Would ousting Iraq's Hussein destabilize The Mideast?
Yes: Possible upheavals might create problems hurting U.S. interests
By Anthony T. Sullivan
Editorial
The Detroit News
Sunday, September 22, 2002
detnews.com
Ousting Saddam Hussein might have more far-reaching consequences than most people imagine. The possible splintering of Iraq as a result of U.S. military action might radically destabilize the Middle East. Such an outcome would do nothing to promote American national interests.
Iraq is divided into three parts: the Shiite south, the Sunni center and the Kurdish north. These three constituent parts were soldered together after World War I. Historically, they possessed little in common. During most of the last 75 years, they have been held together only through the heavy hand of the Sunni center.
Hussein is very much in that Sunni dictatorial tradition. Of course, what he has done to Kuwait, and to his own people, is abominable. Nevertheless, one may argue that without the "rigor" imposed from Baghdad, Iraq might dissolve, briefly, into three independent statelets. But such statelets would probably not be independent for long. Much larger and more powerful neighbors would likely gobble each of them up soon enough.
A fragmented Iraq would introduce radical instability into the Middle East political system. Upheavals would probably metastasize, with unpredictable results. None would foster American national interests.
What happens if the United States manages to save Iraq, but in the process loses Saudi Arabia and Jordan? Osama bin Laden, if alive, may well be ecstatic over the myriad possibilities that a U.S. war with Baghdad might offer al-Qaida. What President George W. Bush proposes, if implemented, may well provide terrorists with legions of recruits. Indeed, terrorist threats to the United States might become even greater during and after a war than they are now.
Imagine a war with Iraq that initially "succeeds" in toppling Hussein and his loathsome Ba'athist regime, but results in Iraq dissolving into its three parts.
Imagine that in the postwar confusion, southern Shiite Iraq (constituting 60 percent of the population) detaches itself from Baghdad. Soon enough, Shiite Iran might step into the breach and occupy or effectively control the Shiite region.
By doing so, Iran would place itself on the northern frontier of Saudi Arabia. Seeing this, the Shiites in Saudi Arabia, located overwhelmingly in the eastern part of the country and sitting atop major oil fields, might revolt. The Saudis might well be unable to repress the rebellion, and the Americans might be too overstretched militarily to provide timely assistance. Iranian influence then might plunge southward into the world's most important oil fields.
Would this be in the U.S. national interest?
Then there is the Sunni center of Iraq. Assume the Sunnis, who comprise only about 20 percent of the Iraqi population, are left bereft in a disintegrated country. But imagine that the Sunni plurality in Syria, despite its Alawite regime, couldn't resist the opportunity to take control of formerly Sunni Iraq. Assume further that the result is the creation of a greater Syria with power projected east into Baghdad and west into Beirut.
Would this also be in the American national interest?
Finally, assume that in a postwar Iraq the mainly Sunni Kurds in formerly Iraqi Kurdistan, who sit atop a large amount of oil, decide to realize their millennial dream of an independent state. This might well lead the Kurds in both Turkey and Iran to revolt or secede, and to attempt to unite with their kinsmen to the south and west. Turkey and Iran then might send armies into Kurdistan to repress internal secessions and secure control of at least some Kurdish oil. Then imagine that war breaks out between NATO member Turkey and Iran, whose relations have long been poisonous.
If even one of these dark scenarios were to occur, the United States would be faced with a host of major new problems, and the war against terrorism would suffer a major setback. Oftentimes, the devil one knows is better than the devils one does not.
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Dr. Anthony T. Sullivan is a distinguished senior scholar who holds an honorary position as an Associate at the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Michigan.
Before his retirement in 2000, Dr. Sullivan was affiliated for 30 years with Earhart Foundation (Ann Arbor, Michigan), most recently as Director of Program and Corporate Secretary. From 1962-1967 Dr. Sullivan taught at International College (Beirut, Lebanon).
Dr. Sullivan received his BA from Yale (1960), his MA from Columbia (1961), and his Ph.D from the University of Michigan (1976) in European history and Middle Eastern Studies.
He has written two books and some 80 articles and reviews, and has lectured widely at universities in the United States and abroad.
Over the past three decades he has traveled frequently to the Middle East in connection with his professional responsibilities and research interests. |
