zonder, if you are truly interested on the health effects of exposure to depleted uranium you could read the report of the European Commission, Directorate General of the Environment.
europa.eu.int
This report is specifically about the Balkans and the concern about the 10 tonnes of DU ammunition fired in Kosovo.
You may discount this report as it was produced by European experts and probably does not meet the high standards of Iraqi publications. However they conclude:
1. On the basis of an assessment of the possible exposure from depleted uranium, taking all pathways of exposure into account, it is concluded that it could not result in a deterministic radiation detriment, except perhaps in the case of embedded DU shrapnel. The basic hypothesis of radiation protection implies that the stochastic risk exist even for low doses. However at low doses (below 100 mSv) no observable health effect compared to the base line incidence would be observed.
On the basis of available information, it is concluded that exposure to DU could not produce any detectable health effects under realistic assumptions of the dose that might be received. Moreover, in view of the fact that committed doses from incorporated DU build up over a lifetime and in view of the minimum latency period of cancer induction, such effects could not occur during the first few years after incorporation as a result of radiological exposure.
This conclusion applies in particular to leukaemia: while the latency period for leukaemia is shorter than for solid cancers, uranium accumulates very little in blood forming organs such as bone marrow. Following inhalation of insoluble uranium the calculated risk of leukaemia is orders of magnitude lower than the risk of lung cancer induction.
The possibility of a combined effect of exposure to toxic or carcinogenic chemicals and to radiation can not a priori be excluded but there is no evidence to support this hypothesis either. Under the considered scenarios, exposures to DU give low doses, comparable to natural background. Hence there is no reason to believe that chemicals may change the magnitude of the potential radiation effects.
2. Deposition of depleted uranium on vegetation presents a potential for incorporation through the food chain, but it is limited in time until rainfall. Direct ingestion of contaminated soil must be taken into consideration, in particular for children, as well as ingestion throughhand contamination. Direct ingestion of contaminated soil by cattle and sheep as a pathway to human ingestion could also be considered. Doses that may results both from direct
ingestion of soil and contamination of foodstuffs will be extremely low.
Possible contamination of drinking water must be considered since it is a possible pathway of exposure if very large amounts of DU are buried in soil, depending on the solubility of the uranium or the acidity and reducing properties of the environment, and the hydrological characteristics of the region. A generic assessment however yields nothing but very low doses resulting from drinking water.
Test firing or disposal of unused ammunition is being carried out in the sea. Due to the low corrosion rate and to the large volume of surrounding seawater, no detectable increase of uranium concentration in seawater or biota is expected.
3. The experts feel that no useful guidance can be given with regard to the need for monitoring individuals for incorporation of DU without knowing the specific exposure situation. In general it will be more appropriate to monitor the environment rather than individuals. Nevertheless individual monitoring may be useful for confirmatory purposes and to provide reassurance.
4. The experts also conclude that no guidance can be given on the need for intervention measures specific to a given situation. Intervention should be justified taking the specific situation into account. Straightforward general protective measures should be considered on the basis of a common-sense approach to justification for easily avoidable exposures. Where appropriate, specific protection against exposure to depleted uranium should be proposed by a radiation protection advisor with knowledge of the local situation.
5. The experts see no need to derogate depleted uranium from any provision of the BSS, nor to introduce stricter requirements in the BSS for specific uses of DU. |
