Each argument is coherent in itself and depends on ones interpretation of a whole slew of supporting data. I don't find M&W compelling, but I can respect the argument.
Disagree.
The weakness of the M&W argument lies in the lack of coherent analysis with respect to the options available to Saddam should he become armed with nukes. His options are broadened considerably with nukes even if one accepts the dubious notion that he is a rational calculator of risk. Deterrence is unlikely to work.
This is what M&W say about Saddam and nukes:
But what if Saddam invaded Kuwait again and then said he would use nuclear weapons if the United States attempted another Desert Storm? Again, this threat is not credible. If Saddam initiated nuclear war against the United States over Kuwait, he would bring U.S. nuclear warheads down on his own head. Given the choice between withdrawing or dying, he would almost certainly choose the former. Thus, the United States could wage Desert Storm II against a nuclear-armed Saddam without precipitating nuclear war.
Ironically, some of the officials now advocating war used to recognize that Saddam could not employ nuclear weapons for offensive purposes. In the January/February 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, for example, National Security Advisor Rice described how the United States should react if Iraq acquired WMD. “The first line of defense,” she wrote, “should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.” If she believed Iraq’s weapons would be unusable in 2000, why does she now think Saddam must be toppled before he gets them? For that matter, why does she now think a nuclear arsenal would enable Saddam to blackmail the entire international community, when she did not even mention this possibility in 2000?
Recall that M&W's major premise is that Saddam is a rational risk calculator. Ask yourself this: As such a cold-blood risk taker, would he be justified in believing that the US would never nuke him because we would refuse to risk the radioactive contamination of Kuwait's and Saudi Arabia's oil fields--perhaps up to 20% of the world's supply--for the next few decades simply because he took them over? I dare say he would be playing good poker if he ignored our alleged deterrence under these circumstances. He is fully justified in thinking that it is not him but us who would be deterred from using nukes. He can make his threats to contaminate the oilfields real, and we'd be powerless to act unless we were willing to risk a worldwide Depression to deter him. He would be probably correct in thinking that we would not.
If you assume that he is not a rational risk-taker--the better view, in my opinion--what does that do to the M&W position? Eviscerate it, I think. |
