Imagining the Worst-Case Scenario in Iraq
The New York Times
September 12, 2002
"All our presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, accepted the
principle of avoiding a war that might wreck the planet. Mr. Bush is the
first to question this principle…"
By MILTON VIORST
WASHINGTON
Like most Americans, I've reflected this week on the personal impact of the
tragedy of Sept. 11, recalling most vividly the trauma of
emptiness I felt in the pit of my stomach as I watched the towers
of the World Trade Center vanish from my television screen. The feeling still
periodically recurs. In a flash, the inconceivable had become real,
the horror of the unbelievable had become part of my and every American's
existence.
During the cold war, the futurists who studied world conflict had devised
a clever name for such an event: the "worst-case scenario." Implied
in this phrase, however, was the sense that the event was unlikely to happen.
Government and policy professionals hypothesized less severe
outcomes, dismissing the doomsayers. But on Sept. 11 we all
learned that even disasters can be of an unexpected magnitude. Forthrightness
now demands that we gird not for some tepid end to our conflicts but for catastrophes
hitherto unimaginable.
In preparing for a war against Iraq, President Bush urges us to
overlook that lesson. Categorizing Saddam Hussein as "evil," he warns that the
Iraqis have nuclear, chemical and biological weapons with which to attack us.
Mr. Bush's concern is justified, though some responsible
statesmen at home and abroad believe he overstates the danger.
But in suggesting that our forces will dispose of Saddam Hussein in a war
that is quick and painless, like the Persian Gulf war or the war in Afghanistan,
the president is clearly choosing not to consider the worst-case scenario at all.
Mr. Bush asserts a new doctrine for America, the right of preemptive attack,
to keep Saddam Hussein from using his weapons. Preemption,
Mr. Bush tells us, is what the proposed war is all about. But the doctrine
does not take Saddam Hussein's own efforts at pre-emption into
account; it assumes that he will wait around for America to attack at its convenience.
Surely Saddam Hussein will not repeat the strategic mistake he made
after swallowing Kuwait in 1990 when, in choosing not to invade Saudi
Arabia, he allowed half a million allied troops to assemble over several
months time for invasion. Saudi Arabia is hardly less vulnerable now.
By moving into Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein would shift the battlefield
far to the south, imposing on American forces a much heavier
burden than just the capture of Baghdad. We should also recall that in the
last war Saddam Hussein blew up almost all of Kuwait's oil wells;
in the next he could blow up Saudi Arabian wells, with significant repercussions
for the international economy.
That's one scenario. Another is that Saddam Hussein, prior to an American
attack, goes after Israel with the chemical or biological weapons that
Mr. Bush says Iraq possesses. Israel , if it survives, will retaliate,
perhaps even with nuclear weapons. Such retaliation might indeed bring
about the "regime change" Mr. Bush seeks, but it would not end the story.
Just over the horizon lies Pakistan, a Muslim country armed with
nuclear weapons and permeated by extremists. Pervez Musharraf, its
president, has joined America's war on terrorism but he is unlikely to survive
politically should there be a nuclear attack by an American ally
on Iraq's Muslims. Islamists, overthrowing him, would take control
of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal; lacking the ability to launch missiles that
would reach Israel, they would turn on India, their more proximate enemy.
A nuclear attack would set off global chaos.
Before Sept. 11, I probably would not have written the above lines.
I have covered the Middle East conflict as a journalist for several decades,
but I would have considered such scenarios fantasy, if not madness.
Now they seem to me at least plausible.
The responsibility of America's leadership is to prevent the plausible from
becoming reality. The cold war is a useful precedent. Saddam
Hussein's power, and perhaps his evil too, pale next to that of Stalin.
Yet even when we had clear military superiority over Stalin we chose not
to attack him.
All our presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, accepted the principle
of avoiding a war that might wreck the planet. Mr. Bush is the
first to question this principle, and his resolve is bolstered by
Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, both of
whom close their eyes to the potential ramifications of a war with Iraq.
Iraq, as a highly centralized tyranny dedicated to its own preservation,
is not that different from the old Soviet Union, and it is no
coincidence that the same deterrence that restrained the Kremlin has
kept Iraq in line for a decade. The Soviet Union's ultimate fall with
barely a whimper vindicated America's patience, and in time Saddam
Hussein too will vanish. Is not Sept. 11 a compelling reminder that the
steadfast vigilance exercised by our leaders for a half-century of cold war
is wiser than rushing toward a worst-case outcome?
Milton Viorst is author of the forthcoming "What Shall I Do With This People: Jews and the Fractious Politics of Judaism."
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