Steven Den Beste has good commentary on the UNSC Resolution:
Anyone who thinks there's any kind of principle or nobility in international diplomacy should disabuse themselves of that idea right now. The reality is that when you negotiate, you don't get what's justified. You get what's cheap, and you get what you buy. There is no altruism or selflessness involved. If something is valuable then the price will be high, whether you deserve to get it or not.
There certainly was no principle involved in the UN process which led to unanimous passage by the UNSC of the resolution regarding Iraq. The key question was just how valuable passage of such a resolution would be to the Bush and Blair administrations; the continental Europeans entertained the fantasy that it might end up being extremely valuable and thus that they could use the threat of France's veto to try to wring substantial concessions out of President Bush. Occasionally in that kind of diplomatic process when there's a substantial disagreement about value you end up with an impasse, and the process will stall (sometimes for years) while events develop and make the value more clear, and in a sense that's what happened this time.
For instance, when Congress considered passage of an authorization for war under the War Powers Act, if it had included a requirement for UNSC approval (which was in fact proposed by some Democrats in the Senate) then France's veto in the UNSC would suddenly have taken on enormous value and thus France would have been in a position to dictate terms.
But France received a one-two punch, with passage of a Congressional authorization that did not require approval from the UN or anyone else (i.e. NATO or "consultation with allies"), followed by the Republican victory in the election. After that, it became obvious to everyone that France's veto had negligible value because a UN resolution had only minor value to Bush. In fact, what became clear was that if France (or Russia) had used their veto it would have harmed them far more than it would harm Bush. A French veto would have turned the UNSC into roadkill when Bush proceeded to war without it. So the process unstalled; France was permitted to ask for and get a face-saving cosmetic change, and then the resolution passed.
There's enormous difference of opinion in the news reports from commentators and the statements made by various politicians about whether the resolution just passed would require a second action by the UNSC before hostilities begin. My opinion on that is twofold:
1. It does not require a second UNSC resolution, but
2. When the time comes, we'll ask for one and get it. Rapidly.
I think that this is the deal that was worked out in private between Bush and Chirac in the phone call which led to passage of the resolution. Bush said he'd consult the UNSC again if and only if Chirac promised not to obstruct the process next time, and Bush made it clear that if there was any sign whatever of obstruction that he'd kiss off the UN entirely. With a congressional authorization for war in his pocket and a major electoral victory just behind him, this was no empty threat. Chirac, anxious to encourage at least the appearance of American multilateralism, has decided that it's better to give America what it wants than to try to stand up to us and by so doing prove that France and the UN are unimportant.
The US is going to do what it wants to do, but France can make it look multilateral by agreeing to American plans ahead of time. Any hope that France could actually alter American plans died Tuesday.
The administration is making very clear in all its commentary that it interprets this resolution as not requiring a second UNSC resolution. For instance, UN Ambassador John Negroponte told the UNSC itself the following:
The resolution makes clear that any Iraqi failure to comply is unacceptable and that Iraq must be disarmed. And one way or another Iraq will be disarmed. If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a further Iraq violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq.
In other words, we'll continue to work with you but only as long as you work with us. Cross us and you join the League of Nations on the ashheap of history. If indeed there was such a deal between Chirac and Bush, then this speech by Negroponte is a message to Paris that we won't put up with the same kind of crap next time. We will ask, but the answer better be "yes" and it better be fast. (And Bush himself has emphasized, yet again, that he does not feel bound.)
The reason why we'll ask when the time comes, and why we'll get what we want (a second resolution almost immediately authorizing war) is because it will be less important to us than to France and Russia. In reality, we'll be doing them a favor by asking, and everyone knows it.
There's been speculation about why Syria went along with it. That's actually pretty straightforward. If France's threat of veto turned out to be unimportant, a "no" vote or abstention by Syria was completely meaningless given that the other 14 members of the council all voted "yes". But if Syria had not voted "yes" that would have given the US something to point to later if we come into potential conflict with Syria, which remains a distinct possibility. It would have been a pointless show of bravado which could easily have come back to haunt them later. They made a face-saving claim to diplomatic victory (diplomats are always successful!):
Syria's deputy U.N. Ambassador Fayssal Mekdad said Damascus voted "yes" after assurances from Washington and Paris "that this resolution would not be used as a pretext to strike Iraq." The resolution "reaffirms the central role of the Security Council" and Iraq's sovereignty, key issues for Syria, he said.
Of course, the fact that it does nothing of the kind isn't important. It will end up being used as a pretext for attack, it affirms the impotence of the Security Council, and Iraq's sovereignty is about to get trampled.
Meanwhile, Schröder is also attempting to declare victory:
The resolution also satisfied German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who angered Washington with his vocal opposition to war during his re-election campaign in September.
"The decision...to go to the U.N. Security Council and to choose the route of multilateralism was thereby proved right," Schroeder said in a statement.
It hardly matters, of course, that the American decision to go to the UN had nothing to do with multilateralism, and the result came about through sheer power politics rather than being settled in the spirit of compromise and justice. (As if.)
Everyone sees the bandwagon. Everyone knows what direction the wind is blowing. None of them are fools. (Well, maybe I shouldn't go that far.)
With regard to international obstruction, the worst is over, and you'll get progressively more and more support now as nations decide they'd better try to suck up to the side that's obviously going to win. They all know now that war is inevitable, and what they want to avoid is being remembered later by America as having opposed the US or of siding with Iraq. It is realpolitik; there's not the faintest trace of idealism here.
Even France is doing so:
But French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin hinted that Paris may take part in any military action against Baghdad should it become necessary.
"If there were serious violations, obviously the Security Council would meet again and we would accept our responsibilities," Villepin told TF1 television.
It is entirely possible that when the time comes that France will be permitted to make a token contribution, but I think there's no chance whatever that it will be substantial and I think there's no chance whatever that it will be relied on or given any critical assignment. After French refusal to carry out a bombing mission in Afghanistan in the heat of battle last March, I do not think General Franks will be in any mood to take any further chances with them.
But there's no obvious value for the US in deliberately insulting and degrading France (satisfying though it would be), and if France ceases to be an obstacle, and if the effective cost is low, then France will be allowed to posture and pretend that it's involved. Irrespective of public posture, Chirac has accepted the reality that France is no longer a "great power". He made his big attempt to stand up to us, and lost.
A lot of nations will probably be permitted to make token contributions. In fact, I expect a token German contribution. But for all the claims about victory for the idea of multilateralism, the converse was actually true. This was a victory for American/British "unilateralism". It proved that Bush won't back down in the face of international pressure when he's determined to do something, and that Blair is also steadfast. (And I'd like to affirm, yet again, my admiration of and gratitude to Tony Blair.)
In the immediate future, there are three things to watch for. First will be whether the government of Iraq actually signals full consent by next Friday. I think the highest likelihood is that they'll signal partial consent; they'll agree but with reservations. Second will be whether the report required 30 days from now will be ready on time and whether it will actually will turn out to conceal or lie.
Third will be what the inspectors do when they return to Iraq in ten days time. I know what I hope will happen, but I can't be sure it will because it will depend on who the inspectors are and how motivated they are. Ideally, some of them will go to Iraq with lists in hand provided by British and American intelligence of "interesting" places to look, and that some of the inspectors will immediately visit one or more Presidential palaces and others will go see things that Iraq wishes we didn't know about. They won't actually be ready for anything like thorough inspections for weeks, but I hope to see such visits immediately anyway.
There's good reason why the inspectors should want to do that, because they need to establish immediately to Iraq that they're not going to knuckle under this time and avoid looking at some things just because doing so might anger the Iraqi government. What with all the concessions that the inspection process ended up making to Iraq last time, it's important to set a precedent immediately that it's not going to be like that. Such visits in the short term may find things but won't by any stretch be adequate, but the mere fact of doing so will be very important.
If they actually do that, then within a very short period of time someone in Iraq will do something stupid, and then we'll have our material breach (i.e. our justification for war under this UNSC resolution). I just hope that it doesn't cost any of the inspectors their lives.
The UN resolution requires that IAEA and UNMOVIC choose their inspectors for reasons of technical value (which overturns the previous principle of selection based on political alignment and acceptability to Iraq) and that should mean that a lot of them are American and British and Australian. If so, I think those can be relied on to stand up to Iraq in this way. But given that UNMOVIC is moving so soon, they're likely to go in with the inspectors they have now, and I'm not sure that they're going to have that kind of motivation.
Which is why I'm putting my money on the IAEA to be the ones to end up pushing the envelope and to first encounter Iraqi resistance.
One way or another, I think it virtually certain that one of these three things will happen within the next five or six weeks, after which the UNSC will hold a pro forma meeting and approve a second resolution in parallel with final mobilization for war. Any conception that the resolution passed today somehow represents a path to peace is a drug-induced fantasy.
denbeste.nu |
