from the notebook
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Consciousness & It Place in Nature :
Original paper by David J Chalmers
The natural world is the physical world, but its hard to see how consciousness could be physical. So then we must revise our concept of what it is to be physical, or revise our concept of nature.
Where does mind fit in in this physical world ? C D Broads 4X4 matrix attempts clarification and at the end of his thesis, 3 views are left standing : those which show mentality as an emergent characteristic of a physical or neural substance. In case of neural substance, the physics might be emergent or delusive.
This paper gives a general landscape in which theories of consciousness may fall. Chalmers holds that reductive methods are incorrect and non reductive methods are promising.
1. The Problem : The word consciousness is sometimes used for the ability to discriminate stimuli, or to report information, or to monitor internal states, or to control behavior, but these problems of definition cannot lead us to disbelieve that it is purely physical in nature. The problem of subjective experience – that it understands what it is like to be like them. There is hope, hurt, joy associated with any visual or other stimuli and each of these states is a phenomenal property (or qualia) characterizing what it is like to be in that state. (Easy Problem)
Physical processes in the brain give rise to experience – but how and why do they do so ? Neural and computational mechanism can play a role in explaining the question. It would involve explanation of how physical process interacts with consciousness and leads to experiences. A reductive explanation may explain experiences but would not explain consciousness.A materialist or physicalist theory would see consciousness itself as being a physical process. A non physicalist solution will be a solution where consciousness is seen as on physical. A non reductive solution will be one which assumes that consciousness cannot be further reduced and exists as a basic part of the explanation, as a fundamental law, so to say. Reductive explanation may be found, but so far consciousness has resisted materialistic explanation in a way phenomenon do not. (Hard Problem)
3. Arguments Against Materialism :
Explanatory Argument : The easy problem deals with explanation of behavior and cognitive functions. Physical accounts explain only structures and functions. Thus, explaining structures and functions does not explain consciousness.
(1) Physical accounts explain at most spatiotemporal structure and function ( which really are causal roles in behavior production)
(2) Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain consciousness.
(3) No physical account can explain consciousness.
What cannot be physically explained cannot itself be physical, and so materialism about consciousness is false and natural world contains more than the physical world.
Conceivability Argument : Its conceivable that there is a parallel world of zombies, inverts or partial zombies or a combination thereof. Zombies maybe physically identical to humans except lacking in consciousness, inverts having some different kinds of experiences, partial zombies having only some experiences absent. These will have an identical molecular structures in the brain, their actions may be identical, but their first person experiences will be different. How is it like to be any of these ? There of course is nothing it is like to be a zombie!
It may not be possible for Zombies to exist in our world, with our physical laws, but it is conceivable that God created a similar world for them. Then God must have put in an extra effort to create consciousness in ours. Thus it follows that ours has a little more than physical elements in it.
(1) It is conceivable that there be zombies.
(2) If it is conceivable, then its metaphysically possible that there be zombies.
(3) If it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies, then consciousness is non physical
(4) Consciousness is non physical
The Knowledge Argument : Frank Jackson’s illustration of a neuroscientist Mary, having grown up in a black and white room, knows all there is to know about color, but has never experienced it. Her knowledge of color is incomplete till she comes out of her room and observes the color for the first time.
(1) Mary knows all the physical facts.
(2) Mary doesn’t know all the facts.
(3) The physical facts do not exhaust all facts.
Or
(1) Truths about consciousness are not deducible from physical truths.
(2) If there are truths about consciousness that are not deducible from physical truths, the materialism is false
(3) Materialism is false
The Shape of the Arguments : These arguments establish epistemic and ontological gaps between physical and phenomenal domains in that the truths are non existent, unexplainable and undeducible.
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Ontology concerns the nature of things in the world.
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(1) There is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths.
(2) If there is an epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal truths, then there is an ontological gap, and materialism is false.
(3) Materialism is false.
There are 3 ways in which a materialist may resist the epistemic arguments
4. Type-A Materialism : This asserts there is no epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, or if one exists, it is easily closed. Thus there are no physicalworlds where zombies could exist,no truths which Mary is ignorant about. And so, there is no hard problem of explaining consciousness if one solves the easy ones.
Type A view is one that holds that explaining the function explains everything.
(i) It is conceivable that P and not Q.
(ii) If it is conceivable that P and not Q, it is metaphysically possible that P and not Q.
(iii) If it is metaphysically possible that P and not Q, them materialism is false.
(iv) Materialism is false
It is eliminativism in that it assumes consciousness does not exist and there are no phenomenal truths. Its also analytical functionalism or logical behaviorism in that it assumes consciousness exists where concept of consciousness is defined in functional and behavioral terms. The differences in these two are only terminological since both accept that we’re conscious from the functional point of view (we have functional capacities of acce, control, report etc) and that we’re not conscious from any non-functionally defined sense.
Type A assumes that on reflection there is nothing that needs to be explained over and above explaining various functions. Relevant functions may be subtle and complex involving neurobiological processes etc. Thus views rejecting functionalism on grounds it neglects biology of the role of environment can still be Type A views.
The problem with Type A view is that it denies that we are conscious and that consciousness needs to be explained. Are there any compelling arguments for the claim that explaining functions explains everything ?
It seems to hold for other domains of science, but not for consciousness since there is something additional there which calls for explanation.
In the past, thinkers found epistemal gap for other phenomenon which could be explained away when more sophisticated tools of physics were discovered. But vitalists were behaviorists,in that they felt being alive meant exhibiting certain behavior.
Rejecting A-Type views could lead to dualism.
Some theories argue that there is no need to explain qualia since behavior is independent of qualia, as if only behavior need be explained. Dennett assumes that the disposition to react ad report needs to be explained only.
A way to explain Type-A materialism is to assume that there is an intermediate X such that explaining functions suffices to explain X and explaining X suffices to explain consciousness (bridge). X may be a representation then, so we may be able to explain consciousness in functional terms. But explaining functional representation still doesn’t explain consciousness. Explaining functioning thru a phenomenological point of view doesn’t explain consciousness either and the gap between epistemal and phenomenal remains.
Giving a physical belief about consciousness, the belief that we are conscious etc, may work if beliefs themselves were functionally analyzable. But anyway, they may remove a third person account, but they’re not the first hand experiences.
Intuition that consciousness exists and that there is something that needs to be explained. To deny this intuition needs very powerful arguments, hence there are very few proponents of Type A theory.
5. Type B Materialism : According to these, there is only an epistemal gap and not ontological gap between physical and phenomenal, so zombies are conceivably possible but they’re not metaphysically possible. Thus, Mary is ignorant of some truths inside her room, and these truths concern an underlying physical reality which she learns when she leaves the room.
Most Type B materialists hold that phenomenal states can be identified with the physical or functional states..like water is analogous to H2O and genes are to DNA. Nature of consciousness is different from any physical or functional concept (epistemal gap), but empirically we may find that these refer to the same thing in nature (no ontological gap) and so retain the materialistic worldview.
Its hard to find complete epistemal gap with consciousness as DNA, H2O is all physical whereas consciousness is not. Perhaps Mary could ot deduce the shape of water from the physical knowledge about water, but then, it just proves the point that experiences cannot be physical. Thus a Type B Materialist should hold that identification between consciousness and physical truth in the word must be epistemically primitive and fundamental ie the identity is not deducible from physical truth.
The only place where one finds this is in fundamental laws of physics. This sort of primitiveness is the hallmark of law of nature. If we accept the primitive nature of this law, then consciousness is distinct from any physical property since fundamental laws only connect distinct properties…and this leads to non reductive properties discussed later. Type-B materialist however, maintains that the connection between physical and phenomenal is more like an identity.
If one accepts primitive connection between physical states and consciousness as a fundamental alw the consciousness is distinct from any physical property and so a non reductive views will hold. Type B materialist takes an observed conection between physical and phenomenal states suggesting that it is an identity (physical IS identical with mental) to preserve a prior commitment to materialism. Papineau explained that identities need not be explained, they’re primitive. But in other domains identities can be deduced from basic truths, so they’re not primitive in relevant sense. Block ad Stalnaker suggest that even truths involving water and genes cannotbe deduced from underlying physical truths but epistemal arguments outlined at the beginning suggest strong disanalogy between conciousness and other states. Loar acknowledges that identities are unlike other identities and appeal to unique nature of consciousness.
Identity between mental and physical states is not needed, only that physical states necessitate phenomenal may be proved for materialism to be true ie P is contained in Q be true where P is complete physical truth about the world and Q is the arbitrary phenomenal truth.
There is a sense in which materialism gives up on reductive explanation. Even if Type-B is true, consciousness cannot be treated like genes,coz of the gap between the physical and the nominal thru primitive principles.
6. The Two-Dimensional Argument against Type-B Materialism : Type B hold that zomie worlds are conceivable (no contradiction in P and not Q) but not metaphysically possible ie P a superset of Q is held to be a posterioriori necessity like water is H2O.
If Kripkean cases, conceivability does ot entailpossibility. It is conceivable water is not H2O, its not possible water is not H2O but there is SOME possibility in the vicinity, in the sense that it is metaphysically possible that there is a world W where the watery substance may not be H2O,but XYZ.
Epistemic Argument :W could turn out to be real <a priori> and if it does, then water thee would be XYZ. If that’s so, we should rationally conclude that water is not H2O. The epistemic possibility that W is actual is an instance of the epistemic possibility that water is H2O.
Counterfactual : If W is considered counterfactual <meaning : running contrary to the facts> the character of the actual world is already fixed. If Kripke is right then if the watery stuff had been XYZ,XYZ would not have been water.SO if we consider W as counterfactual world, it does not make ‘water is not H2O’ true. Considered as counterfactual, we describe W in light of actual world fact that water is H2O, so we conclude that XYZ is not water but merely watery stuff.
Applying this principle, if P is complete physical truth about the world, and Q the phenomenal truth. The argument is as follows :
(1) P and not Q is conceivable
(2) If P and not Q is conceivable then a world verifies P and not Q.
(3) If I world verifies P and not Q, then a world satisfies P and not Q or type F monoism is true.
(4) If a world satisfies P and not Q, materialism is false.
(5) Materialism is false or type F monoism is true
Couldn’t understand this part and the part that follows…
7. Type-C Materialism : There is a deep epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal domains but it is closed in principle. Zombies are conceivable to us now, not in the limit. Someday the sciences are going to be developed enough and we can bridge all gaps, so whereas we cannot solve this problem now, the problem, nevertheless, is solvable. The reasoning required is beyond us or because we do not currently grasp all required physical truths. The gap may appear to us, but there is no gap in nature.
This view collapses into Type A or B materialism or Type D Dualism or Type F Monoism.
If the science were to be complete, it could fall into Type-A Materialism with the same arguments for and against it. If we set Type-A materialism aside, the options for closing the gap become highly constrained due to nature of physics and nature of consciousness.
(v) Physical descriptions of the World characterize world in terms of structure and dynamics. We might someday have new theories which define physical in terms of consciousness, but that would be non reductive theory and would fall under F
(vi) From truths about structure and dynamics, we can only deduce further truths about structure and dynamics.
(vii) Truths about consciousness are not truths about structure and dynamics. Mary would know all about the spatiotemporal structure, but it won’t tell her what it is like to see red. And even though consciousness ahs structure and form, the phenomenal structure are different from spatiotemporal structures and representations.
8. Interlude : Quine’s followers reject distinction between conceptual truth and empirical truth,apriori and apostperiori, contingent and necessary. Quineans may reject Type-A and Type-B holding that materialism is true despite the shortcomings. (??) Some Quineans (Dennett) assert that explaining functions explains everything leading to Type-A type problems. Other hold that the two are connected by strong isomorphic connections (Churchland) and so Type-B issues arise. Other may appeal to new discoveries in the future and Type-C problems arise.
Type-A and Type-B are the only valid views. All else collapse into these two. But denying the experience or embracing consciousness as primitive identities are both extreme views.
Consciousness or phenomenal properties, could be fundamental feature of the world like space time mass. Or, consciousness is not fundamental but is necessitated by some fundamental feature X that is not necessitated by physics. We can say proptophenomenal properties are fundamental. Do these relate to the properties of physics by way of psychophysical laws which are undeducible and are taken as primitive ? How can fundamental phenomenal properties be integrated with this causally closed network ?
(i) Type-D Dualism : Denies causal closure of microphysics - There are causal gaps in the microphysical dynamics that are filled by a causal role for distinct phenomenal properties.
(ii) Type-E Dualism: Accepts causal closure of microphysics – Phenomenal properties play no role with respect to the physical network.
(iii) Type-F Monism: Microphysical network is causally closed – Phenomenal properties are integrated and play a causal role by virtue of constituting the intrinsic nature of the physical.
9. Type-D Dualism : Also called interactionism, it asserts that microphysics is not causally closed and that phenomenal properties play a causal, interactive role in affecting the world in that physical states cause phenomenal states and vice versa. The corresponding psychophysical laws will run in both directions then.
Named after Descarte’s substance dualism, where there are separate interacting mental and physical substances, it is also compatible with property dualism where there’s only one substance with physical and phenomenal fundamental properties which are irreducible. It also encompasses emergentist views where phenomenal properties are otological novel properties of the physical system and have novel effects on microphysical properties. This would cause downward causation of mental on microphysical.
Objection : Since there is no nexus between mental and physical, it is often argued that they cannot interact. Argument : Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works, relevant laws are fundamental. Same applies in other laws of physics and could possibly apply to psychophysical laws : there is no need for a causal nexus distinct from physical and mental properties themselves.
Objection : It is incompatible with physics. The microphysical realm is causally closed so there is no room for metal states to have any interaction.
Argument : Experimental sciences have not revealed these effects, but they haven’t been denied either. An addition of the fifth law of physics, an extra force associated with the mental field, may be in order. Wave theory superposed on physical theory and this would just another dimension. Read schrodinger’s evolution and collapse theory. The collapse dynamics, which occurs occasionally, on measurement, leave the door open for an interactionist interpretation. Measurement could be purely a conscious observation, and this conscious observation causes a collapse.
Read more. Bipartite role of quantum mechanics assumes one situation will have special link to mental.
This theory allows conscious states to be correlated with the total quantum states of a system with an extra constraint that such states can never be superposed, but must correlate in a nonsuperimposed, quantum state. Schrodinger’s evolution at the moment of observation would cause observed system to be correlated with brain yielding a resulting superposition of brain states, and so a superposition of conscious states, but since that cannot happen, so one potential conscious state is selected. The results is a definite brain state and a definite state of the observed object are also selected. The same may apply to consciousness and non conscious processes of the brain…when superposed, non conscious states threaten to affect the consciousness and there is some sort of selection. Thus there is a causal role for consciousness in the physical world.
[collapse theories yield predictions slightly, minutely different from no-collapse theories. If experiments could be performed, and collapse theory proved, consciousness could be acceptable and there could even be an exmperical criterion for existence of consciousness.
When superposed non conscious processes threaten to affect consciousness, there is some sort of selection and there is a causal role for consciousness in the physical world.
If physics is to rule out interactionism, then maybe physical theories need to be modified.
10. Type-E Dualism : Also called epiphenomenalism, this holds that phenomenal properties are ontologically different from physical properties and phenomenal has no effect on physical. Physical states cause phenomenal states but not vice versa so psychophysical laws run oly in one direction , from physical to phenomenal.
Type-E dualism is compatible with substance dualism, with property dualism and with emergentism.
It respects both science ad consciousness and supports anti materialist arguments about consciousness and closure arguments of the physical.
Objection : It is counterintuitive coz if Type-E dualism holds, then phenomenal states have no effect on our actions eg sesation of pain will not cause hand to move away from the flame.
Argument : Still, there is nothing which may cause us to reject it outrightly.
Objection : If consciousness is epiphenomenal then it couldn’t have evolved thru natural selection.
Argument : If evolution selects certain physical properties, then psychophysical laws ensure that the phenomenal properties are initiated too. Thus as physical systems increase in complexity, more complex consciousness may evolve. Thus consciousness may be a byproduct.
Objection : Its strange to assume consciousness plays no role in my utterances of the words “I am conscious”. If consciousness does not lead tophysical states and belief are physical states then consciousness doesn’t cause beliefs.Even if beliefs are not physical, how can consciousness cause beliefs?
Argument : Knowledge doesn’t always need a causal connection. Consciousness plays a role in formulating phenomenal concepts ad phenomenal beliefs.
Objection :My zombie twin would produce the same report “I am conscious” by using same mechanism and if his reports are unjustified, so are mine.
Argument : The zombie produces the reports without experiencing in first person. As such, even if his report is identical, his experiences are not. That still makes a difference.
Objection : If psychophysical laws are independent of evolution, there must be a world same as ours with different psychophysical laws, so there is mismatch between reports and experiences.
Argument : These are most natural laws, with burden of proof here.
Coherent view without fatal problems but inelegant producing fragmental picture of nature where physical and natural properties are weakly integrated in the natural world.
11. Type-F Monoism : Consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of the fundamental physics entities.Thus phenomenal and protophenomenal properties lie at the fundamental level of physical reality. Bertrand Russell asserts consciousness and physical world maybe deeply intertwined. In such an assumption, nature consists of entities with intrinsic protophenomenal qualities standing in causal relation within a spacetime manifold. Physics emerges from relations between these entities and consciousness emerges from their intrinsic nature. The view is compatible with causal closure of microphysics and with existing physical laws.
This view has elements of materialism and dualism. Dualism is an obvious conclusion, but If properties are intrinsic, it can be seem as a totally materialistic view. View supports phenomenal or protophenomenal properties as ontologically fundamental. It fits materialism as well as antimaterialism. Panpsychism, with phenomenal properties ubiquous at the fundamental level, or one could call it panprotopsychismwith either phenomenal or protophenomenal properties lying at the center of all physical reality.
Some F-Type theorists may hold that complete physical description must be expanded to include intrinsic properties, thus denying the conceivability of zombies. Some may feel that intrinsic properties are indirectly referred to thru the disposition of the physical, thus the conceived world is structurally identical to ours, not physically.
As for knowledge argument, if Mary had been aware of intrinsic properties of color red, she may have known what it was like to see red.
This seems to be strange but rational view, and if it were true, thing would appear to us just the way they do. But our phenomenology has a rich experience and it is not clear how all physical entities with their intrinsic properties could add up to form this rich structure rather than a disunified jagged collection of phenomenal spikes. This is termed as the Combination Problem for Panpsychism, or tructural mitatcg problem for Russellean views. To understand this, we need to understand the compositional principles. We have a good understanding of physicalcomposition, but no understanding of principles of phenomenal composition. Some F-monoists may argue that phenomenal properties are properties of high level physical dispositions (those involved in neural states) and need not be constituted by intrinsic properties of microphysical states (hence they may deny paprotopsychism). But if low level network is causally closed and hight level intrinsic properties ar eot constituted by low level intrinsic properties, hi level intrinsic properties will be phenomenal all over again unless we deny the causal closure of physical properties…but then that’s Type D dualism !
This may provide the best integration theory for physical and phenomenal within the natural world.
12. Conclusions: Other options for non reductionism ? Some onmaterialists hold that phenomenal properties are ontologically wholly distinct from physical properties, microphysics is causally closed but phenomenal pays a part in it nevertheless. This could happen by causal overdetermination : physical states causally determine behaviour but at the same time phenomenal causes behaviour too. This could also happen by causal mediation :In microphysical causation from physical state P1 to P2, there is a causal connection from P1 to the mind to P2, so mind enters the nexus without altering structure of network. This is called Type-O dualism.
Idealist non materialists hold that physical world is constituted by conscious states of an observing agent (Type-I monoism). Here, separate microphenomenal states do not underlie each physical state but physical states are constituted holistically by a macroscopic phenomenal mind.
Chalmer sees the best theories as Type D Dualism, Type E dualism, or Type F monoism ie, interactionism, epiphenomenalism and panprotopsychism. Empirical science may give some guidance. Even though its hard to see how materialism could be true, materialism must be true since alternatives seem unacceptable, and, consciousness has a fundamental place in nature. |
