Paul,
I gather from this post you are now agreeing with my point about Iraq and oil. Our point of disagreement appears to be in your line that the general point doesn't "translate well to specific situations." You then follow that sentence with more text which underlines the fact that without the oil issue, the US would not now contemplate an invasion, even a unilateral one, of Iraq.
If the other nations cannot get their mind around the threat or cannot muster the political will to act, why wait for them? Management by committee is no way to handle a crisis.
This particular formulation fails to include the other variables. A unilateral invasion dramatically reduces the legitimacy of the invasion, dramatically increases the likelihood of severe repurcussions throughout the region, some of which may make matters much worse. You like to talk about leadership and being decisive. One of the features of good leadership, Paul, is knowing its limits. In this case, knowing the limits reduces the negative consequences. So far, much to my surprise, the Bush folk have done a reasonable job here. Despite all the hot air. I'm not entranced by tek's suggestion that the hot air has not affected the material base of US foreign policy, to play with that formulation, but in this case, the hot air appears to have been coupled with some less unreasonable actions. We will see what the future brings.
My point about economic self interest and democratic committment began with the statement 'when percieved in conflict'. I think you missed or ignored it.
I gather, then, that we are in agreement here.
Arafat has convinced me that he has no intention of negotiating peace with Israel.
I disagree with this formulation of the problem in two ways. It's not clear that Arafat has the structural capability to negotiate a peace whether he has the intentions or not. I don't think the question is Arafat; rather it's the leadership selected by the Palestinians. The structural capability arrives when the Israelis will agree to negotiate some settlement in good faith. That, of course, won't end the conflict but it will put its on a different plane. My second problem with your formulation is to leave Sharon and the increasingly right wing, exclusivist agenda he carries, to leave them out of the equation. Just as the present conflict cycle is driving Palestinian politics toward its extremes--Hamas and other jihad parties, so it has driven Israeli politics to its extremes. An op ed piece in today's NYTimes illustrates just how far. I'll post it if I don't see it when I finish reading the thread this morning.
I am glad that Bill Clinton went to the wall to negotiate peace. It exposed Arafat. Now we know what we are dealing with.
Lord, do I wish it were that simple. That process is open to multiple interpretations which we've banged around here, nearly to our communal death. And from what I've read, Arafat does not lead but follows. He waits to see what the consensus is likely to be, then jumps in front of it. So measures to affect the Palestinian consensus need to be considered. And, of course, as I've typed above, Sharon's actions have contributed, mightily, to the present stew of despair. |
