I am getting a feeling from the Public Intellectual "Fencesetters" that they are frustrated with the Arabs and leaning more and more toward "Slum Clearance."
The obvious problem with this formulation is that once your “slum clearance” is done, you’re still dealing with the Arabs, and the frustration is likely continue.
It’s easy to clear a slum. Making sure that the cleared area does not revert to slummery is a somewhat thornier problem, and I see no evidence that anything resembling a coherent plan for approaching that problem is in place. I see no little or no discussion at all of the specific requirements for the development of a functioning democracy in Iraq, and how they are to be provided, none at all of the risks that are likely to emerge and how they are to be managed. I don't see even the most basic rudiments of a plan. Ajami suggests, albeit obliquely, an extended period of foreign rule under a “High Commissioner”. Others suggest installing a government and getting the hell out ASAP. Each strategy has attendant risks and potential rewards, as do all variants in between. What exactly do we plan to do? How exactly do we plan to do it? Where is the discussion?
Most obvious, of course, is the question of duration. Do we have the commitment to stay the course, even if it turns out to be an extended course? The example in Afghanistan is not encouraging. I sometimes get the feeling that we are prepping for a sprint and showing up for a triathlon, which is not terribly encouraging.
You are so unhappy with our present leadership that I think I am detecting a hint of "Paleoconservative" in your postings… are you ready to join the "Buchanan" camp?
Buchanan begins with some valid observations, though by the time he filters them through his ideological bias there is little substance left. It is very true that democracy does not necessarily, automatically, or instantly produce good government. Many countries have elected very bad governments. The results of the democratic process are unpredictable, and can often run counter to our interests and those of the nation in question.
Does this mean that democracy is not possible in the developing world, or is not a valid goal? Buchanan might say so. I don’t. I would say that democratization is likely in most cases to be an extended process, often involving periods of internal instability and extreme vulnerability to outside intervention. It is likely to involve false starts: regressions back into non-democratic government as frustration with the corruption and process gridlock so common in emerging democracies sets in.
None of this means that democracy is a bad thing, anywhere. After all, our own democracy did not exactly spring into being in its current form. In the early part of the industrial revolution our government was controlled by elite factions and was as corrupt as any of today’s 3rd world backwaters. Human rights? Americans kept slaves for 100 years, and virtually annihilated the nation’s indigenous population. Stability? We had to fight a civil war as ferocious as anything we’ve seen in Africa to clarify the interface between the rights of States and central government control.
Did any of this mean we were not suited for democracy? No. It just meant that democracy had to grow, and we had to grow with it.
If we set out to promote democracy without an acute awareness of the extended growth processes involved, we are setting ourselves up for frustration and failure. At this point I don’t even see a consensus definition of what democracy is, and how progress toward it is to be measured, let alone practical discussion of the obstacles that will emerge and the means by which we intend to address them. All this makes me wonder we aren’t proceeding with excessive hubris, assuming that because we can defeat any army, we can achieve any goal. I don’t think that’s necessarily the case. There are things armies can’t do. |
