Plan to destroy Russian weapons nears collapse
"Pentagon officials, having kept the project alive with a trickle of residual funds,
say they will start canceling construction contracts this month because their money
runs out today,…."
dailynews.yahoo.com
Tue Oct 1, 7:19 AM ET
Peter Eisler USA TODAY
WASHINGTON -- The U.S. government has spent $230 million trying to build a
Russian plant to destroy thousands of tons of deadly chemical munitions from
the old Soviet arsenal. This month, unless Congress acts, the Pentagon will begin closing down the project without laying a single brick -- or eliminating a single weapon.
The facility was designed to wipe out one of the
world's most worrisome stockpiles of weapons of
mass destruction: nearly 2 million artillery shells and
missile warheads filled with deadly nerve gasses.
Stored in open racks in a cluster of wooden
warehouses in the town of Shchuch'ye, they are
among the most portable, ready-made weapons of
mass destruction a terrorist could obtain. Even the
smallest shells, which fit in a briefcase, can kill
100,000 or more if set off in a crowded city.
There have been no reported thefts at Shchuch'ye
(SHOO-che), but U.S. officials note that such an act
would be hard to detect and represents a serious
threat. President Bush called the
stockpile's destruction a ''vital mission'' in a national
security address last winter at The Citadel military
college in South Carolina.
Yet the U.S. effort to build the plant that would
dismantle and neutralize the arms at Shchuch'ye has
been unraveling quietly for years. Now, it's close to
collapse.
The project is the most costly and ambitious of U.S.
efforts to help eliminate Russia's chemical arsenal. With the $230 million spent
so far, design and site preparation are complete for the plant. But hundreds of
millions of dollars pledged for construction have been frozen for three years by
congressional critics who distrust Russia's plans to destroy its stockpile.
Pentagon officials, having kept the project alive with a trickle of residual funds,
say they will start canceling construction contracts this month because their
money runs out today, the start of the new fiscal year. Even if the cash is
released later this fall, the holdup has added years to the project -- and to
Russia's entire chemical weapons disposal schedule.
The delays in destroying the 5,400 tons of weaponized nerve gas at Shchuch'ye
are emblematic of setbacks that have plagued U.S. and international efforts to
help Russia wipe out its 40,000 tons of mostly Soviet-made chemical weapons.
It's the world's largest collection of nerve and skin-burning blister compounds,
stored both in bulk and in munitions. Virtually none has been eliminated.
The U.S. assistance is part of a multibillion-dollar Cooperative Threat Reduction
program Congress began in 1992 to help newly independent Soviet states
secure and destroy nuclear, biological and chemical weapons they inherited.
A decade later, the effort to address Russia's chemical stocks is perhaps the
least successful of its cooperative assistance initiatives. Russia's balky,
cash-strapped, demilitarization campaign has no chance of eliminating the
arsenal by 2007, the deadline in the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention for
destroying stockpiles worldwide.
Critics say Russia's slow progress shows a lack of commitment, and they
argue that continued assistance for the Shchuch'ye project is unwarranted.
The critics ''don't realize how serious this situation is,'' says Sen. Richard
Lugar, R-Ind., who helped set up the assistance program. ''This is the kind of
stuff, at Shchuch'ye, that (terrorists) are after. We have an opportunity to get rid
of it, and we're not moving forward.''
The unaddressed threat
The weapons at Shchuch'ye represent one-seventh of Russia's chemical
arsenal, nearly all of it inherited from the Soviets. The Soviet chemical warfare
program, which continued secretly into the early years of Russian statehood,
was the world's most advanced. Besides working with such widely used nerve
gases as VX and sarin, the Soviets built a secret program, called novichok, or
''new shock,'' that created more lethal toxins from agricultural compounds.
The Shchuch'ye stockpile, one of seven in Russia, is a major concern:
* The weapons are portable and ready to use, making them a more attractive
target for theft than the bulk containers of toxins stored at other Russian sites.
Many of the shells and warheads at Shchuch'ye are easy to hide and are
launchable from widely available artillery pieces and rockets.
* The stockpile is vulnerable. It sits in an impoverished region near the border
with Kazakhstan and Asian havens for al-Qaeda and other terror networks.
Security, despite recent upgrades, is weaker than at Russian nuclear facilities
and other sensitive sites. There's no reliable inventory, so thefts by an insider
could go unnoticed.
* The munitions are deadly. Most of the shells and warheads are packed with
sarin, soman and VX gasses, all of which can kill in minutes. An 85mm shell of
sarin -- the smallest artillery piece at Shchuch'ye -- can kill up to 140,000 if set
off in a densely populated area. It can fit in a briefcase.
Paul Walker, who toured Shchuch'ye as a congressional staffer on the first U.S.
inspection, in 1994, calls it ''one of the most vulnerable and worrisome sites
worldwide.''
''It certainly has the potential of becoming a Wal-Mart for terrorists,'' says
Walker, now with Global Green USA. It's part of an environmental organization,
Green Cross International, set up by former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev
to facilitate elimination of weapons stockpiles.
The money spent on the Shchuch'ye plant so far is about a quarter of the $888
million that U.S. officials pledged to complete the project. It is the largest
American investment in helping Russia eliminate chemical arms.
The Pentagon also has spent millions to install alarms and other safeguards at
both Shchuch'ye and Kizner, a chemical stockpile in central Russia. U.S.
officials say the upgrades addressed the sites' big weaknesses, though they
remain worried about insider thefts or a well-executed raid.
Other U.S.-backed initiatives focus on dismantling chemical weapons
production facilities and providing research equipment and jobs to former
weapons scientists who might otherwise be lured to work for rogue states or
terrorists.
European nations fund similar projects, including a German-financed disposal
plant set to start running this winter at Gornyy, a bulk-container stockpile 500
miles southeast of Moscow.
But the Shchuch'ye plant is the key to Russia's chemical demilitarization plans,
which envision expanding the facility to destroy munitions from several
stockpiles.
The Russian Embassy in Washington declined to comment on the funding
freeze. Officials in Moscow have said it's unwarranted. They note that they've
boosted budgets for the program and replaced military managers with more
committed civilians.
''We are fulfilling all of our obligations,'' says Nikolai Platé, of the State
Commission on Chemical Disarmament. He dismisses criticism that Russia
has hidden the true size of its arsenal.
Officials would not underestimate the size of the stockpiles because that might
result in less assistance, he says. ''The U.S. promised this money, and they
should give it to us and come see that we will use it to destroy the weapons,''
Platé says.
Old suspicions, new hurdles
Questions about Russia's tally of its chemical weapons were a central issue
when a small group of mostly Republican lawmakers blocked spending for the
Shchuch'ye project in late 1999. The hold lasted until Congress approved $35
million for Shchuch'ye in its 2002 budget. But critics set conditions that still left
the Pentagon unable to spend the funds.
The spending restrictions are far stricter than those for other threat reduction
programs. Such rules generally require the administration to ''certify'' that states
receiving assistance are making progress in getting rid of the arsenals they
inherited. But the added conditions for Russian chemical weapons programs
include six criteria, requiring that Russia provide a detailed inventory of its
chemical weapons and more verifiable plans for destroying them.
Critics ''are using these criteria as a stick to hit the Russians,'' says Michael
Moodie, an arms control negotiator in the first Bush administration who now
runs the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute in Washington. ''Their
feeling is, 'If we're going to have these assistance programs, we're going to
make it as hard as we can for the Russians.' ''
The Bush administration has asked Congress for authority to waive the funding
criteria. But the idea has hit resistance.
Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, an Armed Services Committee member, says
it's more likely that Congress will pass a limited, short-term waiver later this
year.
''A blanket waiver removes some of the leverage we have to make sure Russia
complies with the intended purposes for these funds,'' he adds, noting that
Russia's demilitarization program has a history of management problems. ''The
bigger issue is how big is the problem and if we spend this much money, how
much of a dent will it make?''
Foes of a waiver accuse Russia of lying about the size and nature of its stocks.
They note that despite admissions about the novichok program by its former
managers, Russia has not detailed what became of those toxins.
They also say Russia has not provided sufficient U.S. access to chemical
weapons sites.
''They want a confession, and what we need is a solution,'' says former
Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who now runs the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, a foundation that seeks to eliminate excess Soviet weapons. He says
the Russians have shown ''good faith'' and may not know the full extent of their
arsenal.
Nunn says U.S. officials should seize the chance to destroy the weapons at
Shchuch'ye. ''It's going to take unprecedented cooperation to make this work,''
he says.
The multibuilding complex planned for Shchuch'ye would drain the weapons,
neutralize and immobilize their toxins in asphalt, and incinerate the shells. It
was to begin operation by 2006, but is at least two years behind schedule.
The Pentagon is requesting $126 million for construction at the site in the new
fiscal year. Officials say they need at least the $35 million that is frozen in the
bank to keep the project viable after the residual, pre-freeze money they've used
to sustain it runs out today.
''If we don't get this money, we're going to have to start taking down the
(contracting) teams we've assembled,'' says Thomas Kuenning, chief of
Cooperative Threat Reduction for the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction
Agency.
If the money is released now, construction could begin in weeks, Kuenning
adds, but the start-up time will grow exponentially if it becomes necessary to
line up new contractors. ''Eight months from now, it may take a year. Those
people will go and find other work.''
Without the assistance, most U.S. officials agree, Russia has no hope of
meeting the Chemical Weapons Convention deadline for stockpile destruction,
even given the likelihood that it will be extended to 2012 at Russia's request.
U.S. stockpiles, interests
The United States also will be pressed by that deadline, despite having smaller
chemical weapons stocks -- 30,000 tons vs. Russia's 40,000 -- and far more
money.
The Pentagon has destroyed a bit more than 25% of its chemical weapons, and
officials say the job can't be done by the treaty's original 2007 target.
Meanwhile, cost estimates for eliminating the entire stockpile have climbed
from $15 billion to $24 billion.
Russia, its economy in shambles, hopes to spend about $6 billion.
Critics say Russia's comparatively small financial commitment and its
reluctance to open the books on its arsenal justify the hold on money for
Shchuch'ye.
Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., who chairs the House military procurement
subcommittee, sees some validity to the criticism, though he wants the project
funded. ''The Russians have got to be more transparent, more flexible. You can't
just blame the Congress.''
Supporters of the Shchuch'ye project say it must be viewed in the larger
context of U.S. interests.
''I don't think the Russians have been completely up front with us,'' says Amy
Smithson, a chemical weapons expert at The Henry L. Stimson Center who
testifies often before Congress. ''Does that mean we should allow the weapons
to sit there? We have a chance to address a serious national security problem.
It behooves us to do so.''
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