US Boxed In By Bush's Strike-First Doctrine
By James Rubin
The Guardian UK
Wednesday, 23 October, 2002
Key Clinton adviser assesses the dangers of America's new national security strategy
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Reading the National Security Strategy of the United States one is reminded of the old story about America's First Lady in 1865: "So, Mrs Lincoln, other than that one small interruption, how did you like the play?"
For more than 20 pages, this new document lays out the political, economic, and military objectives of the United States in the world, reflecting a post-September 11 consensus regarding the importance of fighting terrorism, stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting democracy, peaceful resolution of disputes and market economics.
As a spokesman for the Clinton administration at the United Nations and the state department for nearly eight years, I have probably articulated most of what is in this document on subjects as wide-ranging as peace in the Middle East, economic development in Africa, the fight against HIV/Aids and the urgency of countering the danger from rogue states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
But there are a few paragraphs that stand out as remarkable. They are the basis for the suggestion that there is a new Bush doctrine, which codifies the pre-emptive use of America's military might as a key component of our national security policy. The argument is straightforward. There are terrorist groups and states which consider themselves at war with the US. In an era of missiles, weapons of mass destruction and new tools of asymmetric warfare, we simply cannot wait for the traditional measures of imminent battle that would historically have justified pre-emptive military attacks.
A further claim is made that because key groups may lack a home country, and because of their hatred of America and, in the case of Islamic terrorists, their desire for martyrdom, they will not be dissuaded from attacking us by the threat of overwhelming retaliation. Therefore, according to the key sentence, "to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively".
The idea of a great power using military force before being attacked is not new. Nato used military force against Serbia, and few would argue against pre-emptive attacks against al-Qaida in Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan or Indonesia.
In retrospect, most would probably agree that before September 11 more, not less, should have been done to pre-empt al-Qaida attacks. In other words, pre-emptive attacks in specific circumstances are not only justifiable but can be wise policy.
The problem with the Bush document is that it appears to make first strikes the rule rather than the exception.
Another problem is the context in which the strategy has been promulgated. The document is the latest in a series of actions by the administration that have been extremely controversial internationally and have raised troubling questions about our commitment to traditional norms of international politics.
These steps include the withdrawal from the 1972 ABM treaty prohibiting missile defences, the rejection of the Kyoto protocol on the environment, aggressive steps aimed at undermining the international criminal court, and the initial decision not to apply the Geneva conventions to the prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay.
Korean crisis
But perhaps the biggest problem of all is that this so-called doctrine has been put forward just when war with Iraq may be imminent. And now with the recent revelations that North Korea is building critical nuclear weapons materials inviolation of its international commitments, the question of pre-emption against Pyongyang is also on the table.
Instead of arguing its case against Iraq, and possibly North Korea, based on specific circumstances, the US now must try to fit its actions into a strategy that appears to have broken decades of careful Amercian policy. In the case of Iraq, had there been no new "doctrine", the administration would be far better positioned to argue that its plans for military action were intended, not as a pre-emptive measure, but to enforce UN resolutions.
A compelling case can be made that Iraq remains in material breach of the 1991 ceasefire, and assuming the regime does not change its behaviour and agree to give up its weapons of mass destruction, the US and others would be justified in seeking to eliminate the threat to international peace and security. Now, partly because of the pre-emption strategy, many around the world may see any military action against Baghdad as America attacking Iraq rather than enforcing a UN resolution.
Arguably the case against North Korea is even stronger. Most of President Bush's key advisers have been saying for years that Pyongyang's leaders may not be rational and therefore our capability to destroy North Korea would not deter a missile strike against the United States.
In terms of intentions, Kim Jong-Il clearly fits the bill of particulars described in this new strategy. And when it comes to capability, North Korea is way ahead of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Most have forgotten that there are at least five bombs-worth of plutonium sitting in North Korea. Pyongyang has now admitted that it has a separate programme to enrich uranium and make nuclear weapons. This is a country that has already shown a willingness to export its best weapons to the highest bidder.
President Bush has understandably emphasised the importance of a peaceful solution to this new crisis. Yet, according to Washington's new strategy North Korea fits precisely the circumstances described as justifying a pre-emptive attack.
Perhaps the only real benefit of declaring a doctrine of pre-emption is the possibility that it will deter our enemies from acting, or scare them enough to change their behaviour. But of course, the very countries we aimed the statement at are those the administration says do not respond to the normal calculations of deterrence and threat.
Difficult decisions about how to deal with the threat from Iraq and North Korea should be based on specific circumstances and not further complicated by trying to fit them into pre-cooked formulas.
Teddy Roosevelt once counselled America to "speak softly and carry a big stick". Unfortunately the current administration has forgotten those wise words, choosing instead to accompany its big stick with a loud voice.
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James Rubin was an assistant secretary of state under Bill Clinton. He is now a visiting professor of international relations at the London School of Economics.
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