Human Rights Watch January 2003....IRAQ
hrw.org
(15 page PDF file)
[snip]
The Failure of the United Nations to Act
In 1992, the cumulative force of continuing, consistent reports of a government campaign of terror against the Ma'dan prompted the special rapporteur on Iraq to voice his concerns directly to the U.N. Security Council for the first time. His intervention, on August 11, 1992, came hot on the heels of some of the fiercest aerial attacks the marshlands had witnessed up to that point.36 Human Rights Watch reported that in "late July, after days of aerial strafing of villages south of al-`Amara, especially near the town of Salaam, international observers reported that the main hospital in al-`Amara was overflowing with `hundreds' of casualties. The heaviest attacks, which involved the use highly destructive ordnance against villages, lasted from July 20 to 27."37 On August 27, U.S., U.K., and French forces launched Operation Southern Watch, imposing an "air-exclusion" zone south of the 32nd parallel.38 The Iraqi government's response was simply to change tactics and the result was an overall worsening of the situation.
Notwithstanding the Iraqi government's continuing refusal to cooperate with the U.N.'s human rights mechanisms, the special rapporteur had requested as early as February 1992 "the sending to Iraq of a team of human rights monitors who would remain in Iraq until the human rights situation had drastically improved."39 He justified his recommendation by stating that "this exceptionally grave situation demands an exceptional response-a response that would have to be considered as disproportionate in most other cases of human rights violations."40 In February 1993, he recommended the placement of monitors "in such locations as would facilitate improved information flow and assessment and would help in the independent verification of reports on the situation of human rights in Iraq."41 Such locations included neighbouring countries that were hosts to large numbers of Iraqi refugees, notably Iran and Turkey.
The special rapporteur reiterated his recommendation every year until his resignation in 1999, but it was never acted upon despite being endorsed in annual resolutions adopted by the Commission for Human Rights and the General Assembly. These resolutions had requested the U.N. secretary-general "to provide the Special Rapporteur with all necessary assistance in carrying out his mandate and to approve the allocation of sufficient funds and material resources for the sending of human rights monitors" to Iraq and other relevant locations.42 In an expression of frustration, the special rapporteur took the unusual step of criticizing the U.N. in his 1994 report to the Commission, in which he described his own efforts at monitoring the human rights situation in Iraq as constituting "a bare minimum." He stated that "these modest activities have not been achieved easily owing to the scarcity of resources allocated for the purpose and the very slow decision-making process within the United Nations. Consequently, the Special Rapporteur must record his disappointment that to date no staff has been assigned for specific monitoring purposes nor, so far as he knows, has any discernible and secure budget been allocated for the mandate."43 The special rapporteur's contention that the Iraqi government's continuing repression of the civilian population in the country "is in violation of Security Council resolution 688 (1991) which mandated `that Iraq, as a contribution to removing the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression,'" also fell on deaf ears at the Security Council.
This lack of resolve on the part of the international community effectively gave the Iraqi government a free hand to carry on with large-scale repression. It proceeded to do this through a range of methods that set the pattern for the next several years. Except when it violated the terms of the 1991 ceasefire agreement by using fixed-wing aircraft within the zone, Iraq was essentially left to conduct ground operations backed by helicopters (which were not prohibited under the ceasefire agreement) with impunity. Scores of refugees who had fled to the safety of Iran and who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch in early 1993 were consistent in describing the tactics being used by government forces: 44
Intensified attacks, including indiscriminate bombardment and shelling of residential areas in towns and villages in the vicinity of Basra, al-Nasiriyya, and al-`Amara.
Mass arrests involving house-to-house searches following artillery and mortar attacks on villages. Regular armed forces as well as special forces and Republican Guards were used in these operations. While in most cases those arrested were taken away blindfolded to an unspecified destination and did not return, others were held for several days and then released after undergoing interrogation and torture. This was apparently designed to spread fear among the local population and to demonstrate that despite the imposition of the "air-exclusion zone," the Iraqi government remained in control of the region.
Widespread and deliberate destruction of homes and property through bulldozing or burning.45 This was carried out systematically following the shelling or bombardment of targeted villages, both to prevent the inhabitants from returning and to deprive them of their assets. Similarly, crops and other vegetation were also set on fire, and livestock deliberately were killed.
The indiscriminate laying of land and water mines. The use of unmarked mines was reported in early 1992 but continued after the imposition of the "air-exclusion zone." Most water mines were laid in the al-Hammar and al-`Amara marshes, concealed in and around river entrances leading to the marshes, apparently with the aim of deliberately killing or maiming those entering or leaving these areas.46 Until the drainage works rendered it impossible to use boats as the principal means of transport in the marshes, water mines were also laid in the shallow waters used by the local population. They were reportedly responsible for scores of civilian deaths and injuries, as well as the deaths of large numbers of water buffalo and cattle on which much of the local economy depended. Land mines were used principally in areas cleared for drainage, including in and around destroyed villages, to deter the inhabitants from returning. They were also laid along embankments, apparently to protect them from attack by armed opposition forces.
The denial of medical treatment to injured civilians, particularly to individuals belonging to tribes considered "hostile" to the government, or those whose homes were located in the "prohibited zones" (cleared for drainage or for military purposes). Seeking medical treatment in state-run clinics or hospitals meant risking certain arrest. Where possible, the injured were smuggled to Iran for treatment, but the journey was hazardous and some did not survive it. Civilians who fell ill or required medical treatment for ordinary conditions also faced similar problems, particularly after the government began removing medical stocks from hospitals and clinics from the major cities in the vicinity of the marshes (including Basra, al-Nasiriyya, and al-`Amara) and taking them northwards to areas beyond the 32nd parallel.
The tightening of the economic blockade the government had imposed on the region (as per the `Plan of Action for the Marshes'). This entailed a total ban on the transport into the marshes of foodstuffs, refined oil products, and medicines. Army patrols were reported to be searching travelers into the region, and any food judged to be in excess of a family's needs was either seized or destroyed. Food smugglers who were caught were often harshly dealt with, including by summary execution.47 The U.N. special rapporteur, citing reports from marshes refugees reaching Iran, said that the authorities had denied families who refused to relocate to government housing the monthly food supplies distributed in accordance with the ration card system introduced following the imposition of U.N. sanctions.48 This compounded an already dire situation since, by virtue of the isolation and inaccessibility of the marshlands, some of the Ma'dan were not officially registered in government records and did not possess the identity cards necessary to register for the receipt of rations.
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