I didn't change ground at all. I was addressing the limited issue of acting in a morally responsible manner, about which I stipulated that one might fail to conform one's behavior to social norms, but could only do so responsibly by being willing to show justification or mitigation. In the case of conflicting social norms, well, in fact you did assume that ours were better, when you said that you thought someone opposing genital mutilation was behaving well. I actually gave a more limited example: one doesn't have to take a position on which is better, per se, one only has to justify intervention on the basis of one's own values. If all are equally valid, than there is nothing that says you have to stand by, if your values motivate you to act.
I never said that the violation of a basic social norm was necessarily bad, I said that within that code, it had to be regarded as bad unless it could be justified or mitigated. Furthermore, society may accept or reject your defense, moral responsibility only requires that you be willing to answer for your actions, and to make an earnest attempt to show cause for rebellion. And the willingness to defend your action means a willingness to address it not in terms of personal preference, but in terms that would be plausible to others with a shared set of reference points.
In the case of society itself, a well- functioning society will engage in self- criticism, and therefore be willing to entertain the notion that there are exceptions to general rules, or considerations that annul common practices, or mitigating factors which at least lessen the severity of violation. That is the only way that it can adequately assure itself that it has a code that is able to handle conflicts of values, novelty of situations, and attain flexibility enough that it can be assured of general allegiance.
As far as the rationale offered goes, it is, of course, conceivable that the rationale is somewhat different. One might appeal to a father's affection for off-spring, and ask if he wants to do his daughter so much harm; there may be other tacks to take. But there may be no argument that rings true within the code given, in which case, only changes in socialization (for example, an American education) will provide the changes necessary to argue against the practice.
Finally, although all of the foregoing is compatible with a relativist point of view, I will not deny that one could move beyond relativism to some sort of evaluation of what moralities are better and worse. Nietzsche, supposedly the "hyper- relativist", did this on a naturalistic basis when he distinguished between vital and decadent societies, and promoted the ethics of nobility over the ethics of goodness. There is also the empirical approach: the subordination of women is premised upon the idea of their inferiority, similar to the inferiority of children or other persons requiring guardians. It has now been proven that women are not mentally and morally inferior to men, given our experience in the modern world. Therefore, the empirical rationale for masculine domination is false. I name these two only as examples......... |
