The Wall Street Journal published more of Al Qaeda's memos from the computer they bought in Kabul in the fall of 2001. Excerpt:
Perhaps more revealing, however, is the yardstick set by Mr. bin Laden and his lieutenants in messages stored on a computer they used in Afghanistan and in statements issued since Sept. 11 through Arab media and the Internet. The internal messages, placed on the computer shortly before U.S.-backed Afghan troops seized Kabul on Nov. 13, 2001, include communications from Mr. bin Laden to Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader. It couldn't be determined whether Mr. bin Laden stored the documents on the computer himself or they were transferred from a disc created elsewhere.
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Measured against its own expectations, al Qaeda stumbled badly immediately after Sept. 11. Since then, however, it has reshaped its strategy to survive and even thrive as a serious menace. Much of its infrastructure has been destroyed, but the anti-American resentment that underpinned al Qaeda has only increased, creating a fresh pool of potential recruits in addition to those like Mr. Yusuf and his fellow volunteer, both of whom apparently remain at large.
Some of the computer messages indicate Mr. bin Laden miscalculated America's resolve in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror attacks. Shortly before the U.S. bombing campaign, he wrote a soothing message to Mullah Omar, advising the Taliban leader that Washington might shy from military action. Even if America did strike, he added, it would quickly retreat, humiliated like the Soviet Red Army in the 1980s. Either way, he said, America would end up a "third-rate power like Russia."
Mr. bin Laden urged a propaganda campaign to convince the American public that intervention would only lead to "further losses of money and lives." He told Mullah Omar this would "cause a rift between the American people and their government." The letter, signed "your brother Osama bin Mohammed bin Laden," was dated Oct. 4, 2001. Three days later, Mr. Bush announced that U.S. warplanes had launched strikes against al Qaeda camps and Taliban positions.
Raising a New Army
After the bombing began, al Qaeda evidently hoped for a replay of the anti-Soviet jihad, and drafted a budget for the raising of a new army of mujahedeen. Its bookkeepers estimated it would cost $670,000 to arm and clothe 2,000 fighters, each getting a Kalashnikov rifle, four grenades, two pair of socks, slippers and a hat. But panic was already taking root: One Arab militant used the computer to draft a letter that asked for his cash to be moved elsewhere.
Mr. bin Laden fretted about his own safety. In a separate letter, he anxiously told Mullah Omar the U.S. intended to "arrest all those whom America terms terrorists, at the head of which is my weak person." He said Mullah Omar would likely be killed. The letter doesn't appear to have been finished.
In the ensuing weeks, al Qaeda leaders scrambled to save themselves and their cause. They abandoned grand plans to extend what, in Afghanistan, had become a parallel state with territory and its own bureaucracy. Instead, they rebranded al Qaeda as a champion of Palestinians and Iraqis, people in whose suffering Mr. bin Laden hadn't previously shown serious interest. They also set about salvaging their core activity: suicide terrorism.
"Stimulating jihad against the Crusader aggression requires a stepping up of incitement to jihad, of training and preparation, of martryrdom and of spending for God's cause," said Mr. bin Laden in a message stored on the computer.
Al Qaeda chiefs homed in on what they saw as the West's big weakness: its struggling economy. They inflated their image with boasts of having crippled capitalism. In one of his messages to Mullah Omar, Mr. bin Laden reported with glee that "many American and European airlines are on the verge of bankruptcy," and "seven out of every 10 Americans suffer psychological problems following the attacks on New York and Washington."
'Glorious Tuesday'
The most detailed account of al Qaeda's thinking immediately after Sept. 11 is a rambling 52-page essay, "The Truth About the New Crusade," that crows about the success of "Glorious Tuesday" and calls for a "thousand more operations like these." Stored in draft form on the Kabul computer and later revised slightly and distributed abroad to rally recruits, the text includes hints that the White House was among the targets. It refers several times to the "destruction of the World Trade Center, the Defense Department and the White House."
The author apologizes for "errors and deficiencies" due to hasty composition. Nonetheless, he wanted his work preserved for posterity: "Please Translate into English and Keep at the Library of the American Congress," says a note appended to the computer draft. On its cover: a drawing of a hand smashing a plane into a black map of the U.S., along with the flags of America and Israel and a skull-and-crossbones banner.
The draft version is unsigned, but authorship was claimed this year by Ramzi Binalshibh, who had roomed with hijacker Mohamed Atta in Hamburg, Germany. Mr. Binalshibh, who wanted to be a hijacker but couldn't get a U.S. visa, gave a revised edition to Yosri Fouda, a journalist for the Arab-language television channel al-Jazeera, who interviewed him in May. Called the "Second Edition," this version had a more polished cover, a montage of photos from Sept. 11.
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