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan, because the Afghan government is unable to exercise control over its own territory.
Musharraf in effect told McNeill that he should worry less about the Pakistani side of the border and more about his own area of responsibility on the Afghan side. The president has reasons to be concerned.
Three men are on trial for plotting to kill Musharraf, and the Pakistani press has reported that there was another attempt on his life at the Chaklala air force base in early August, resulting in the deaths of several soldiers. He has been canceling trips and appearances and is under extremely heavy guard. From his point of view, he has risked a great deal -- including his life -- by cooperating with the United States, and Washington has endangered his position by failing to take effective control of Afghanistan.
The American position in Afghanistan became more complicated over the weekend, as major media, including Newsweek, reported alleged massacres of Taliban prisoners by the Northern Alliance and ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum's forces.
It may turn out that some U.S. personnel might have been aware that the massacres had taken or were taking place. The United States was entirely dependent on the Northern Alliance and Dostum in particular and was not in a position to control, let alone punish him. War makes nasty allies.
It is not clear whether the stories that are breaking will help or hurt the American position. Dostum is despised by many Afghans for similar actions in the past, and cracking down on him may unify the country. This will not be easy however, and having a new civil war break out, with human rights groups demanding that coalition forces arrest Dostum, is not going to simplify life on the Afghan side of the border.
The root of all of this chaos lies in the fact that the United States cannot devote sufficient force to Afghanistan to pacify the country. It is not clear that anyone has enough force to do this. Therefore, although the Taliban has been dislodged, there are plenty of vacuums and possibilities for alliances to help the Taliban and al Qaeda re-emerge.
The Pakistanis have gone as far as they can on their side of the border without triggering chaos there. They see no reason to risk more until they see Washington getting traction in Afghanistan. The Americans feel they can't do this unless they are allowed to carry out cross-border operations. The Pakistanis want the Americans to carry out operations on their side of the border before they get more ambitious. In short, it's a mess. |
