I don't think you are quite getting the tenor of the argument here, Steven. The neocons who argue that we must do "the right thing" are not arguing that we alone act for altruism (at least, most don't). Rather, they think that "the best defense is offense" and that acting aggressively against both Saddam and the other terrorist-supporting states is in the best interests of both America and Europe, and the Europeans are being have their heads in the sand when they don't see it the same way.
That’s what some people think. Other people – and not all of them are in Europe – think that establishing a precedent for preemptive war in the absence of an imminent and compelling threat, and giving sanction to a war for which no immediate and compelling case has been made, is more dangerous than any threat posed by Saddam. There are arguments on both sides, and it is by no means clear which argument is correct, or indeed if either is entirely correct. Describing one position as “right” assumes what has yet to be demonstrated, and proclaims a clarity that exists only in neocon fantasies.
Much of the UN-bashing that I see these days seems motivated more by childish petulance than anything else. The purpose of the UNSC is not to provide a convenient rubber stamp for whatever the US wants to do. The UNSC is not convinced that this war is necessary. That’s not because they are inutile or because they have their heads in the sand, it’s because the Bush administration has not presented a terribly convincing case in support of war.
There are many in the world who believe that war is not a matter of convenience, but that it is the device of last resort, to be used only when absolutely necessary, when no other means are possible. Many people and many nations are not convinced that this is the case in the current situation, and the administration’s arguments to the contrary have not been particularly effective. The Rwanda argument, that military intervention is necessary to prevent an immediate human rights catastrophe, might have been successfully invoked a decade ago, but it cannot be now. No convincing connection has been made between Saddam and 9/11, and there is no real evidence that removing Saddam will significantly degrade the operations of terrorist networks. It has not been shown that Saddam presents a threat to the US sufficiently compelling and immediate to justify war. We are arguing, in essence, that we want to go to war not because we are threatened, but because we think we might be in the future. This justification is widely perceived as inadequate. It is not the responsibility of the UN to accept our arguments simply because we are the ones making them. It is our responsibility to convince the community of nations that the action we seek is necessary.
Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the UNSC is not eager to sanction the war. If two other countries were involved, it’s not likely that we would sanction a war in similar circumstances. India’s case for preemptive war against Pakistan is far more compelling than the US case for preemptive war on Iraq, and we are not exactly eager to see that war break out. It has been suggested that we must argue that we do not seek a blanket sanction for preemptive war, but that Iraq is a special case. Unfortunately, the only discernably special feature about it is that we are the ones who want the war.
Some Americans claim that if the UN fails to sanction a war on Iraq it will effectively be pronouncing its own inutility. The opposite is actually the case: if the UN sanctions a war that most of its members think unnecessary simply because the US desires it, it might as well disband and declare the world an American colony. |
