From Asia Times Sept 24, 2002: "Iraq may well have nukes"...
atimes.com
Middle East
Sep 24, 2002
ANALYSIS
Iraq may well have nukes
By Marc Erikson
You doubt it? Think again and consider this September 13 Pravda (yes, Pravda, the reformed former Soviet propaganda sheet) headline: "200 SOVIET NUKES LOST IN UKRAINE". Who says so? None other than Petro Symonenko, the leader of the (opposition) Ukrainian Communist Party. According to Symonenko, speaking at a public meeting in Kharkiv (eastern Ukraine) on September 11, there were 2,400 nuclear warheads in Ukraine when the Soviet Union disintegrated, although the transfer to Russia (supposedly completed in 1997) of only 2,200 of them has been officially documented. "The fate of the remaining 200 warheads is unknown," Symonenko said, claiming his information was based on the findings of a now-defunct parliamentary commission. Serhiy Sinchenko, head of the parliamentary investigation, admitted that some of the warheads had been "lost".
This is, of course, not the first time that claims about missing nukes have been made. On September 7, 1997, former Russian national security adviser General Alexander Lebed (who died in a helicopter crash in Siberia in April of this year) told the US CBS News' 60 Minutes program that the Russian military had lost track of over 100 suitcase-size one-kiloton nuclear bombs produced in the 1970s for the Soviet intelligence services (KGB, GRU).
There is also ample documentation of smuggling and theft of weapons-grade nuclear materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported 175 nuclear smuggling incidents since 1993, 18 of which involved highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient in an atomic bomb. A new database by the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University terms the protection of nuclear and radioactive material "woefully inadequate" and records 643 cases of smuggling and theft. Russian authorities say that in the past three years alone, they have broken up hundreds of nuclear-material smuggling deals. They say their nuclear weapons are under "safe and reliable" protection, but admit that nuclear materials are less well-protected, including storage sites for an estimated 1,100 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 160 metric tons of plutonium.
What's most troubling about the Symonenko claims is the existence of a tape recording examined by US intelligence and said to confirm high-level Ukrainian involvement in selling high-tech weapons to Iraq. The tape, made by a bodyguard who has since fled Ukraine, records a conversation between Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and the head of the country's military export service, Valeriy Malev. It is said to contain evidence of military sales to Iraq of Kalchuga radar equipment through shadowy Jordanian middle men. (Malev could not be questioned because he died in a mysterious road accident in March.) The fact that Kuchma has recently boasted of his warm links with Iraq adds credibility to US suspicions that Ukrainian nuclear materials (if not whole weapons) may have come into Iraqi possession.
Such and related concerns were behind the extensive, four-day search at sea by the US Coast Guard and federal agencies of the Liberian-registered "Palermo Senator" container vessel after radiation traces were detected in its hold when it steamed into New York on September 9. The search came up empty. But the incident was regarded as sufficiently serious to consign US Vice President Dick Cheney to a secure place on the night of September 9. All that may appear to be Tom Clancy Sum of all Fears material. It would not, however, be played out in reality if it weren't for reliable information that nuclear weapons or radiological devices ("dirty bombs") were in the hands of terrorists or states supporting them. The task of searching through 2,600 20-foot containers carried out by members of the US Nuclear Emergency Security Team and Navy SEALS would not have been undertaken just for the hell of it.
When it comes to possible Iraqi nuclear capabilities, the US government has plenty more concerns than it is prepared to acknowledge in public - and specialized aluminum tubes usable in the construction of centrifuges to separate weapons-grade from natural uranium are not at the top of the list. It's a long way from assembling a centrifuge to the production of enough enriched uranium to make a bomb. Classified Bush administration briefings to Congress have included varieties of evidence indicating that Iraq has covertly acquired sufficient amounts of weapons-grade materials to assemble a nuclear explosion device, though it may still lack an appropriate delivery vehicle.
Procurement of weapons materials as well as components to upgrade missile technology has since the 1980s been in the hands of Al Amn al-Khas, the most secretive of Iraq's multitude of covert action services and special forces. Though parts of the worldwide Al Amn al-Khas network of front companies and organizations have been uncovered by Western intelligence services, much of it has remained intact and active in Iraqi efforts to frustrate UN trade sanctions. Could the network over the past several years have obtained the 100kg or so of highly enriched uranium (HEU) required for the production of two or three crude nuclear weapons of the simplest assembly type ("gun assembly")? It would not have been easy. But with money no real object and an estimated cost of between $25-50 million, it can hardly be ruled out.
Would the know-how and assembly facilities have been available? Certainly. Iraq prior to 1991 ran a multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons program that employed hundreds of scientists and thousands of engineers and technicians. Due to the very low neutron emission rate of HEU, even very low technology can produce a high probability of high yield detonation. Low-tech weapons would be quite large; but higher-tech weapons assembly (implosion type, using neutron deflectors) to produce smaller high-yield detonation would also probably not be beyond Iraqi scientific and technical capabilities.
Israeli intelligence believes that Saddam Hussein possesses three or more 10-kiloton-yield bombs as well as some dirty bombs. The former are likely too large and heavy for ballistic-missile delivery, but could be transported by truck and placed in the vicinity of advancing enemy troops. Some consider such assumptions as Israeli scare propaganda or deliberate disinformation. But the probability that Iraq has attained a rudimentary nuclear capability is sufficiently high for war planners to take it into serious account.
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