Yemen, an Uneasy Ally, Proves Adept at Playing Off Old Rivals
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"These people are under the protection of the government," one Saudi diplomat asserted. But Yemeni officials insist that is not the case. Ambassador Hajjri asserted that Mr. Nashiri did not set foot in Yemen during 2002 and therefore could not have been in the company of a Yemeni intelligence officer.
"Yemen is a tough client," said one administration official who follows the Middle East. "We have to hold their feet to the fire to carry through on anything."
Mr. Saleh's allegiance is the subject of an ongoing debate within the Bush administration. The complexities of Yemen's tribal politics underscore the perilous aspects of alliance management in the antiterror campaign where trust is often the first casualty.
The Scud episode proved embarrassing for President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, who decided that the United States had to accede to Mr. Saleh's demand that the missiles be delivered to Yemen's army after they were intercepted at sea.
A senior administration official explained the White House motives more bluntly: the United States needs Yemen. As long as Mr. Saleh allows the C.I.A. to fly pilotless Predator drones over Yemeni territory and cooperates with American Special Forces and C.I.A. teams hunting for Qaeda members, the administration will not allow conflicts over weapons purchases to undermine an important relationship.
A C.I.A. spokesman declined to discuss covert funding to Yemen. A senior administration official acknowledged that money provided covertly could have freed other funds in cash-starved Yemen to purchase the missiles.
The Yemeni ambassador said: "Whatever the U.S. is giving is given with a clear idea on what it will be spent on. You think the U.S. will give money without knowing where it will go or be used for?"
Yemen also needs the United States, the ambassador said. Yemen is home to as many as 60,000 militants who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980's as allies of the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Still, there are an estimated 60 million Kalashnikov rifles in Yemen; some tribal chiefs are so heavily armed that they park Soviet-era tanks in their courtyards, the business end of the barrel facing out. The kidnapping of foreigners by Yemeni tribes to extort favors and concessions from the government is common.
So is terrorism directed at Mr. Saleh's government, most prominently over the past year by a group called Al Qaeda Sympathizers, who have carried out a half dozen bombings and demanded the release from detention of more than 170 of their comrades.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, the Pentagon put Yemen on a potential target list, and Mr. Saleh later told Muslim leaders that he was determined that Yemen not become the next Afghanistan. He flew to Washington to declare his support for Mr. Bush's antiterror effort.
During the White House meeting on Nov. 27, 2001, administration officials said, Mr. Bush told Mr. Saleh that Yemen's cooperation in the fight against terrorism would define relations between Yemen and the United States and between the two leaders personally.
Mr. Bush said a good first step would be the arrest of two of the most-wanted Qaeda operatives in Yemen, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi and Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, American and Yemeni officials said. In Yemen, they are known as Abu Ali and Abu Asem, reputed members of the Qaeda cell that attacked the Cole.
Mr. Bush offered to send Special Forces troops if Yemen's Army was not up to the job of confronting tribal leaders sympathetic to Al Qaeda, a senior administration official said, but Mr. Saleh pleaded for time and patience, saying Yemen's tribal politics — which have fueled frequent fighting in the past, and did not fade away with the union of North and South Yemen in 1990 — made it difficult.
A year ago, the Yemeni leader sent heavily armed troops into eastern Marib Province, a stronghold for Qaeda sympathizers. But instead of making the arrests that Washington was pressing for, the troops were outgunned. Eighteen soldiers died.
Yemen's ambassador blamed the debacle on lack of preparation and "some misunderstanding." Mr. Saleh thought "other more carefully planned attempts" would follow, the ambassador said.
Mr. Saleh quietly told Washington that he was ready to accept assistance and a greater covert American presence in Yemen. C.I.A. financing and special forces training of Yemeni Army forces began early this year, administration officials said.
Last January, Mr. Bush sent an emissary to Saudi Arabia seeking Saudi agreement to conduct covert operations with Saudi and Yemeni forces, including Predator flights from Saudi bases along the Yemeni border. Crown Prince Abdullah gave his approval, Saudi officials said.
C.I.A. and Special Forces teams arrived in Saudi Arabia within weeks. "They are not difficult to accommodate," one Saudi said. "All they need is a warehouse." In the seven months that preceded the first Predator strike, Yemeni and Saudi operatives cooperated to track Qaeda targets, but key Qaeda leaders, like Mr. Ahdal, are still at large in Yemen.
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