Sandy Berger is "Good to Go." But only if everybody else joins us.
washingtonpost.com
Demonstrate Iraq's Deception
By Samuel R. Berger
Wednesday, December 11, 2002; Page A33
With Iraq's weapons declaration and its repeated assertions that it does not possess weapons of mass destruction, some now argue that we should, after digesting the declaration, immediately go to the U.N. Security Council, declare material breach and go to war along with whoever will join us. Others prefer to give the inspectors however long they need, perhaps in hopes that the day of reckoning will never come. Both approaches are wrong.
The threat posed by Saddam Hussein is real, particularly as he develops nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iraq would change the power equation in a vital region in ways that are dangerous and strategically unacceptable to the United States -- and it is highly unlikely Hussein will give up these programs voluntarily.
If the threat is real, however, so are the risks of military action. We can hope for the best -- a swift assault that decapitates Hussein's regime before missiles are launched or oil fields exploded; crumbling support from his military; manageable rumblings in the region; a joyous population, and the establishment of a government that has broad legitimacy throughout the country.
But we must be prepared for more difficult contingencies, any of which is possible: biological or chemical weapons launched against our troops; similar attacks against Israel, causing the conflict to break along an Israeli-Arab fault line; more serious disruption in the region -- at worst, regime change in Pakistan or Jordan; increased terrorism directed against American interests; conflict between Turkey and the Kurds. There also is the prospect of U.S. involvement in post-Hussein Iraq that is messy, brutish and long, as we face civil unrest, a million already-misplaced persons inside Iraq seeking to return to homes that have since been occupied, deconstruction of major Iraqi institutions now in the hands of regime officials, and a struggle for power among various claimants, internal and external.
All these risks are substantially increased if this conflict is seen in the region as essentially a U.S.-British enterprise. Conversely, the risks are greatly diminished if the conflict is seen as an international coalition confronting Hussein, as in the Gulf War. And those perceptions will turn in no small measure on how we handle the Iraqi declaration in the days and weeks ahead.
Iraq has drawn its line in the sand. American and other analysts now will review the declaration against previous Iraqi declarations, gaps that were unaccounted for when the inspectors were expelled in 1998, information from defectors and our continually accumulating intelligence. Based on our assessment of the most apparent discrepancies, we must share at least selective intelligence with the inspectors and press them to give urgent priority to targets of greatest opportunity and concern, using all the authority they have.
We should not accept an endless, desultory inspection process. The Security Council has given these inspectors sweeping authority, including to interview Iraqi weapons experts, out of the country if appropriate. We must insist it be used robustly, focusing on the most glaring gaps and inconsistencies to reinforce our own case of Iraqi deception. The burden of proof is on Iraq, and there it must remain. Inspectors, for example, can demand from Iraq, in specific instances, credible evidence to account for weapons that Iraq previously acknowledged it had but now claims, without proof, have been destroyed. Inspectors cannot assemble all the pieces of the puzzle. They cannot disarm an intransigent Iraq. But they can help establish that Hussein has no interest in the puzzle being solved, exposing Iraq's intransigence for all the world to see.
If we use a sweeping inspection regime we were instrumental in creating to help demonstrate Iraq's deception -- rather than proceed on the basis of national assertions alone -- we will strengthen the legitimacy and broaden the support for military action that may be necessary, whether or not a second Security Council resolution is possible. A military assault on Iraq would still carry risks and burdens, and it is incumbent on the administration to discuss them forthrightly with the American people. But it would be far better if those costs were broadly shared, not sharply and most dangerously focused on us.
In his press conference after the Security Council resolution was adopted, President Bush said the question of Iraqi disarmament no longer was "whether" but "how." The issue now is how we use all the information and tools at our disposal to demonstrate Iraq's deception, not just assert it, so that if necessary, we confront Iraq with the broadest coalition, and at the least risk possible.
The writer was President Clinton's national security adviser. |
