I found an interesting den beste quote on America's relationship with Europe:
I wrote a few days ago discussing arguments being made in many quarters to the effect that a side effect of current American foreign policy is to alienate the Europeans. Brent Scowcroft, for instance, argued that this was fatal and that we couldn't win this war without them. In response I argued that I hadn't actually seen any legitimate explanation of just why we actually needed enthusiastic support, or indeed any support at all, from anyone in order to fight this war in the short term.
In reaction to that, both online and via email, several people have made essentially the same argument: that what we choose to do now will be remembered by the Europeans, that it will affect our relationship with them in the negative, and that in the long run we'll come to regret it when we discover we need them, sometime in the future, for one reason or another, because they'll then take the opportunity to screw us in retaliation, or variations on that theme. Jay Mazumdar was one such, online. I responded to him that I felt that in the long run most international relations was based on utilitarian motives and enlightened self interest, and that when it really mattered, the Europeans wouldn't do such things because it would hurt them as badly as it hurt us.
Having said that, I'd like to examine this entire argument on a deeper level. When you take the paint job off it and examine its structure, it turns out to be the "root causes" argument again. We have free will, they don't. We think, they react. We make decisions, they are a preprogrammed bag of responses to our decisions. We bear ethical responsibility for what we decide to do; and we also bear ethical responsibility for what they do because it is wholly determined by what we decide to do.
Thus if anything bad happens it is our fault and the onus is entirely on us to change to correct it.
I didn't buy that argument when it was applied to Islamic Fundamentalists flying jets into our buildings, and I don't buy it now with respect to our relationship with the Europeans.
What's notably missing from every version of this argument when I've seen it is any mention of the fact that we as Americans also will remember and react to what they do, and that their behavior will also affect that long term relationship. (The reason, of course, is that the "root cause" of their behavior towards us is something previous that we did. So it's still all our fault.)
But if this argument makes any sense at all, it only makes sense if it's applied symmetrically. A relationship is a two way street, and accommodation and compromise has to be made by both sides. But somehow no one ever seems to ask Europe to make any for us.
denbeste.nu
I have a feeling that the answer to den beste's point will involve the relative power imbalance between America and Europe. But the trouble with the argument is that the power imbalance is used as a substitute for describing the behavior of the parties, not as a context for it. Even the less powerful partner has a range of options. The Europeans may not have the power to stop us, but they do have the power to make a reasoned response to our initiatives, and listen to our motives, not just complain.
I have been struck with the parallels between the America-Europe arguments and the Israel-Palestine arguments, such as Tony Judt's argument that because Israel has a state and an army, it is responsible for resolving the current Mideast impasse. To maintain that argument in the face of Palestinian radicalism and terrorism, with no behavioral requirements on the Palestinian side at all, none!, is a version of "We make decisions, they are a preprogrammed bag of responses to our decisions. We bear ethical responsibility for what we decide to do; and we also bear ethical responsibility for what they do because it is wholly determined by what we decide to do." Like den beste, I don't buy it.
Furthermore, such reasoning, if enforced, ensures the radicalism it purports to deplore, by removing its natural costs -- the chances of getting really clobbered by the more powerful entity. With risks reduced, what politician will not prefer to sell his people beautiful tales of victory without compromise, rather than the hard and painful necessities occasioned by what can and cannot be achieved between nations? |
