Don't you think OBL considered that before he started this one on 9/11, and don't you think the gov. who support and give comfort to Al qaeda have considered that?
I thought we were talking about Iraq?
Isn't it too late to think the war against terrorists will be resolved peacefully.
You are taking a chapter out of Bush's book. Iraq, OBL...all the same. OBL attacks NY and Iraq is to blame. Or is it that if one frustrates you and you are unable to bring him to justice, going after the other will keep the public from noticing it and will make them feel like you are doing something about terror.
As for your NK conflict, what crisis? Just because NK wants to scaremonger with its bombs, doesn't mean we necessarily have to get our undies in a bunch over nothing. Have a little patience, China or Russia will bring NK in line shortly.
Very convenient to rely on China and Russia to clean up GW's mess in NK...I hope he remembers when they refuse to also go along with him to create another in Iraq.
Al
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North Korea has a point
By David Kang
Published: January 2 2003 19:40 | Last Updated: January 2 2003 19:40
George W. Bush's administration is right to ease the pressure on the North Korean regime, since
the events of the past month have threatened to spiral out of control. But the US still lacks a
long-range strategy to resolve the peninsula's tensions.
In a nutshell, the problem is this: the US refuses to give security guarantees to North Korea until it
proves it has dismantled its weapons programme. The North refuses to disarm without security
guarantees from the US. Hence, stalemate. Without movement towards resolving the security
fears of the North, resolution of the nuclear weapons issue will be limited.
The US and North Korea are still technically at war - the 1953 armistice was never replaced with
a peace treaty. The US has been unwilling to discuss even a non-aggression pact, much less
normalisation of ties. While the US calls North Korea a terrorist nation and Donald Rumsfeld
discusses the possibility of war, it is no surprise that it feels threatened.
The 1994 Agreed Framework was a process by which both sides set out slowly to build a
sense of trust. But both sides began hedging their bets early in that process. Since neither the
US nor North Korea fulfilled many of the agreed steps even during the Clinton administration, the
framework was essentially dead long before the recent nuclear revelations.
The accepted wisdom in the US is that North Korea abrogated the framework by restarting its
nuclear weapons programme. But both Clinton and Bush administrations violated the letter and
the spirit of the agreement. For example, the US promised under the framework to help North
Korea build light water reactors that could not be used to make nuclear bombs. The first of these
was due to come into operation this year but it was clear in 1998 that it would be at least three
years behind schedule because of US reservations and hesitancy.
Furthermore, the Bush administration made clear from the beginning that it had serious doubts
about the Agreed Framework: the inclusion in Mr Bush's "axis of evil" speech made it clear that
the Bush administration did not trust the North. For the Framework to have had any hope of being
even modestly successful, both sides would have needed to implement the steps much more
enthusiastically.
The collapse of the framework is disappointing because North Korea, unlike Iraq, is actively
seeking accommodation with the international community. In addition to a voluntary moratorium
not to test its missiles until 2003, North Korea has undertaken economic reform over the past
decade. Last July, it introduced a free market system allowing prices to determine supply and
demand for goods and services. In September, it announced a special economic zone in Shinuiju.
Even in the past six months, work has begun to clear a section of the demilitarised zone to allow
reconnection of the railway between North and South Korea. To cap these developments, Kim
Jong-il admitted in September - after three decades of denials - that the North had kidnapped
Japanese citizens in the 1970s.
Economic reforms can be slow to have an effect. But the changes under way in North Korea
matter - and are becoming irreversible. It makes no sense to criticise the North for being
isolationist and then refuse to trade with it. The North needs economic assistance to help open
up its economy and ultimately its political system. The US should encourage this trend, not work
against it with a policy of pressure and isolation.
If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons, it would have done so long ago. The
North wants a guarantee of security from the US, and a policy of isolating it will not work.
Isolation is better than pressure, because pressure would only make it even more insecure. But
even isolation is at best a holding measure. Nor would the imposition of economic sanctions - or
economic engagement - be likely to get North Korea to abandon its weapons programme.
Above all, the regime wants better ties with the US. The policy that follows from this is clear: the
US should begin negotiating a non-aggression pact with the North. It should let other countries,
such as South Korea and Japan, pursue economic diplomacy if they wish. If the North allows
back UN nuclear inspectors and dismantles its reactors, the US can move forward to
engagement. But to dismiss the country's security fears is to miss the cause of its actions.
The writer is associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and co-author, with
Victor Cha, of Nuclear North Korea (forthcoming) |
