>>...biological or chemical weapons launched against our troops; similar attacks against Israel, causing the conflict to break along an Israeli-Arab fault line; more serious disruption in the region -- at worst, regime change in Pakistan or Jordan; increased terrorism directed against American interests; conflict between Turkey and the Kurds. There also is the prospect of U.S. involvement in post-Hussein Iraq that is messy, brutish and long, as we face civil unrest, a million already-misplaced persons inside Iraq seeking to return to homes that have since been occupied, deconstruction of major Iraqi institutions now in the hands of regime officials, and a struggle for power among various claimants, internal and external.
All these risks are substantially increased if this conflict is seen in the region as essentially a U.S.-British enterprise. Conversely, the risks are greatly diminished if the conflict is seen as an international coalition confronting Hussein, as in the Gulf War.<<
I don't think this logic necessarily follows at all, I see it more as a leap of faith on Berger's part. He'd have to name specifically which allies could produce this diminished risk, and what is the realistic likelihood they would actually participate. Jordan? Turkey? Is that sufficient? Or do we have to add Saudi Arabia and Pakistan too? Is that even feasible?
"Everybody else" isn't going to join us. Not in any proactive way. They may leap on the bandwagon once the parade starts, but that still implies someone has to start the parade. |
