Hi DJ, just checked out the URL you pointed to np-plitvice.tel.hr
Beautiful!
Meantime, in other parts of the world, brewing troubles may make the world a less safe place as the policeman gets too busy. Closing of borders and strategic retreat, should they happen, will mean bad juju for financial markets:
stratfor.com
U.S. Forces Numbers May Not Match Washington's Ambitions
6 September 2002
Summary
Some U.S. officials reportedly are suggesting that Special Operations troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan and used elsewhere. Such a decision would only contribute to the destabilization there, but the real problem for Washington is that its military resources could be spread increasingly thin in the global war on terrorism, while its priorities do not seem to be clearly set and major war targets have not yet been achieved.
Analysis
The New York Times reported earlier this week that some senior U.S. officers in the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) recently suggested that their forces be freed from hunting Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. These officers believe bin Laden was killed during the bombing of the Tora Bora cave complex last year.
But there is still no proof that bin Laden is dead, and with Afghan resistance on the rise, a withdrawal of the most elite U.S. units from Afghanistan would only worsen the military situation on the ground there. So far at least Washington appears committed to keeping the forces there. But as pressure grows on the military to deploy these forces elsewhere, Washington in the future could have to spread its resources dangerously thin, especially if faced with a war in Iraq and increasing instability in Afghanistan at the same time.
The JSOC officers have justified their stance by saying that their hunt for bin Laden may well be pointless, although they admit that they have no hard forensic evidence to prove he was killed. Other military and intelligence officials in the United States and abroad strongly argue that it is too early to make any judgments about the al Qaeda leader's fate.
For example, on Sept. 5 a senior official in Germany's foreign intelligence service (BND) said, "According to the information we have, we believe that bin Laden and most of those in the immediate al Qaeda leadership are still alive," Berliner Zeitung daily reported. The BND is well respected by its allies for its ability to pick up human intelligence, and it has maintained a network of agents in Afghanistan since World War II.
Regardless of whether bin Laden is dead or alive, Afghanistan is full of forces that are determined to push American and other foreign troops out of the country. Among these are al Qaeda elements, armed followers of other international radical Islamic groups, Taliban fighters and Pushtun tribal warriors from both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Their numbers are on the rise, with some non-Pushtun tribes also considering joining the anti-U.S. flight. On Sept. 2, for example, a new group calling itself the Secret Army of Mujahideen said it had carried out 21 separate attacks against the U.S. military this summer, The Times of India reports.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a powerful warlord who was the most feared mujahideen commander during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, has also renewed his calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, BBC reported Sept. 3. The Afghan turmoil continues to impact its neighbors, with sweeps by both U.S. and Pakistani troops continuing for Taliban and al Qaeda forces on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border.
The anti-U.S. forces in Afghanistan also seem to be uniting their forces and rapidly increasing their attacks, with Afghan sources confirming that the Taliban have sealed a partnership with militant group Hezb-i-Islami. Two car bombings in central Kabul and an assassination attempt on Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai Sept. 5 seem to be well-coordinated attacks.
In these conditions, a withdrawal of Special Operations troops would only worsen the military situation on the ground. Even if bin Laden is dead or out of the country, there are several top ranking leaders planning and executing an anti-U.S. resistance in Afghanistan.
The JSOC's colleagues in the Afghan operations -- CIA paramilitary units -- would be even less likely to achieve any results in the hunt for bin Laden and al Qaeda if left alone. The 82nd Airborne Division and other forces have been trained and skilled in other kinds of combat operations, but have little of the training and experience needed for hunting groups like al Qaeda.
Without Special Operations forces, the U.S. command in Afghanistan would have to change its tactics. The American forces would have to conduct frequent and exhaustive sweeping operations involving larger amounts of troops. That would highly increase the exposure of the U.S. soldiers to enemy fire and ambushes, and the number of U.S. casualties could rise much faster.
The last example of a large operation of this kind was Operation Anaconda last February, when several U.S. soldiers were killed during the first day because of the ambush tactics of the mujahideen. The next day, the U.S. command had to start relying on air, missile and artillery bombing. No major Afghan operation has been conducted since then. A withdrawal of Special Operations troops could make the U.S. command in Afghanistan resort to large operations again.
But the U.S. government is faced with a dilemma given that it also needs Special Operations forces elsewhere. In plans to attack Iraq, Washington would have to deploy the most elite Special Operations units to destroy suspected Iraqi launching pads for missiles, long-range artillery batteries, and important command and control centers and communication facilities. Such forces would also have to secure control over suspected facilities for making weapons of mass destruction. These units would also likely to be used to hunt down Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants.
On the al Qaeda front, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently said he wants to use Special Operations troops anywhere in the world where U.S. and allied intelligence will be able to identify the presence of al Qaeda or other terrorist rings. Such a mission, even if not coupled with an Iraq war, would probably require at least 10 times the number of Special Operations troops the United States has now.
Of the nearly 46,000 personnel in Special Operations forces, only between 7,000 and 8,000 of them belong to combat units such as Army Rangers, Delta Force, Navy Seals and Air Force Special Operations units. Furthermore, of this group only about 1,000 are designated for counterterrorism missions and constitute front-line teams fully suited to fighting al Qaeda, according to the officers interviewed by The New York Times.
This is one example of Washington running short of key resources as the war spreads globally. It takes years to train Special Operations soldiers, and their current numbers are not enough to accomplish all the missions Washington may soon want. As with logistics and other issues, the problem with the shortage of these troops likely will interfere with the Bush administration's goal to achieve a major breakthrough in its global war efforts in near future.
stratfor.com
Chaos and Neglect Dominate U.S. Agenda in Latin America
5 September 2002
Summary
Latin America still has not assumed high priority on the Bush administration's radar, despite previous pledges the president has made. Disorganization and confusion within the White House's Latin America team have left leaders in the region wondering who is in charge.
Analysis
U.S. President George W. Bush pledged repeatedly before and after the 2000 presidential elections that Latin America would be a top foreign policy priority during his administration. However, 19 months into Bush's presidency, the region still occupies a low niche on the U.S. administration's agenda.
Worse, most governments there are not even certain of exactly who is running the shop on Latin America policy in Washington. As a result, U.S. influence and credibility throughout the region have withered considerably in recent months.
Changes in Washington's foreign policy agenda after Sept. 11 made defending the U.S. homeland and locating and eradicating al Qaeda more important than Latin American policy issues for the remainder of Bush's first four years. But even before then, it was increasingly evident to many Latin American political leaders and investors that the only regional head of state with good personal access to Bush was Mexican President Vicente Fox.
And even Mexico's seeming importance to the Bush administration has appeared to evaporate, as the collapse of the World Trade Center also killed any chance for a bilateral immigration agreement that would have legalized the status of some 5 million Mexican citizens who live and work in the United States without legal residency documents.
Bush has pointed often to his Texas business roots and the marriage of his brother, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, to a citizen of Mexico to stress his strong interest in Latin American issues. However, it is nearly impossible to advance a coherent Latin America foreign policy -- with clear-cut objectives -- when the Cabinet-level officials tasked to such an assignment appear to have no interest in the region, and the individuals working on Latin America policy issues at middle and lower levels in the Bush administration seem to be working at cross-purposes and without true support from their bosses.
Moreover, Bush, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell may share most of the blame for the current confusion in the U.S. administration's Latin America policy. According to congressional and administration sources, Bush started out on the wrong foot within hours of his inauguration when he made Ambassador John Maisto, a career foreign services officer who previously had served in Nicaragua and later Venezuela, the senior Latin America adviser at the National Security Council.
Sources said Maisto was and is philosophically more attuned to the Latin America policy concerns of former President Bill Clinton's administration than to the more conservative policies the Bush administration wishes to advance in the region.
Bush subsequently nominated Otto J. Reich, also a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, to head the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. Reich's nomination in 2001 immediately sparked very strong opposition from Senate Democrats, chiefly led by Sen. Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.), who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. Dodd has alleged for more than a decade that Reich was involved in what became the Iran-Contra scandal and spread disinformation about the U.S. military role in Nicaragua in the 1980s.
Dodd and Foreign Relations Committee chairman Sen. Joseph R. Biden (D-Del.) in effect denied Reich even the opportunity for a hearing on his nomination. After a nearly yearlong delay, Bush used his executive authority to grant Reich a congressional recess appointment, which legally means he can serve only until the end of 2002, unless Bush decides to grant Reich another congressional recess appointment next December.
As a result, during the first year of the Bush presidency, Maisto was the only senior Latin America policy adviser in the administration. However, his appointment to the NSC -- whose advisers have no direct input in actually mapping and executing foreign policy carried out by the State Department -- shut down any chance for the Bush administration to advance a coherent Latin America policy, according to congressional sources.
Unlike Clinton, Bush also did not appoint a special presidential envoy to Latin America, a role that Clinton's longtime adviser Thomas "Mack" McLarty carried for several years. Although McLarty had no real policymaking influence in that role, his official status as a presidential envoy gave him political clout and legitimacy across Latin America that both Maisto and Reich do not have, according to Latin American diplomatic sources in Washington. It also persuaded Latin American leaders that Clinton did care about the region.
They add that Maisto is viewed as a career foreign services officer "lightweight" who is overdue for retirement, while Reich is widely perceived regionally as lacking the vital political legitimacy that would be bestowed by a formal Senate confirmation of his appointment. However, Dodd has vowed that Reich will never be granted a confirmation hearing while Democrats control the Senate.
After his congressional recess appointment in December 2001, Reich was still putting together his team when Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was briefly topped from power in mid-April. Congressional critics of Reich immediately accused the Bush administration of playing a role in the coup, an assumption that Chavez fueled in multiple interviews with international news media like CNN. Moreover, Dodd immediately announced an investigation to determine what role, if any, Reich and other senior administration officials might have played in the political crisis.
An official U.S. investigation subsequently concluded that there was no involvement by any Bush administration personnel, and Dodd apparently has abandoned notions of holding hearings on the issue. However, the political damage this caused Reich and his team may be irreparable, according to U.S. congressional and Latin American diplomatic sources.
Without an influential guiding hand for Latin America policy in the Bush administration, and without any indications of Cabinet-level interest and support by key officials like Rice and Powell, different agencies and officials in the administration have been managing multiple issues in the region. While it is not unusual for different U.S. federal agencies, such as the State and Treasury departments, to have their hands in some aspects of Latin America policy, the Bush administration's execution of foreign policy in the region so far has been more confused than coherent. |
