The president's real goal in Iraq
" The report's repeated references to terrorism are misleading, however, because
the approach of the new National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the
events of Sept. 11. They can be found in much the same language in a report issued
in September 2000 by the Project for the New American Century, a group of conservative
interventionists outraged by the thought that the United States might be
forfeiting its chance at a global empire."
"….That close tracking of recommendation with current policy is hardly surprising,
given the current positions of the people who contributed to the 2000 report.
Paul WOLFOWITZ is now deputy defense secretary….."
By JAY BOOKMAN
accessatlanta.com
The official story on Iraq has never made sense. The connection that
the Bush administration has tried to draw between Iraq and al-Qaida
has always seemed contrived and artificial. In fact, it was hard to
believe that smart people in the Bush administration would start a
major war based on such flimsy evidence.
The pieces just didn't fit.
Something else had to be
going on; something was
missing.
In recent days, those missing
pieces have finally begun to fall into place.
As it turns out, this is not really about
Iraq. It is not about weapons of mass
destruction, or terrorism, or Saddam, or
U.N. resolutions.
This war, should it come, is intended to
mark the official emergence of the United
States as a full-fledged global empire,
seizing sole responsibility and authority as
planetary policeman. It would be the
culmination of a plan 10 years or more in
the making, carried out by those who
believe the United States must seize the
opportunity for global domination, even if it
means becoming the "American
imperialists" that our enemies always
claimed we were.
Once that is understood, other mysteries
solve themselves. For example, why does
the administration seem unconcerned
about an exit strategy from Iraq once
Saddam is toppled?
Because we won't be leaving. Having
conquered Iraq, the United States will
create permanent military bases in that
country from which to dominate the Middle
East, including neighboring Iran.
In an interview Friday, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld brushed aside that
suggestion, noting that the United States
does not covet other nations' territory. That
may be true, but 57 years after World War
II ended, we still have major bases in
Germany and Japan. We will do the same
in Iraq.
And why has the administration dismissed
the option of containing and deterring Iraq,
as we had the Soviet Union for 45 years?
Because even if it worked, containment
and deterrence would not allow the
expansion of American power. Besides,
they are beneath us as an empire. Rome
did not stoop to containment; it
conquered. And so should we.
Among the architects of this would-be
American Empire are a group of brilliant
and powerful people who now hold key
positions in the Bush administration: They
envision the creation and enforcement of
what they call a worldwide "Pax
Americana," or American peace. But so
far, the American people have not
appreciated the true extent of that
ambition.
Part of it's laid out in the National Security
Strategy, a document in which each
administration outlines its approach to
defending the country. The Bush
administration plan, released Sept. 20,
marks a significant departure from
previous approaches, a change that it
attributes largely to the attacks of Sept.
11.
To address the terrorism threat, the
president's report lays out a newly
aggressive military and foreign policy,
embracing pre-emptive attack against
perceived enemies. It speaks in blunt
terms of what it calls "American
internationalism," of ignoring international
opinion if that suits U.S. interests. "The
best defense is a good offense," the
document asserts.
It dismisses deterrence as a Cold War
relic and instead talks of "convincing or
compelling states to accept their
sovereign responsibilities."
In essence, it lays out a plan for
permanent U.S. military and economic
domination of every region on the globe,
unfettered by international treaty or
concern. And to make that plan a reality,
it envisions a stark expansion of our global
military presence.
"The United States will require bases and
stations within and beyond Western
Europe and Northeast Asia," the
document warns, "as well as temporary
access arrangements for the long-distance
deployment of U.S. troops."
The report's repeated references to terrorism are misleading, however, because the
approach of the new National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the
events of Sept. 11. They can be found in much the same language in a report issued
in September 2000 by the Project for the New American Century, a group of
conservative interventionists outraged by the thought that the United States might be
forfeiting its chance at a global empire.
"At no time in history has the international security order been as conducive to
American interests and ideals," the report said. stated two years ago. "The
challenge of this coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American peace.' "
Familiar themes
Overall, that 2000 report reads like a blueprint for current Bush defense policy. Most
of what it advocates, the Bush administration has tried to accomplish. For example,
the project report urged the repudiation of the anti-ballistic missile treaty and a
commitment to a global missile defense system. The administration has taken that
course.
It recommended that to project sufficient power worldwide to enforce Pax
Americana, the United States would have to increase defense spending from 3
percent of gross domestic product to as much as 3.8 percent. For next year, the
Bush administration has requested a defense budget of $379 billion, almost exactly
3.8 percent of GDP.
It advocates the "transformation" of the U.S. military to meet its expanded
obligations, including the cancellation of such outmoded defense programs as the
Crusader artillery system. That's exactly the message being preached by Rumsfeld
and others.
It urges the development of small nuclear warheads "required in targeting the very
deep, underground hardened bunkers that are being built by many of our potential
adversaries." This year the GOP-led U.S. House gave the Pentagon the green light
to develop such a weapon, called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, while the
Senate has so far balked.
That close tracking of recommendation with current policy is hardly surprising, given
the current positions of the people who contributed to the 2000 report.
Paul Wolfowitz is now deputy defense secretary. John Bolton is undersecretary of
state. Stephen Cambone is head of the Pentagon's Office of Program, Analysis and
Evaluation. Eliot Cohen and Devon Cross are members of the Defense Policy Board,
which advises Rumsfeld. I. Lewis Libby is chief of staff to Vice President Dick
Cheney. Dov Zakheim is comptroller for the Defense Department.
'Constabulary duties'
Because they were still just private citizens in 2000, the authors of the project report
could be more frank and less diplomatic than they were in drafting the National
Security Strategy. Back in 2000, they clearly identified Iran, Iraq and North Korea as
primary short-term targets, well before President Bush tagged them as the Axis of
Evil. In their report, they criticize the fact that in war planning against North Korea
and Iraq, "past Pentagon wargames have given little or no consideration to the force
requirements necessary not only to defeat an attack but to remove these regimes
from power."
To preserve the Pax Americana, the report says U.S. forces will be required to
perform "constabulary duties" -- the United States acting as policeman of the world
-- and says that such actions "demand American political leadership rather than that
of the United Nations."
To meet those responsibilities, and to ensure that no country dares to challenge the
United States, the report advocates a much larger military presence spread over
more of the globe, in addition to the roughly 130 nations in which U.S. troops are
already deployed.
More specifically, they argue that we need permanent military bases in the Middle
East, in Southeast Europe, in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such
bases now exist. That helps to explain another of the mysteries of our post-Sept. 11
reaction, in which the Bush administration rushed to install U.S. troops in Georgia
and the Philippines, as well as our eagerness to send military advisers to assist in
the civil war in Colombia.
The 2000 report directly acknowledges its debt to a still earlier document, drafted in
1992 by the Defense Department. That document had also envisioned the United
States as a colossus astride the world, imposing its will and keeping world peace
through military and economic power. When leaked in final draft form, however, the
proposal drew so much criticism that it was hastily withdrawn and repudiated by the
first President Bush.
Effect on allies
The defense secretary in 1992 was Richard Cheney; the document was drafted by
Wolfowitz, who at the time was defense undersecretary for policy.
The potential implications of a Pax Americana are immense.
One is the effect on our allies. Once we assert the unilateral right to act as the
world's policeman, our allies will quickly recede into the background. Eventually, we
will be forced to spend American wealth and American blood protecting the peace
while other nations redirect their wealth to such things as health care for their
citizenry.
Donald Kagan, a professor of classical Greek history at Yale and an influential
advocate of a more aggressive foreign policy -- he served as co-chairman of the 2000
New Century project -- acknowledges that likelihood.
"If [our allies] want a free ride, and they probably will, we can't stop that," he says.
But he also argues that the United States, given its unique position, has no choice
but to act anyway.
"You saw the movie 'High Noon'? he asks. "We're Gary Cooper."
Accepting the Cooper role would be an historic change in who we are as a nation,
and in how we operate in the international arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not
campaign on such a change. It is not something that he or others have dared to
discuss honestly with the American people. To the contrary, in his foreign policy
debate with Al Gore, Bush pointedly advocated a more humble foreign policy, a
position calculated to appeal to voters leery of military intervention.
For the same reason, Kagan and others shy away from terms such as empire,
understanding its connotations. But they also argue that it would be naive and
dangerous to reject the role that history has thrust upon us. Kagan, for example,
willingly embraces the idea that the United States would establish permanent
military bases in a post-war Iraq.
"I think that's highly possible," he says. "We will probably need a major
concentration of forces in the Middle East over a long period of time. That will come
at a price, but think of the price of not having it. When we have economic problems,
it's been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force in Iraq, there will
be no disruption in oil supplies."
Costly global commitment
Rumsfeld and Kagan believe that a successful war against Iraq will produce other
benefits, such as serving an object lesson for nations such as Iran and Syria.
Rumsfeld, as befits his sensitive position, puts it rather gently. If a regime change
were to take place in Iraq, other nations pursuing weapons of mass destruction
"would get the message that having them . . . is attracting attention that is not
favorable and is not helpful," he says.
Kagan is more blunt.
"People worry a lot about how the Arab street is going to react," he notes. "Well, I
see that the Arab street has gotten very, very quiet since we started blowing things
up."
The cost of such a global commitment would be enormous. In 2000, we spent $281
billion on our military, which was more than the next 11 nations combined. By 2003,
our expenditures will have risen to $378 billion. In other words, the increase in our
defense budget from 1999-2003 will be more than the total amount spent annually
by China, our next largest competitor.
The lure of empire is ancient and powerful, and over the millennia it has driven men
to commit terrible crimes on its behalf. But with the end of the Cold War and the
disappearance of the Soviet Union, a global empire was essentially laid at the feet of
the United States. To the chagrin of some, we did not seize it at the time, in large
part because the American people have never been comfortable with themselves as
a New Rome.
Now, more than a decade later, the events of Sept. 11 have given those advocates of
empire a new opportunity to press their case with a new president. So in debating
whether to invade Iraq, we are really debating the role that the United States will
play in the years and decades to come.
Are peace and security best achieved by seeking strong alliances and international
consensus, led by the United States? Or is it necessary to take a more unilateral
approach, accepting and enhancing the global dominance that, according to some,
history has thrust upon us?
If we do decide to seize empire, we should make that decision knowingly, as a
democracy. The price of maintaining an empire is always high. Kagan and others
argue that the price of rejecting it would be higher still.
That's what this is about. |
