An update on local developments. This is a sideshow, of course, but potentially a thorn in the side as well. It’s also a good example of how loose lips, uncoordinated statements, and refusal to consider the legal and public opinion constraints that allied governments have to manage can complicate operations before they even begin.
Somewhere between 1700 and 3000 American troops (different sources cite different figures), apparently including around 350 Special Forces and some Marine units, are or soon will be deployed to the Philippine island of Jolo, along with the amphibious assault ship Essex and supporting vessels. The operation has been sold here as a joint training exercise, with US troops giving field training to local forces that are supposed to be pursuing the Abu Sayyaf, a group of around 200 bandits active on Jolo and the neighboring island of Basilan. As the story is told locally, the Americans will be armed but are not supposed to initiate combat, though they can return fire if fired upon.
This probably sounds familiar, and it should. A very similar operation was conducted on Basilan some months back, at a time when the Abu Sayyaf were holding several hostages, including two Americans. The success of the operation was mixed: a prominent Abu Sayyaf leader was allegedly killed in a sea encounter (no body was recovered), one hostage was rescued, another was killed. The Abu Sayyaf continued to operate, moving their primary base to Jolo while remaining active on Basilan.
The whole affair generated a lot of controversy in the Philippines, and many elements opposed to the current government jumped on it (the nationalist card is always eagerly played by opposition politicians). The main sticking point is that the Philippine Constitution expressly prohibits foreign troops from entering the country except under the provisions of a Senate-approved treaty ratified by both parties. That’s why the operations are called training exercises: such exercises are permitted under the existing Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). There is some question of whether the VFA meets the constitutional requirement of approval by treaty, as the VFA, while treated by the Philippine government as a treaty, has not been ratified by the US Senate and is, to the US, merely an agreement.
The VFA covers training exercises, and does not permit combat deployment of the visiting troops. This is why the Basilan operation had to be classified as a “training exercise”, and why the current deployment to Jolo is being treated the same way.
Naturally, a lot of people question whether the deployment of armed “advisers” carrying live ammunition in the middle of a combat zone falls legitimately under the definition of a training exercise. There’s also been a lot of worry on the pro-American side that there would be an incident involving Americans, something which the local media and the politicians riding the anti-American bandwagon could exploit.
The Basilan operation went off pretty smoothly, from this perspective. The Americans managed to stay out of the spotlight on the combat side, built roads, bridges, etc., earned high marks from the locals, at least the locals that the media could reach, and generally kept their hands clean. The left tried to create an incident at the last minute by claiming that an American soldier had shot a local who was in the process of being arrested. The issue dissolved when it became quite clear that a Philippine soldier had shot the man (in the leg), that the American in question (a medic) had probably saved the man's life, and that the fellow being arrested was wanted for a number of major crimes.
I’m sure a lot of the Americans came away feeling that they could have done a better job of eliminating the Abu Sayyaf if they hadn’t been working under such narrow constraints.
So now we’re doing it all over again, this time in Jolo. The Philippine Government painstakingly explained that the Americans will be there in a training and advisory role, that they wouldn’t be going into combat, etc., etc. Until quite recently, the operation seemed to be following the pattern set by the previous Basilan deployment, and the controversy was active but manageable.
Then, just a few days back, a number of major media outlets in the US released quotes from an unnamed Pentagon official, who allegedly said things like this: “this is different… this is an actual combined operation, and it is US forces accompanying and actively participating in Philippine-led offensive operations… to disrupt and defeat the Abu Sayyaf."
This pulled the rug straight out from the people who were cooperating with us, and created an unholy mess. Opposition to the exercise immediately shot outside the confines of the left, and is being picked up everywhere. Even people who generally support the US are pretty sure that the local administration has negotiated an illegal foreign deployment and lied to the public about it. There are a lot of unhappy people here, and the government is definitely on the defensive. There is talk of Senate action and a challenge before the Supreme Court (the Philippine Supreme Court, of course).
The only explanation that the Macapagal administration has to offer is that the statement must have been made by an official who didn’t know what he was talking about, and that the US media got taken for a ride by a story with no factual basis. Not too many people are buying it.
I suspect that the statement actually was made, whether in ignorance or not, and I suspect that it’s yet another manifestation of the spread of the ToughTalk virus, which inspires otherwise mild individuals to swagger about inserting their feet into their mouths and creating all sorts of unnecessary opposition to the programs they are supposed to be trying to advance. If the statement was made, I hope they track the idiot down and either feed his tongue to the piranhas or consign it to swabbing out the DOD toilet gallery. With a few short words that person just whipped the domestic rug out from under one of the only governments in the developing world that is reliably and consistently pro-US. That’s just dumb. It may sometimes be necessary to do things that you have to say you aren’t doing – though in this case I don’t think it’s either necessary or on the positive side of any risk-benefit equation – but it isn’t very smart to send people out to talk to the press about them.
Of course clarification was sought, but none was forthcoming. White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer’s comments the next day: "the Armed Forces of the Philippines will conduct operations supported by United States troops against the Abu Sayyaf Group. The Armed Forces of the Philippines has the lead and US forces will assist them.".
Of course the US troops will remain under US command. Fleischer’s comments, which did not say anything about a training exercise, have been interpreted here, sensibly enough, as meaning that the deployment is indeed a joint combat exercise. Unfortunately, that would make it completely illegal according to the Philippine Constitution.
I have to wonder what is going on here. Don’t these idiots get briefings? I realize that it would be terminally un-macho for any US official to suggest that the laws, judicial processes, and public opinion of another country, especially a 3rd world country, would have any impact on US operations in that country. But what do we have to gain by setting allied governments up for crucifixion?
I’d love to have a look at the words that must be flying between the State Dept. and the US embassy in Manila. The diplomats here must be livid, and they have every right to be, having just been hung up in a very nasty breeze by their own people.
Quite aside from all the procedural mess, I honestly wonder what the point of the US mission is. The Abu Sayyaf just don’t seem worth the effort or expense. Fleischer’s statement included these comments on the Abu Sayyaf: "Abu Sayyaf is not a small, disorganized band of terrorists… they are a very serious and deadly terrorist organization which, if they have their way, intend to wreak havoc on the people of the Philippines… the United States is proud to stand together with our friends the Philippines to counter the threat." With all due respect to Fleischer, who says what he’s told to say, this is a crock. The Abu Sayyaf are serious and deadly, no doubt, but they are bandits, plain and simple: they may have adopted a nominal Muslim separatist ideology, but they are in it for the money and have shown no hesitation to cut deals with anybody who can make them a profit. Certainly they have Al Qaeda connections, but they are very much on the fringe, with no influence on and little interest in anything that happens more than a day’s trip in a fast boat from their base. As I said earlier, their armed force numbers about 200, though which armed thugs are part of which group is always a bit uncertain in those parts. Their ability to attract recruits is less a function of their ideology than of their money: they earned large sums from kidnap-for-ransom operations, and had the cash to provide themselves with fast boats, designer shades, and really big guns, all of which are major recruitment draws in that region.
What makes it all still stranger is the presence of another group operating in a much larger territory that encompasses that of the Abu Sayyaf. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a real live Islamist group with a number of Afghanistan veterans in leadership positions and very close, documented connections to Islamist groups in the Middle East, including Al Qaeda. The MILF has a presence on Jolo, as it does on most of the Sulu archipelago, but its main base is on the larger island of Mindanao and its influence spreads over a much wider area than that of the Abu Sayyaf. The MILF has approximately 12,000 men under arms, spread over a fairly wide area. They’ve attained sort of a semi-recognized status with the Philippine government, and there have been on-and-off ceasefires and tepid attempts at negotiation for many years. During the Basilan exercise there was an active ceasefire, and the US-supported forces were not able to enter MILF camps, where Abu Sayyaf members frequently run and hide when the going gets tough. The ceasefire is now history, and there’s been some very nasty fighting going on between the MILF and the Philippine armed forces in the Cotabato area, on Mindanao. MILF forces on Basilan and Jolo have kept fairly quiet.
At this point, a brief primer on the place and the people is probably called for. The traditionally Muslim portion of the Philippines is the western half of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. There are three main Muslim ethnic groups: the Maranao, based around Lake Lanao in northwest Mindanao, the Maguindanao, controlling southwest Mindanao, and the Tausug, based in Jolo but dominant throughout the Sulu islands. The MILF power base is strongest among the Maranao and Maguindanao; they have a presence among the Tausug but not a dominant one. The Abu Sayyaf is one of many armed groups operating in the Tausug domain; the most famous, owing to their raids on upmarket dive resorts, but not the largest.
The current operation, which is aimed at Jolo, involves the Tausug.
Before I say anything unpleasant about Philippine Muslims in general and the Tausug in particular, I sholud point out that the experience these people have had with the rest of the world has been pretty grim. The Spanish spent 400 years trying to exterminate them, though the efforts were fairly lethargic, and after the first few attempts the Conquistadors lost much of their enthusiasm for the project. When the Americans took over they occupied the region, and immediately provoked an uprising by telling the local notables that they’d have to abandon piracy and banditry, free their slaves, give up their weapons, pay taxes, and take up fishing and agriculture, traditionally occupations for women and slaves (not that the Tausug have ever made much distinction between those categories). American troops, with vigorous assistance from Cristian Filipino recruits, settled the dispute by massacring several thousand locals, attaining relative quiet for a while. The independent Philippine Government and Philippine Muslims in general have been at each other’s throats since independence in 1946. The government attempted to dilute Muslim control by settling thousands of Christians from the overcrowded and not terribly fertile central islands in Muslim areas, promising free land, much of which was seized from Muslims. The result, naturally, was a long-running civil war, with abundant atrocities on both sides.
To make a long story short, fighting peaked in the mid ‘70’s, but slowed down in the early ‘80’s, when Marcos negotiated an agreement with Nur Misuari, head of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the dominant Muslim group of the period. The agreement did little for the average Muslim, but it awarded Government positions with high graft potential to Misuari and some of his men, who took them and began building their own power basis. The MILF was a breakaway group, formed by ex-MNLF people who had gotten less of the pie than they wanted. The MNLF was not really an Islamist group; its emphasis was political, promoting independence from Manila and a sort of Islam-slanted socialism. Its inspiration and primary support came from Libya. The MILF soon took on a seriously Islamist character, and drew support from among Saudi Wahhabis. MILF fighters served in Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda links are documented.
But back to Jolo, and the Tausug….
The Tausug may or may not have good historical reasons to be uncongenial. Without prejudice, though, I can only say that they are beyond doubt some of the most uncongenial people I have ever encountered. They are clannish, insular, ignorant beyond belief, arrogant, short-tempered, xenophobic, misogynistic, and gleefully and continuously violent. This is less a Muslim thing than a Tausug thing: they assault fellow Muslims with the same joy that they bring to assaulting anyone not in a position to fight back. If they can’t find an enemy closer than a day’s ride in a fast boat, they generally start shooting at each other: Tausug intramural conflicts make the Hatfields and the McCoys look like the Brady bunch, a major reason why they have never been able to conquer anybody. Tausug social organization is simple: a big boss, defined as one with access to money, maintains as many armed followers as he can afford. The hierarchy of bosses is determined by the number of armed followers. Everybody else tries to stay out of the way. Ritual life is direct and to the point, as exemplified by the charming and romantic Tausug courtship process: the bridegroom arrives unannounced at the residence of his intended, with as many armed companions as he can manage. The intended is tossed in the boat and carried off into the sunset. The men insist that the girls expect and enjoy the practice, but how they know this is uncertain, since nobody asks the girls.
Having watched Discovery Channel, I know that all indigenous peoples are possessed of deep stores of ancient wisdom, but in the case of the Tausug all I can say is that the wisdom is hidden very deeply indeed.
So now we’re sending troops into the Tausug heartland, in pursuit of a bandit group composed largely of Tausugs. This will be quite different from the Basilan operation. Basilan was traditionally the territory of the Yakan, a rather timid Muslim tribe that were the subject of frequent raids from the Tausug and substantial encroachment from Christian settlers. By the time US troops arrived there, the main coastal towns had Christian majorities, who treated the US troops as saviors and begged the Government to keep them there. The military operations were conducted among the Tausug in the coastal villages and the Yakan inland (the Yakan have grown less passive in the face of Christian encroachment, and they are starting to turn up in the MILF and other armed groups).
Jolo will be different. Very few Christians ever settled there, for obvious reasons, and the few that are there are concentrated in the capital town. The entire island has to be regarded as hostile.
I don’t think for a moment that the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf, or any other local group or combination of groups could defeat US units in combat. The combat units will be those least at risk, I’d guess. The ones I fear for are the support units in the towns and the ones trying to do good works: an armed outsider is an enemy there, even if all he’s doing is helping little girls’ kittens down from trees, providing medical care, or building roads. I hope the guys have been well briefed, and I hope they are careful. The Tausug were long known for what the Spanish called juramentado, in which a man would fling himself at a crowd, hacking at whoever he could reach until he was killed. The .45 automatic was actually developed in response to these attacks, as it was observed that the .38 revolvers then in use were simply not up to the job. I would expect similar attacks, but using assault rifles and grenades. Just about everybody on the island is armed and a potential enemy. It’s said, and I expect it’s true, that the Abu Sayyaf and other armed groups have been reminding the populace of the American massacres during the occupation period, and encouraging potential martyrs.
The real challenge, of course, will be finding the Abu Sayyaf, not defeating them. The interior of Jolo is composed of heavy jungle laid over volcanic scree and cave-ridden limestone karsts. It is a very inhospitable place, but the real obstacle is the ease with which the Abu Sayyaf will merge with the followers of the MILF or of local bosses – including elected political figures – when under threat.
So the big question, at the end of the day: what’s the real agenda here? Is this a job for Superman, or is it not? Is it really worth deploying warships and troops and possibly creating a constitutional crisis for an allied government over 200 bandits with no influence outside their own area? Wouldn’t training for local forces suffice to at least keep the Abu Sayyaf under control?
Very few around here believe that the operation is aimed solely at the Abu Sayyaf. Theories abound, many of them ridiculous. Some believe that the real purpose is to create a confrontation with the MILF, justifying a wider US deployment in Mindanao. Some people think the operation is a practice run to create a precedent for similar operations in Indonesia, where a Muslim government makes the situationmore delicate. Some think the US is ultimately planning to set up a military installation in Southern Mindanao to support unilateral operations there and in Indonesia.
During the Basilan operation, it was widely believed that the Bush administration was looking for a quick win against a small group operating in a restricted area. They didn’t get it, so why would they make that assumption now?
The upside is limited: possible removal of the Abu Sayyaf, which would probably be replaced by a similar group within days. The downside is not catastrophic, but neither is it pleasant: possible casualties in hit-and-run raids and terrorist attacks aimed at our troops, possible major political confrontation over engagements with groups other than the Abu Sayyaf, possible instability and rising anti-Americanism in Manila over constitutional issues, possible hassles with ASEAN collectively and a consequent reduction of leverage in Indonesia, possible involvement in wider conflicts with little possibility for resolution, considerable cost, and very little potential gain.
My own opinion? I know pretty much what's going on, but I haven’t the faintest idea why it’s going on. If anybody’s had the persistance to read this far, I’d be interested in hearing their opinions…. |
