the final place I will read carefully, is his link between invasion and the necessity to reconstitute Iraq as a democratic society. Is that his position? How much evidence does he advance? If it is a strong argument, and I conclude the Bush folk and, for that matter, the American public, is more than unlikely to be able to do that, does that argue, in Pollack's view for no invasion.
very perceptive. IMO, Pollack makes four kinds of arguments: here's why Saddam is a grave threat; here's why the non-invasion options for dealing with the threat are lousy; here's how we should do the invasion; and here's how to handle the aftermath. He agrees with the Bush administration on the first two, but appears to disagree (in part) on the last two. A key question for him, then, is, "if you knew the Bush administration would reject your suggestions on how to invade and what should come after, would you still support the invasion?"
I think he'd say "no" if they were to try a really stupid invasion plan (like, say, redoing the Afghan campaign). But let's say the professional military knows its business and (largely) gets its way, and so the actual invasion is run at least passably well. That leaves the aftermath, which this admin could quite possibly screw up royally. I've put that question to Pollack directly--would you still support invasion if you thought they would screw up the aftermath?--and he keeps squirming out of it, arguing that for right now the task is to get them to see the light.
I think, bottom line, that if you really thought they'd bungle the aftermath, then there's grounds for opposing invasion while still respecting Pollack's arguments, even if he wouldn't necessarily agree...
:0)
tb@pilpul.com |
