I don't buy your first point, since we're not in fact "devoting so much money to military matters" on a relative basis--defense spending as a share of GNP has dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, and even recent increases won't bring it up near where it was. As Paul Kennedy has noted, what is astonishing about contemporary American geopolitical dominance is that it's being done NOT through massive extraction and deployment of domestic power reserves for military purposes. We've just grown so much (in absolute and relative terms) that even a less-than-dramatic defense spending rate is enough to make us tower over everybody else. In short, we could afford the domestic stuff you want to purchase if there was political will to provide it, which there isn't.
As for your second argument, as far as I can tell, unless something really dramatic happens, oil will be the dominant energy resource of the global economy for decades, and the Persian Gulf's fossil fuel reserves will be absolutely critical for just as long. Down the road that will almost certainly change, but it's not around the corner.
As for number 3, the best and most extended general version of that argument I've seen--that we don't have the stomach for large-scale international engagement--has been made by Charlie Kupchan, in his new book [tk]. It's a possible scenario, but I just don't buy it. If one does, then yes, the implication is indeed "don't take on jobs you aren't prepared to finish."
And regarding no. 4, Iraq does indeed have its own, separate timetable that's not as urgent as, say, dealing with al Qaeda, but just because it's not an immediate danger (today or next month) doesn't mean it might not become one eventually (in a couple of years). We could try another shot at inspections without too much danger, therefore, but the issue won't simmer on the back burner forever.
:0)
tb@agentsRus.com |
