>> Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program
September 20 2002
STATEMENT OF
DR. KHIDHIR HAMZA
DIRECTOR, COUNCIL ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS
NEW YORK, NY
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 19, 2002
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members,
I will comment briefly on two points.
1) The status, goals, and extent of Iraqs WMD programs specifically the
nuclear. And
2) How Iraq acquired the technology necessary to sustain these
programs.
The Status, Goals, and extent of Iraqs nuclear weapon program.
I believe that the testimony of Richard Spertzel and David Kay covers well
the biological weapons and the nuclear weapons angles. However I wish to
add some observations relevant to the nuclear weapons program and the
Iraqi system in dealing with weapons in general.
The nuclear weapons program is now almost complete waiting for the
enrichment sector, which makes 90% of the program to finish its job and
put together a working production facility. The bottlenecks in the
enrichment are already resolved. German sources provided Iraq with
classified reports and a working unit in the centrifuge enrichment
technology. This can reduce the time needed for research and
development for a country like Iraq by at least ten years. The whole
centrifuge technology was acquired for a little over a million dollars. This
included state of the art carbon fiber cylinders. The recent announcement
of interception of large orders for aluminum cylinders indicate that the
process of putting together large enough units for full production is not
complete yet. At the same time it also indicates that Iraq has already
bypassed the initial testing and possibly pilot plant stage. Also Iraq
always use duplicate sourcing of materials and supplies which may mean
that it is already in possession of enough materials for a small scale
production facility. My estimate is that Iraq may be in actual production in
two years with enough accumulated product for two to three nuclear
weapons in three years. The problem however remains that we are dealing
with a series of indicators but no first hand witness. This I will deal with
later in this statement.
Iraq never seriously attempted to acquire nuclear fissile materials from
outside sources by smuggling or other means. Though this may have
changed since I left in 1994 but my belief is that this is a serious program,
and is designed to turn Iraq into a nuclear power with credible nuclear
force and as such systematic build-up of its capability was embarked on
for over twenty years with no change of goals or purpose. This make it one
of the most intensive single-minded objectives of the Iraqi regime. It dwarfs
many times over both the BW and CW programs combined. By the time I
left hiring was intensive especially among college graduates in engineering
and science. A program declared publicly by Saddam created a series of
graduate groups trained in nuclear and other weapon technologies
dedicated to working in the program after graduation. This step among
others turns the university system which is forced to award degrees based
on classified research unseen by its faculties into an integral part of the
Iraqi WMD industry. On the other hand Atomic Energy Establishment
(AEE) teams were turned into civilian contracting entities that actually
engage in contract work for the civilian sector. They helped rebuild Iraqs
civilian infrastructure including power stations, oil refineries and telephone
exchanges. This achieved two purposes. On the one hand Iraq can, and
did claim that these are now civilian sector entities unrelated to the WMD
program. On the other hand by working with other government
establishments they can incorporate the best of these establishments into
their work. There were complaints from the various sectors that AEE took
away so many of their engineers that they had a hard time getting their
work done. Even important sectors such as oil and power generation were
not immune. One result of this is the unavailability of scientists and
engineers that the Iraqi government can claim to be transferred from the
military industry and as such not available to the inspectors. Also it
means that Iraq has integrated its WMD into its civilian sector turning Iraq
into one giant WMD factory.
I wish to point here that Dr. Spertzels hunch about the role of Iraqs
intelligence agency the Mukhabarat in the WMD program is right.
Iraqs BW program was started under an organization created by
Mukhabarat called al-Hazen. In 1985 as an advisor to AEE I was asked to
visit al-Hazen to check on their computer work and see if they need help
in setting up their computer network. I was familiar with the early phase of
al-Hazen and its late director Merwan al-Sateda. A Palestinian with
Yasser Arafat connections he was a fellow physicist. The center started
as a military research and development organization that have extensive
cooperation with the U. of Arizona. It was run by the Iraqi Mukhabarat and
as such was independent of any oversight by other government organs
such as the Ministry of Finance. Later after being accused of pilfering 20
million dollars Merwan was jailed and later killed by Saddam and the
center dissolved to be opened later with a new mission: development of
Iraqs BW program.
Iraqs Mukhabarat is the creation of Saddam Hussein. It was founded on
the premise that Iraqs security starts abroad. As such it had units for
assassination, terror, use of poisons and biological agents against Iraqi
dissidents and an extensive experimental program in all means of terror
and intelligence tools. Even Atomic Energy was not immune from their
power. They infiltrated AE and took under their wings many of its staff at
will. As such we were aware of some of the developments going inside
this terrible organization. Later I acted as a liaison with this agency
regarding their acquisition of proscribed nuclear materials and presumably
classified reports. I found it to be corrupt, deceitful and totally without
human values.
Thus the BW program replaced the research in physics as priority for
Mukhabarat because of its potential for terrorism. An angle rarely reported
and I found extensive incidents regarding it when I left Iraq and worked in
Libya from Iraqi expatriates was the use of humans as disease carriers.
Dissidents living abroad with families in Iraq will suddenly get the news
that their families are allowed to join them. Before they can obtain their
passports they are usually inoculated against some of the standard
infections. There were many incidents of whole families infected this way
with HIV and other diseases. It should be noted that any Iraqi infected with
HIV was transferred to a remote region in Western desert called Salman
Hole presumably for treatment. However nobody ever came back and most
were reported dead within a year of going there. Since HIV is rarely a
cause of death this fast it was assumed that they were subject to many
kinds of experiments. If smallpox is to be sent abroad from Iraq one
should expect unwitting carriers being sent to the destination targets
possibly not even Iraqis to achieve deniability.
When I was transferred to the military industry some of my workers were
questioned about the effects of radiation and how to cause disease and
death by what kind of radiation sources. Later I heard of many incidents of
people with radiation burns treated in Iraqi hospitals. Work on the Iraqi
dirty bomb which was tested in 1988 in Muhammediyat had an Iraqi
Mukhabarat angle.
How Iraq acquired the technology necessary to sustain these programs.
Iraq understood that the first step in acquiring technology is the human
element. Thus a large scale program of government scholarships was
launched that covered all areas of WMD in addition to other needs. The
program was of such a scale that though most of scholarship holders
never returned those who did were of large enough number to form the
nucleus of its WMD. This is critical to understand if any use is to be made
of the inspectors to uncover the Iraqi WMD. Comparison with Iran may
explain this point. Iran acquired calutron technology for uranium
enrichment from China. Iraq developed its own much larger program for
calutrons from scratch. Iran attempted acquiring heavy water technologies
from many countries including Argentina. Iraq did research and
development for more than twenty years to develop its own heavy water
technology. Thus the scientists are Iraqs main asset not equipment nor
facilities. At the same time Iraq allowed weapons inspectors to destroy
many pieces of equipments and facilities it refused to give them full
unmonitored access to its scientists. Inspections became a serious
problem when inspectors in later years began to demand more access to
the scientists. After several incidents some of which were described in
earlier testimony Iraq began to get more and more difficult in providing
access. Thus the demand for access to the scientists was the cause of
the demise of the inspection process in Iraq.
This points out a critical factor for inspections to be of any meaning. With
little or no human intelligence about Iraqs WMD inspectors have little to
direct them to the whereabouts of the Iraqi programs. However if a
condition is made that the scientists are to be made available outside Iraq
together with their families the story could see an immediate turnaround.
All Iraqs pretexts of no WMD will collapse. Iraq will expose its hand
immediately through flat refusal to cooperate. The names of all the relevant
scientists are known to the US authorities. Unmovic already possesses
huge financial resources from its share of Iraqs oil revenues at its disposal
to take care of all the important Iraqi scientists and engineers
permanently. Iraqs scientists if they chose to and my guess is that they
will can go under the equivalent of the US witness protection program paid
for by income already under Unmovic disposal if they agree to cooperate.
This is the test. If Iraq has really no illegal WMD program it should agree.
My bet would be that it will not. This is the smoking gun everybody is
looking for.
Iraq was reorganizing its concealment mechanism even before the
defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddams son in law. The resulting system
took effect in 1995 by the creation of the Concealment Organization
headed by Saddams younger son Qussey within the Special Security
Organization (SSO). The NY Times interview of the Iraqi civil engineer
charged with building backup sites tell only part of the story. The defector
who brought with him official Iraqi contracts reports duplicate sites built
mostly underground with specifications that included lead impregnated
concrete and resin covers that mean radioactive work. A back-up system
of support do the rest. Any inspection process is monitored carefully as to
its intentions. Once a possible target is identified a special team with its
transport vehicles and technicians will descend on the target of inspection,
dismantle all equipment and any possible incriminating evidence and carry
it to the back-up site. This is the more sophisticated version of what
inspectors already experienced through denial of access and standoffs.
Good luck for any future inspection team that wants to beat this system.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.<<
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