The War's Initiation
Feb 20, 2003
Summary
There is speculation in the media that the beginning of an Iraq war has been shifted to mid-March. Although not impossible by any means, this is not an optimal period for meteorological reasons. There are a number of reasons why this shift in timing might take place, but the only plausible one is that new intelligence indicates that more forces are needed than originally planned. That is possible, but two extra weeks won't make a decisive difference. Confusing the Iraqis on the timing of the war appears to be a greater factor in these reports than diplomatic or military considerations.
Analysis
The Washington Times and other media are reporting that sources in the Defense Department have decided that the commencement of an Iraq war must wait until mid-March. The reasons are said to be diplomatic and logistical. The debate in the Security Council might drag on into March and, more important, not all of the armor is in place yet.
These reports may be true, but they are difficult to believe. On the diplomatic front, the only rationale for delay is if it would buy the United States the support -- or at least abstention -- of France and Russia. However, it is difficult to believe that these two countries would regard a few weeks as critical to their position. The idea that they would veto a Security Council resolution for war on Feb. 28 but would have a different position on March 14 is hard to fathom. It is possible, but it is hard to build a war fighting strategy on that assumption.
The failure to deliver sufficient forces to Iraq is more serious. It could depend on two things. First, it could indicate a massive failure on the part of U.S. planners to get their forces into position on time. February has been regarded as the target by planners for quite a while. Moreover, since the Iraqis are also capable of taking actions that would require sudden action, having forces in position by February to take advantage of all contingencies would seem to have been essential. If, as of today, the timetable for deploying troops has slipped by two weeks, this represents a very serious failure by U.S. planners and logistics operators. If the war must be delayed because the deployment was fouled up, this reveals an extraordinarily serious weakness on the part of the U.S. military that will require some massive changes in personnel and policies.
Another explanation is the Turkish situation. The Turks seem to have delayed the U.S. deployment for internal political reasons, and the situation is still tenuous at best. If Washington feels that a northern front, in place, completely equipped and ready to go is essential to the war plan, this might account for the delay. But in our view, the northern front -- while important toward the end of the war -- is less important at the beginning, and the severe terrain of the north will limit the quantity of forces deployed there. Moreover, even if forces were to begin deploying there immediately and with the full cooperation of the Turks, it is a stretch to assume that those forces will be in position with logistical support to begin offensive operations in a month.
Yet another explanation is that the U.S. intelligence has reached a different evaluation of the quality of Iraqi forces or of Iraqi war plans. The founding assumption has been that Iraqi forces were incapable of mounting a sustained defense. U.S. defense officials began warning about a week ago that the Iraqi war is going to be a difficult and potentially dangerous operation. If there has been a re-evaluation of the potential Iraqi capability, there may have been a decision to increase the amount of heavy forces being bought in.
Alternatively, if the Iraqi strategy is shifting from a broad defense to a concentrated defense of Baghdad and the northern, mountainous region, then forces deployed in Turkey do become crucial and the quantity of forces required will increase. But if that is the case, mid-March is still too soon.
A final explanation is that the United States, having given up strategic surprise, still wants to retrain operational surprise. Since the geography of the war is clearly set by the massive U.S. deployment in Kuwait, it is difficult to surprise the Iraqis on that front. But timing is something that might be a surprise. If the Iraqis could be convinced that the war would not begin until mid-March, they might not execute the last minute re-deployments that would be expected, leaving them more exposed in the initial phases of the campaign. Convincing them that they have until mid-March would be a great idea if the attack is actually planned for late February and early March. Secretary of State Colin Powell's trip to Korea late this week and these leaks would help convince them that war was not imminent.
It is certainly possible that the war plan has shifted based on intelligence, and that two additional weeks are going to be needed to bring more forces in. It is less likely that the deployment has been such a disaster that it has failed to keep to its timetable. First, U.S. planners are better than that, second they have had ample time and were not constrained to cut it this fine. Finally, there would be backbiting on this score leaking out. It is far less likely that diplomatic considerations are driving this. The United States, if committed to war, will not give up military advantage for the public relations benefit of a French or Russian endorsement, since neither bring any meaningful forces to bear.
There is a political aspect to this. The longer the U.S. waits, the more global demonstrations there will be and the more possibilities there are of last minute shifts away from the U.S. position. Time does not necessarily play to coalition building at this point -- it could go the other way as well. Moreover, domestic U.S. political support is there, but potentially volatile. It could shift. Waiting another month instead of two weeks carries with it risks. Finally, events in Korea and potential risks elsewhere dictate that, if there is going to be a war, the war should be terminated as quickly as possible.
Therefore, unless new intelligence indicates that substantial reinforcements are needed in the war or unless a northern front is now regarded as indispensable, we are of the opinion that an attack in the Feb. 27-March 4 time frame remains the most likely outcome and is certainly militarily preferable. |
