It seems to me the writer is leaning over backwards to give Saddam the best of all possible interpretations of events. Some facts seem to be ignored in the discussion of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars.
That's just one possible interpretation. Arguably, the point can also be made the war hawks are leaning over backwards to give Saddam the worst of all possible interpretation of events in order to sell a war. The authors are trying to read into the mind of a man, not an exact science. No clear answers here.
In discussing the Iran-Iraq war, he neglects to mention Saddam's claim that Iran's Khuzestan province, which contains all of Iran's oil, was Arab territory and should be annexed to Iraq. Mentioning this would have suggested that Saddam's purpose in starting that war was not a defensive move as the writer claims but rather an imperialist attempt to annex Iran's oil reserves at a time when Iran was isolated and weakened.
The reasons that Saddam initiated a war with Iran-Iraq are, indeed, multifactorial. I would have not suggested the start of this war was purely defensive because, as you have articulated, Saddam has shown he is an opportunist given the weakened state of his opponent. But at the same time, we cannot casually dismiss the remaining substance of the authors' essay for the omission of a single detail because this single piece of information is not critical to the centrality of our discussion: whether Saddam can be deterred?
It is well known the American policy of "two pillars" consisting of Iran and Saudi Arabia was shaky at the foundation from the very beginning. The overthrow of the Shah and the rise of the Ayatollah with his accompanying brand of Islamic fundamentalism brought about the collapse of the two pillars and new challenges to the stability of the Mideast. It became very clear to the United States, Iraq, and the surrounding Arab states of the danger imposed by this new theocracy in Tehran and its spreading influence. Saddam, a secular dictator, attacked Iran to prevent Tehran's meddling and incitement of Iraq's large Shi'ite muslim to the south--something which could potentially weaken his grasp of power and threaten his regime. Of course, the United States was more than willing to assist Saddam in an attempt to contain the spread of Tehran's reach. So was this war purely offensive? Hardly. But was this war also purely defensive? Probably not. Given the weight of circumstances, the nature of the Iran-Iraq was more of a defensive posture than one would suspect.
Coincidentally, Saddam made a similar claim - that Kuwait legitimately should be a province of Iraq - before invading that country. The writer doesn't mention this either. These stated Iraqi justifications for the Kuwait invasion are evidence that Saddam's purpose was to annex the country not just to deal with alleged Kuwaiti over-protection or negotiate favorable financial arrangements.
Once again, the reason for a war with Kuwait are also mutifactorial and portraying Saddam as a binary, amoral robot serves very little purpose. The only point I would like to illustrate with the invasion of Kuwait is the subtle role diplomacy played in escalating the conflict. The infamous meeting between U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie and Saddam shows how miscommunication between two involved parties can have devasting consequences. This is an example of when being blunt superceded the graces of being diplomatic--a task Secretary of State, James Baker, did not take for granted when he made it abundantly clear to Iraq's Foreign Minister that any use of WMDs against American troops during the Gulf War would result in an overwhelming response.
His best argument is that Saddam may have been deterred from using chemical WMD's against us during the Gulf War. Of course, it also possible that Iraqi forces were simply unable to deploy these weapons given the sustained and effective air campaign waged against Iraq. So how can we be sure this was a valid example of Saddam being deterred?
For someone who is making the point that the authors are leaning over backwards to give Saddam the best of interpretations, this hypothesis seems like quite a stretch. <smile> Air power cannot win a war alone. While an effective air campaign was waged against Iraq, the superiority of our air campaign was virtually useless in the location and destruction of Saddam's arsenal of Scud missiles (just ask the Israelis who took the brunt of at least 39 Scuds or so). It would have been well within the Iraqi capability to arm the Scuds with either chemical or biologic weapons to disrupt either the Americans, Israelis, or Saudis. This did not occur.
Also, even if Saddam was deterred from using chemical weapons by our threats to retaliate with our own (presumably nuclear) weapons of mass destruction, that doesn't seem to me to be something we really want to have to rely on very often.
True. But we live in a world where we are presented with difficult choices, and there is no "clear" solution here: deterrence or invasion.
So Americans shouldn't be concerned with someday having to send their troops into a conflict with a nuclear power? One thing that didn't happen during the Cold War is armed conventional conflict between the US and another power who also possessed nuclear weapons. How could we know the conflict wouldn't go nuclear?
Of course Americans should be concerned with that possibility; it is of vital interest to our national security. At the end of the day, who really has the shiny and transparent crystal ball to make these kind of predictions? No one. |
