New information on Iraq's weapon programs and procurement attempts
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- New information on Iraq's weapon programs and procurement attempts
by Kelly Motz
New revelations about Iraq's mass destruction weapon efforts emerged in September, when the British government made public a long-awaited dossier. Billed as an assessment by Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee, it reported that Iraq was continuing to produce chemical and biological agents, and was still trying to buy the means to make nuclear weapons. It also said that Iraq was already trying to "conceal and disperse" evidence of its weapons programs from future U.N. inspectors. The 50-page document had been ready in March, but Prime Minister Tony Blair's government scrapped the plan to release it then because of the tense situation in Palestine.
Also in September, the Bush administration suspended its annual $55 million aid program to Ukraine because Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had been caught on tape in July 2000 approving the sale of the "Kolchuga" anti-aircraft radar to Iraq. According to the New York Times, the U.S. government had at least "some indications" that the radar actually reached Iraq. Kuchma's bodyguard, who made the tape, was granted asylum by the United States and testified in court in California. According to press reports, the radar, made by the Ukrainian firm Topaz, locks on aerial targets at a range of 500 miles and is mobile. It is a "passive" radar, meaning it detects an aircrafts' own emissions rather than bouncing a signal off the craft, which would alert its pilot.
In August and September, Iraq began taking journalists on tours of former weapon sites in order to rebut charges that it was again in the business of making mass destruction weapons. The reporters visited sites including Daura (a former biological weapon factory, where they were shown a single destroyed building), Taji (a former germ site where they viewed one building full of baby milk and sugar), Falluja-3 (a former chemical weapon site where they saw an intact insecticide factory), Al Qaim (a former uranium extraction plant where they saw one destroyed building), Salman Pak (a former germ plant and site of a plane alleged to be for terrorist training), and Tuwaitha (a former nuclear site where they saw buildings said by the Iraqis to be for medical tests on animals, drug production, electronic drafting, and mushroom farming).
Earlier, in March, the administration had put on a show for the U.N. Security Council in which Iraqis were revealed to be converting Russian and German trucks imported for peaceful purposes to missile components and artillery delivery vehicles. According to the Washington Post, the proof was contained in satellite photos and a video.
Other news about Iraq's chemical and biological efforts surfaced in December 2001, when allegations by an Iraqi defector were reported by the New York Times. According to the Times, Iraqi defector Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri told Western officials that as recently as a year previously, he had been renovating sites that he believed were part of Iraq's chemical and biological weapon programs. His company's job was to seal rooms, making them leak-proof and resistant to corrosion. He said some of the sites appeared to be hidden production and storage facilities, located behind private villas or in underground "wells" lined with lead-filled concrete. He claimed to have seen at least 20 different facilities that he judged to be WMD-related, based on their characteristics and what he was told about them, though most of the sites were not operating while he was present. The sites included a biological "clean room" (renovated in 1998) in a residential area known as Al Qrayat and a laboratory hidden under Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad, from which he said he was shown biological materials. Mr. Saeed was hired by Iraq's Military Industrialization Organization (MIO) and the Al Fao company.
Experts have long estimated that Iraq could resume manufacture of chemical and biological agents within months of a decision to do so, could assemble a nuclear weapon within weeks of importing the fissile material necessary to fuel it (five years is a reasonable estimate if Iraq itself is obliged to produce the material) and could convert its plants for building short-range missiles, now permitted under U.N. resolution 687, quickly into plants for producing longer-range ones, which are forbidden.
Nuclear weapons
According to the British dossier, Iraq has continued its nuclear shopping efforts. Since 1998, the dossier says, Iraq has tried to buy "significant quantities of uranium" from Africa. Because Iraq has no need for such an import for peaceful purposes (such as reactor fuel), it was cited as evidence of an effort to produce nuclear weapons.
Iraq also tried to buy, the dossier said, a series of items useful for producing gas centrifuges. These, in turn, serve to process natural uranium to nuclear weapon grade. The items were vacuum pumps, which create the vacuum in which the centrifuge rotors spin, a line of machines for producing the magnets needed for centrifuge bearings and motors, a large filament winding machine, which can produce the carbon fiber rotors that go into centrifuges, a large balancing machine, needed to insure that the centrifuges are properly balanced when spinning at high speeds, and more than 60,000 specialized aluminum tubes, which are useful for making centrifuge components. All of these procurement attempts were said to have occurred since 1998.
They followed earlier purchases that were equally revealing. Iraq is allowed to import medical equipment as an exception to the U.N. embargo, so in 1998 Iraq ordered a half-dozen "lithotripter" machines, ostensibly to rid its citizens of kidney stones, which the lithotripter pulverizes inside the body without surgery. But each machine requires a high-precision electronic switch that has a second use: it triggers atomic bombs. Iraq wanted to buy 120 extra switches as "spare parts." Iraq placed the order with the German electronics firm Siemens, which supplied the machines but forwarded the order for the extra switches to its supplier, Thomson- C.S.F., a French military-electronics company. It is uncertain whether the French government barred the sale. Stephen Cooney, a Siemens spokesman, claimed that Siemens subsequently provided only eight switches, one in each machine and two spares. Sources at the United Nations and in the U.S. government believe that the number supplied is higher. It only takes one switch to detonate Iraq's latest bomb design.
These procurement episodes show that Iraq appears still determined to obtain nuclear weapons. And according to the U.N. inspectors, Iraq is closer to the bomb than most people think. The inspectors have learned that Iraq's first bomb design, which weighed a ton and was a full meter in diameter, has been replaced by a smaller, more efficient model. From discussions with the Iraqis, the inspectors have deduced that the new design weighs only about 600 kilograms and measures only 600 to 650 millimeters in diameter. That makes it small enough to fit on a Scud- type missile. According to inspection records, up to nine of Iraq's Scud-type missiles are still unaccounted for.
The inspectors have also determined that Iraq's bomb design will work. Iraq has mastered the key technique of creating an implosive shock wave, which squeezes a bomb's nuclear material enough to trigger a chain reaction. The inspectors have learned that the new Iraqi design also uses a "flying tamper," a refinement that "hammers" the nuclear material to squeeze it even harder, so that bombs can be made smaller without diminishing their explosive force. Thus, Iraq now possesses an efficient nuclear bomb design. The only thing lacking is the fissile material to fuel it.
When the U.N. inspectors left Iraq, they concluded that Iraq was still withholding drawings showing the latest stage of its nuclear weapon design. In addition, they found that Iraq was withholding blueprints of individual nuclear weapon components – including the precise dimensions of explosive lenses – and drawings showing how to mate Iraq's nuclear warhead with a missile. Iraq claimed that these things either did not exist or were no longer in its possession. Iraq had also failed to turn over documents revealing how far it got in developing centrifuges to process uranium to weapon-grade, and failed to provide 170 technical reports it received showing how to produce and operate the centrifuges. Iraq claimed that all these documents were secretly destroyed. Nor did Iraq account for materials and equipment belonging to its most advanced nuclear weapon design team. In fact, Saddam Hussein has taken pains to keep his nuclear teams together and to prevent any of their members from leaving the country. The British dossier noted that Iraq "recalled its nuclear scientists to the programme in 1998."
Moreover, in mid-September, the International Atomic Energy Agency said it had seen new construction or alterations at nuclear sites in commercial satellite photos. While the IAEA refused to name the sites or analyze what it had seen prior to conducting inspections in Iraq, it was reported in the Washington Post that Tuwaitha was among the sites with new buildings. Iraq confirmed the report by inviting reporters to tour the new facilities.
Radiological Weapons
At the end of April 2001, a top secret Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission report on the radiological bomb Iraq built and tested in 1987 was revealed in the New York Times. The report was provided to the Times by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The Times article, citing the Wisconsin Project, concluded that the bomb did not work – the radiation levels were considered too low – but the existence of the radiological bomb program showed Iraq's intention to develop weapons of mass destruction. The Iraqi government immediately denied the report as false, and sent an official letter of denial to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, stating that while the idea of a radiological bomb had been explored, it was abandoned as "not efficacious" and because it "would cause soil contamination that it would be difficult to clean up." The letter said that no bombs were made or tested.
Chemical weapons
The British dossier had a lot to say about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons. It alleged that in violation of U.N. resolutions, Iraq has continued to produce chemical and biological agents since 1998 (without saying which agent, or where it was produced). The dossier also said that Iraq has chemical and biological agents available for use in war that could be deployed within 45 minutes. These agents could be delivered by "artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles." It also said that Iraq's current military planning "specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons."
The dossier also alleged that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons left over from the Gulf War period, which tallies with the conclusions of U.N. inspectors, who have concluded that Iraq is still hiding key parts of its chemical weapon program. According to the inspectors, Iraq has refused to account for at least 3.9 tons of VX, the deadliest form of nerve gas, and at least 600 tons of ingredients to make it. Iraq produced the gas but claimed it was of low quality and that all of the ingredients to make it were either destroyed or consumed during production attempts. Also missing are up to 3,000 tons of other poison gas agents that Iraq admitted producing but said were used, destroyed or thrown away, and several hundred additional tons of agents Iraq could have produced with the 4,000 tons of missing ingredients it admitted was at its disposal. Iraq also admitted producing or possessing 500 bombs with parachutes to deliver gas or germ payloads, roughly 550 artillery shells filled with mustard gas, 107,500 casings prepared for various chemical munitions, and 31,658 filled and empty chemical munitions – all of which Iraq claimed were destroyed or lost, a fact that inspectors have been unable to verify. Many key records are also missing. These include an Iraqi Air Force document showing how much poison gas was used against Iran, and thus how much Iraq had left after the Iran-Iraq war, as well as "cookbooks" showing how Iraq operated its poison gas plants.
Biological weapons
The British dossier explicitly asserted that "we know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents." It also said that Iraq had the ability to design and construct the necessary equipment, such as "fermenters, centrifuges [and] sprayer dryers." This capability was judged sufficient to provide "self-sufficiency in the technology required to produce biological weapons." The dossier also mentioned three specific sites in Iraq (the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah; the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute; the Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib) that it said were "of concern." In addition to these findings, the dossier confirmed earlier reports that Iraq was making its biological laboratories mobile. It also asserted that Saddam Hussein may have delegated authority to use chemical and biological weapons to his son Qusai.
The total amount of germ agent that Iraq produced (anthrax, botulinum, gas gangrene, aflatoxin) was never revealed to the U.N. inspectors, who learned only that Iraq's production capacity far exceeded what it admitted producing. Iraq simply alleged that its production facilities were not run at full capacity, a claim directly contradicted by its all-out drive to mass-produce germ warfare agents. Inspectors concluded that Iraq retained at least 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads filled with germ agents, spraying equipment to deliver germ agents by helicopter, and possessed enough growth media to generate three or four times the amount of anthrax it admitted producing. Iraq either claimed that these items were destroyed unilaterally, claimed they were used for civilian purposes or simply refused to explain what happened to them. Nor could the inspectors account for the results of a known project to deliver germ agents by drop tanks or account for much of the equipment Iraq used to produce germ agents. Finally, Iraq contended that many essential records of its biological weapon program, such as log books of materials purchased, lists of imported ingredients, and lists of stored ingredients, simply "cannot be found."
Fueled by this uncertainty, there have been reports of additional categories of biological weapons in Iraq's arsenal. According to the New York Times, a secret U.S. intelligence assessment completed in late 1998 concluded that Iraq was probably concealing the smallpox virus. The assessment was said to be based on evidence that Iraq had recently manufactured smallpox vaccine. Dr. Richard Spertzel, former head of biological inspections in Iraq, added some weight to this assessment in December 2001, pointing out that there was a smallpox outbreak in Iraq in the 1970's (just after Iraq's BW program began), from which it would have been easy to retain clinical samples.
There are also signs that Iraq may have been working on the means to deliver biological weapons. In August 2000, when making its semi-annual report to Congress, the C.I.A. warned that Iraq was still developing an unmanned aerial vehicle, converted from an Eastern European L-29 trainer jet, which the C.I.A. believed was intended to deliver chemical or biological agents. This effort is taking place at the Al-Faris Factory, located in Al-Amiriyah, Baghdad, the same site where Iraq built drop tanks to deliver biological agents before the Gulf war. Iraq actually deployed L-29s to an air base in November 1997 when threatened with attack by the United States.
A second attempt to develop an unmanned airplane was reported by the Financial Times in July 2002. Iraq had been working on its "al-Baya" project, which would have produced drones from Czech-made aircraft. However, the factories making the drone were bombed by the United States in December 1998, and it is unknown whether any al-Bayas are still in existence.
Iraq also took over several Russian-built crop-dusting helicopters from the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization in May 2001. While only about half of the original six helicopters are still airworthy, the remaining three could possibly be used to disseminate biological or chemical agents. Before the Gulf war, Iraq's Technical Research Center at Al Salman developed an aerosol generator for the dispersal of biological agents by modifying helicopter-borne disseminators for chemical insecticides.
Missiles
According to the British dossier, Iraq began to develop missiles in early 2002 with a range of more than 1,000 km. The dossier predicted that if sanctions against Iraq remained in effect, Iraq would not be able to field such a missile before 2007. Iraq is permitted under U.N. resolutions to produce missiles with a range not exceeding 150 km, but in mid-2001, Iraq drastically increased its effort to produce engines for missiles exceeding this range, according to the dossier.
The dossier said that one of the shorter-range missiles, the liquid-propellant al-Samoud, was being deployed to military units and that at least 50 had been produced. Iraq was trying to extend its range to at least 200 km, in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. The solid- fueled Ababil-100 was also being produced, with plans to extend its range as well to 200 km. As proof of its findings, the dossier presented a photograph of a new Iraqi rocket test stand capable of testing engines with ranges exceeding 1000 km.
In addition to these shorter-range missiles, the dossier said Iraq had retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles in breach of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles have a range of up to 650 km and can carry conventional, chemical or biological warheads. They could reach as far as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. This estimate conflicts with the estimate of U.N. inspectors, who when they left in December 1998 said that Iraq could still possess up to nine ballistic missiles, plus imported guidance components. In addition, the inspectors could not account for up to 150 tons of missile production materials, or for Iraq's stockpile of liquid rocket fuel.
New interest in Iraq's missile programs was sparked in June 2001 by the revelation that Iraq continued to buy prohibited weapon components throughout the 1990s despite U.N. sanctions. An article in Commentary magazine described a series of deals to buy missile and conventional weapon components from companies in Ukraine, Belarus and Romania. The deals also included high-tech machine tools useful in building both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Jordanian middlemen played a key role in most of the sales. Those sales included a sensitive plasma spray machine manufactured by Visoky Vacuum (Belarus) that turned up in Iraq's Badr State Establishment in 1996. Badr produced components for making Iraqi nuclear weapons before the Gulf War.
In January 2002, the U.S. intelligence community predicted that the United States could face a ballistic missile threat from Iraq by the year 2015, making the threat from Iraq more distant than the ones predicted from Iran or North Korea. The January 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) said Iraq could try to test a missile developed from its failed Al-Abid space-launch vehicle, but would be unlikely to try such a test, because it would probably fail. The NIE predicted that Iraq would be more likely to emulate North Korea and try a three-stage rocket. The time it would take to develop an ICBM would depend on the path Iraq chose to pursue: one to two years if it bought a North Korean Taepo-Dong 2, a few years if it bought North Korean Nodongs or tried to develop its own Taepo-Dong 1 system, about five years if it managed to buy TD-2 engines, and around 10 years to develop a TD-2-type rocket indigenously. U.S. intelligence agencies judged that Iraq could flight-test a medium-range missile by 2005 and is likely to do so by 2010, unless such a missile were imported, in which case a test could occur within months of acquisition.
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