but I haven't been following the buildup as closely as I might. I've just been looking for broad trends, to confirm (or disconfirm) my general sense of an early '03 war--and if possible to get a sense of what kind of strategy the administration will employ.
I have to believe any truly intensive inspection regime is going to push any military actions back to early '03, and hopefully forever...
If the inspections are truly as intrusive as the US desires (and I believe we will place extensive pressure for that to be the case), it will heavily demoralize Saddam's support within Iraq, and probably lead to an internal revolt.
Now what fills that power void will be the question. Can the Hashemites manage to enlist sufficient support amongst Saddam's rivals for their throne to be restored??
And can a Hashemite regime manage to contain the vicious power struggles that will occur between many clans who's own corruption is exceeded only by Saddam's clan??
Or if Saddam should manage to stay in power (he's quite a survivor, as we know), will the US be content with the fact that we're effectively strip-searched his palaces, bases, and anywhere else we suspect WMDs could be hidden??
I probably accept that, although it would be the least desirable outcome, and the backlash against the Iraqi people who collaborated with the US/UN or any opposition groups would likely be severe.
As for the number of troops we need, I would prefer no less than 100,000 "shooters" on the ground (which would require 50,000 or more logistical personnel)..
The strategy would be to "fix" the enemy and use airpower and guided munitions to eliminate his forces one by one (in addition to carpet bombing). This, of course, assumes that his forces leave the cities and remain loyal.
It's likely that would be the case since Saddam really doesn't want that many troops of "suspect loyalty" in the cities where they could launch a coup against him.
And even his own special Republican Guard, being the corrupt "entrepreneurs" that they are, might be unwilling to remain beseiged in Baghdad, where a potentially rebellious and hostile population surrounds them.
Bottom line, I don't think Bush is bluffing about using force, if necessary. But I highly doubt that rival powers within Iraq will permit events to go to the point where a US invasion is necessary. But they might wait until the last moment in order to "strike a better deal" with the Bush administration about what their "slice of the pie" will be in a post-Saddam Iraq.
And once Bush has the congressional authorization to use force, and has achieved the strong resolutions he wants from the UN, I think "negotiations" between Saddam's rivals and the US will be dramatically expedited.
Hawk@Ireservetherighttobewrongdependingonmondaysaddressbybush.com |
