We are still not ready for this. Our force structure is well-equipped, high tech, resistant to attack and able to attack in the air, on the ground, and under water. But it is bulky. It can do enormous damage quickly, but it is wasted on small targets. It is designed for battlefield engagement or for standoff destruction. But it is much harder to focus down to the scale of caves, forests and villages where the rules of guerilla warfare control.
We have more ability to bomb the caves then anyone else and we have well trained infantry that can go out to the forests and villages if we want them to. Our military is not unsuited to or unready for this type of battle. It is however true that we have less of an advantage in this type of battle. In a straight out battle on clear terrain and with a concentrated clearly defined enemy (like we had in the 1st gulf war) it would normally be foolish to try to stand up to the US when it concentrates its power. When the enemy is dispersed in hard to access areas or when they are in a city among civilians our advantage is not as great.
The answers seem to lie in a string of dubious or false assumptions: First, the United States is more
seriously threatened than any other country.
This assumption is not required in order to endorse preemptive action.
Second, other governments do not understand the seriousness of the threat.
Either that or they just disagree with preemptive attack to deal with even serious threats.
Third, other governments cannot be brought to a sufficient level of awareness and understanding to
see our need.
Or it would take to long to do so, or they disagree about how to react to serious threats or we just don't
care what they think
Fifth, the solutions we achieve unilaterally will be acceptable and durable.
Or at least approximately as acceptable or durable as the solutions we would be likely to achieve without acting unilaterally, or that if we start to act unilaterally others will join in and help forge a more multilateral solution, or that there is some disadvantage to acting multilaterally at least in this particular case including such possibilities that multilateralism would take to long or would compromise the achievement of the objective, or that multilateral action is just not possible because the others that could be useful in the effort just don't agree
Sixth, our actions can be pursued without consequences for our roles and standing in the international
system.
Or that such consequences will be minor and or temporary, or that there will be benefits that offset the negative consequences, or that the negative consequences are worth it do to the severity of the threat.
Seventh, we will make enemies in carrying out our strategy, but those animosities will fade as
self-interest takes over in the future.
Or that we will not make new enemies from this strategy or the the threat is severe enough to justify risking the possibility of gaining such enemies.
Eighth, the desire to do business with us will cause many countries to go along with us despite their
reservations or objections.
Or that we just act unilaterally as the above "assumptions" assumed.
Ninth, it is much harder to get other countries to go along with us than it is to do it ourselves.
This is probably true in regards to Iraq and may be true in other cases as well.
Tenth, the requirement for action is urgent.
Or that now is just a better time then later which does not actually require the need for action to be urgent.
Tim |
