US committed to expanding secret bioweapons programs?
[including biocluster bombs] ...
"Questionable activities
After Nixon renounced offensive bioweapons programs, the biodefense program was essentially unclassified. Housed mainly in the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, its only classified portion was a small, analytical (not experimental) threat analysis component. Now the Energy Department, Defense Department, and even the CIA conduct classified biodefense programs. When this change began—and why—is unclear. It appears to have begun early in the Clinton administration, at a time when government concerns about bioweapons in the hands of terrorists were growing and agencies’ roles in the post–Cold War world were changing. Presumably most of the new programs are legitimate defensive work, but in fall 2001 several programs that may have violated the bioweapons treaty were revealed—and it is likely that others remain closeted.
One of the uncovered projects, run by the CIA, involved building and testing a cluster munition, modeled on a Soviet bioweapon, to spread biological agents. Another secret project, under the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, tested whether terrorists could construct a sophisticated bioweapon plant from commercially available materials without raising suspicions. Project personnel bought the supplies, built the facility, and used it to produce nonpathogenic bacterial spores that were then dried and weaponized. A third project was to be administered by the Defense Intelligence Agency, another Pentagon unit, but it may not have gone beyond the planning stage. It was to have genetically engineered Bacillus anthracis (the causative agent of anthrax) to recreate a Soviet strain thought to be resistant to the U.S. vaccine.
In addition, the investigation into the anthrax letter attacks revealed that the United States had an ongoing program to produce dried, weaponized anthrax spores for defensive testing. How much was made is unclear, but multiple production runs were apparently conducted over many years, and total production must have been in the 10s or 100s of grams of dried anthrax spores. Since a single gram of anthrax spores contains millions of lethal doses, the quantities produced seem unjustifiable for peaceful purposes under the bioweapons treaty. Whether excess spores were stockpiled or destroyed—or whether they can even be adequately accounted for—is unknown.
Under the treaty’s confidence-building measures, agreed to in 1986, the United States made a commitment to annually declare all its biodefense projects and facilities. None of the above programs was mentioned in U.S. declarations.
On dangerous ground
It seems the U.S. government has concluded that the global proliferation of bioweapons is inevitable. Having made this decision, the United States may have concluded that an offensive biological research program was necessary to evaluate the threat, devise countermeasures, and possibly even to eventually develop sophisticated bioweapons. Perhaps this decision follows from secret policy responding to known instances of bioweapons proliferation, or perhaps from a convergent belief in the biothreat among those with policy responsibility in different agencies. September 11 and the anthrax letter attacks lent urgency and credibility to this position, and also sparked greatly expanded funding for biodefense work.
The U.S belief that bioweapons proliferation is unstoppable, paired with its long-standing belief that its security is based on technological superiority, may very well lead to the exploration of biotech applied to bioweapons development, with serious implications for arms control. The consequences threaten to fatally undermine both the bioweapons and chemical weapons treaties, leading to a new arms race.
What might such a world look like? All major military powers could be armed with bombs, missiles, shells, and spray tanks on unmanned aerial drones, loaded with chemical agents that cause stupor, convulsions, panic attacks, hallucinations, or violent sensory experiences; or with genetically engineered biological agents that degrade paint, plastic, rubber, fuel, and lubricants. Some regional powers would have stockpiles of lethal agents like third-generation nerve gases and genetically engineered pathogens. Non-lethal chemical weapons, anti-materiel weapons, and possibly also lethal chemical and biological weapons would likely be used repeatedly in regional conflicts. The proliferation of these technologies would dramatically increase the chances that terrorists would become capable of mass-casualty attacks using chemical or bioweapons. Police forces would be armed with new riot control agents, based on military non-lethal weapons that are much more effective than tear gas. This would greatly increase government power to control civil unrest—a dangerous tool in totalitarian hands, and one for which democracies have little use.
For decades, the United States has based its military strategy on maintaining technological superiority. A program that includes exploring new ways to make weapons using biotech would be an appealing response to the threat of bioweapons. But besides helping the military understand that threat, such a program would also constitute a first step toward an offensive capability.
Of great concern are the calls from the U.S. military to alter or eliminate the bioweapons treaty. Doing so would allow it to develop genetically engineered bioweapons that target military materiel like camouflage paint, tires, stealth coatings, electronic insulation, runway tarmac, lubricants, and fuel.
For more than a decade the military has been exploiting a loophole in the Chemical Weapons Convention that permits chemical agents for law enforcement purposes. It has actively pursued development of non-lethal chemical weapons with the expectation of someday using them in military operations other than war (counterterrorism, hostage rescue, embassy protection, peacekeeping operations, etc.).
The United States is also developing munitions to deliver its non-lethal chemical agents. More and more, biotechnology is being used for this program. Reproducing this approach in its biodefense program would be a natural step for the military. Indeed, the same agency that administers the non-lethal chemical weapons program has serious interest in—and apparently projects on—genetically engineered non-lethal bioweapons. This is pioneering very dangerous ground.
No good secrets
The United States appears to have embarked on a largely classified study, across several agencies, of biotech applications for the development of new bioweapons. The clandestine U.S. programs indicate a willingness to ignore treaty law in favor of maintaining technological superiority in response to the emerging bioweapons threat. And U.S. behavior suggests that its biodefense program is even larger than those portions that have been revealed. This U.S. exploration of the utility of biotech for bioweapons development is unwise, for the rest of the world will be obliged to follow suit. In its rush to stay ahead technologically, the United States runs the risk of leading the world down a path toward much-reduced security. More than 30 years ago, the United States ended its offensive bioweapons program in part because it feared that the program’s very existence invited other nations to imitate it. That wisdom seems to have been forgotten.
Furthermore, the secrecy required by such a program is antithetical to the transparency on which long-term bioweapons control must be founded. It could also spark a global bioweapons arms race. A world in which many nations are secretly exploring the offensive military applications of biotech would be ripe for proliferation. If a country doesn’t know its enemy’s offensive capabilities, military strategists must assume the worst—that the enemy possesses or is developing bioweapons. This will provoke the development of bioweapons for a retaliatory or deterrent capability. And once bioweapons are established in military arsenals and in planning, they will be considered legitimate.
The United States is one of the most open societies in the world, with one of the most democratic governments, but as the world’s preeminent power, the military has great influence—especially when projects are secret and have little oversight. Review and oversight of secret biodefense programs need to be strengthened considerably. It is critically important that Congress, U.S. citizens, and U.S. allies understand and debate the use of biotechnology for military purposes, keeping an eye toward the implications for arms control and proliferation. Perhaps the greatest danger is that the United States will embark on this path without public debate.
Congress must determine the full scope of all classified U.S. biodefense programs. It must develop, with maximum public input, a clear philosophy by which to guide these programs; establish effective ongoing oversight mechanisms; and promote as much transparency in biodefense as possible.
U.S. allies need to press the United States to explicitly disavow offensive bioweapons, to renounce non-lethal chemical weapons, and to commit to transparency so as not to provoke destabilizing suspicions. Cooperation with U.S. initiatives against suspected proliferators might also be conditioned on full U.S. compliance with the letter and spirit of the bioweapons treaty, its confidence-building measures, and the chemical weapons treaty. Arms control organizations and the media must also aggressively investigate biodefense issues.
The United States cannot continue to shroud its biodefense program in secrecy. The only way to ensure that bioproliferation is not a serious global problem is worldwide biodefense transparency—and the United States must lead by example, or no one will follow.
Mark Wheelis teaches microbiology at the University of California-Davis. Malcolm Dando is a professor at the University of Bradford, England, and author of New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control (2001).
Sidebar: Killer “non-lethals”
On October 26, 2002, Russian special forces pumped a Moscow theater full of knockout gas to incapacitate Chechen rebels who had taken hostage more than 700 audience members. Afterwards, Russian President Vladimir Putin said, “We managed to do the near-impossible: Save the lives of hundreds, hundreds of people.” But as many as 130 hostages died, and it was four days before Russia identified the gas as a fentanyl derivative, a calmative that in large doses can lead to a total shutdown of the respiratory system.
It’s not surprising that Russia was tight-lipped over naming the gas; many experts see its use as a violation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). But in the court of Bush administration opinion, Russia had little to worry about—Putin’s decision to use the gas was not criticized.
The United States is also attracted to all manner of antipersonnel and anti-materiel non-lethal weapons, including acoustics (infrasound and “acoustic impact”), opticals (flashes), directed energy (heat beams), as well as chemical agents for smokescreens, stink bombs, pepper sprays, tear gas, slippery foams—and agents like the gas used in Moscow. Non-lethal weapons, promoted as an alternative to violence and a way to resolve situations casualty-free, are a temptation that’s hard to resist.
In early November, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a long-awaited assessment of non-lethal weapons. The report recommended the adoption of non-lethals in naval warfighting and operations, as well as renewed research and development of the weapons in the other branches of service. The report says that a “calmative agent sponge projectile,” which would use fentanyl to incapacitate people, is being studied at the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center “after a lull in R&D for 10 years.” That lull was because of the CWC, which banned the development, stockpiling, and possession of chemical weapons. And although stronger than its bioweapons brother, the treaty has weaknesses—namely, allowing the use of chemical weapons like tear gas in law enforcement and riot control, a loophole that some read as permitting the use of other, more dangerous, chemical agents. According to the NAS, though, “perceived treaty constraints” are an obstacle to chemical non-lethal weapons development “in spite of legal interpretations of the treaty indicating that it does not preclude such work or the employment of such agents in specified and increasingly important military situations.”
The situation in the Moscow theater tragically illustrates why some decry calmatives and other chemical non-lethals as violating the CWC: The gas makes no distinction between combatants and civilians. It successfully knocked out both hostages and captors, but overdoses killed or hospitalized hundreds of innocent people. (Although the gas could be to blame for some deaths among the hostage-takers, most were shot to death while unconscious.) The incident shows the difficulty of guessing the appropriate dose level for a non-lethal weapon, and how deadly an incorrect guess can be.
What happened in Moscow is a reminder that if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. But the big picture is more frightening—if NAS is willing to sidestep treaties, arms control could suffer greatly..... "
FUll ARTICLE AT:
thebulletin.org |
