North Korea’s Military Strategy Part 1/2
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© 2003 Homer T. Hodge
Parameters, Spring 2003, pp. 68-81.
Homer T. Hodge is the Senior Intelligence Officer for Asia at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in Charlottesville, Virginia. He is a retired Army officer and former Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer with active service in Korea and Japan. His civilian service includes assignments with the National Security Agency in the United States and Korea; the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade in Korea; and the Office of Special Advisor to CINCUNC/CFC/USFK. Mr. Hodge has served in his current position with NGIC (and its predecessor, the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center) since 1990, and has written numerous intelligence studies on North Korea’s military forces.
Simply put, military strategies derive from national strategies intended to achieve goals and conditions that satisfy national interests. Military strategies reflect capabilities vis-à-vis potential opponents, resource constraints, and desired end states. North Korea is no different; its military strategy is a reflection of Pyongyang’s national goals. Military strategies also reflect what one might call “cultural rules of engagement”; i.e., they are based on the socially constructed views unique to the nation.1
Pyongyang’s Foremost National Goal
Historically, Pyongyang’s foremost goal has been the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on North Korean terms. The regime’s constitution describes reunification as “the supreme national task,”2 and it remains a consistently pervasive theme in North Korean media. However, despite what the North Koreans have continued to tell us for the past five decades, outside observers and specialists differ greatly over exactly what North Korea’s goals really are.
Since at least the mid-1990s, there has been a widespread view among Korea observers that, because of severe economic decline, food shortages, and related problems, regime survival has replaced reunification as Pyongyang’s most pressing objective.3 Further, these observers argue, despite its rhetoric, North Korea realizes that reunification through conquest of South Korea is no longer possible.4 There are also some who argue that the North Korean leadership has recognized the need to initiate substantial change in order to survive in the international community and is embarking on economic reform, reconciliation with South Korea, and reduction of military tensions. In addition to the goals of regime survival, reform, and reconciliation, there is another explanatory view of North Korea’s foremost national goal that has been held by a minority of observers for several decades (and has been a consistent theme of North Korean media)—defense against foreign invasion by “imperialist aggressors and their lackey running dogs.”5 Adherents of this view believe that the North Korean leadership genuinely fears an attack by the United States and South Korea and maintains a strong military purely for defense.6 President Bush’s reference to the “axis of evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union address, announcement of plans to adopt a “pre-emptive” military strategy, and increasing numbers of statements by Administration officials about US intentions to employ military force to remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from power have added support to the “defense” explanation. Some have also argued that enhancement of the military by Kim Jong Il7 serves primarily to strengthen his domestic political power base. While there is an obvious element of truth in this proposition, it is an oversimplification that distorts the true role of military strength in the regime.
Others accept North Korea’s word that reunification remains the primary goal and argue that Pyongyang’s long-term strategy to dominate the peninsula by any means has not changed. They cite North Korea’s continued focus of scarce resources to the military,8 development of longer-range ballistic missiles, and the recent revelation by Pyongyang that it seeks a nuclear weapons capability9 as indications that reunification remains the foremost goal.
The preponderance of evidence clearly supports the conclusion that reunification under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, by whatever means, remains “the supreme national task.” North Korean media rhetoric continues to extol reunification under Kim. A parallel but closely related theme is that of completing the socialist revolution. When North Korean leaders speak of achieving “socialist revolution in our country,” they mean unification of the entire peninsula on their terms.10 The Kim regime in North Korea considers the entire peninsula as constituting its sovereign territory. It does not recognize South Korea as being a separate nation, nor the government of South Korea as legitimate. Therefore, when North Korea refers to “our country” or the “fatherland,” they mean the entire Korean peninsula. When read in the original Korean, the meaning of these terms becomes much clearer. The North Korean leaders view the southern half of their country as occupied by “US imperialists” and the government of South Korea as “puppets serving their imperialist masters.” “Defense” does not refer to defending North Korea, but to defending all of Korea. Accordingly, “defense of the fatherland” means (1) reclaiming that portion of Korea—i.e., South Korea—that is currently occupied and controlled by the “imperialists,” and (2) defending against further encroachment by “US imperialists.” While they certainly see that the possibility of a popular armed revolution in South Korea, particularly one sympathetic to Pyongyang, is extremely remote,11 reunification through force of arms appears to remain possible to the North Korean leadership.12
Without question, survival is a basic goal of incumbent regimes of all nation-states; North Korea is no exception. However, in the long term, reunification is essential to regime survival. In the near- to mid-term, North Korea may be able to “muddle through” economically, based on donations from the outside, primarily from the United States and South Korea. However, pursuit of such a course can only lead to dependency and loss of control.13 Such dependency is inconsistent with the ideological tenet of Juche (self-reliance).14 The alternative to control of the entire peninsula is increasing dependence on South Korea, leading to complete economic absorption by Seoul and a breakdown of isolation and information control. The result would be the awakening of the North Korean populace to the true economic and social conditions of daily life in South Korea and, ultimately, the demise of the Kim regime.15 Clearly, regime survival, national defense, and a self-sufficient economy are logical goals; however, reunification of the peninsula remains the foremost goal that drives North Korea’s national strategy.16
In the North, the fear of conquest and defeat through economic absorption by South Korea undoubtedly has outweighed any fear of attack. North Korean leaders must know that time is on Seoul’s side; if the South Koreans bide their time, the cost of slowly but steadily making inroads into North Korea through economic means is obviously far smaller than the price in terms of blood and treasure required to conquer the North militarily and then rebuild. South Korea enjoys an increasing and irreversible economic lead over North Korea.17
A stronger case, based on recent events and statements of US officials, could be made to support the argument that North Korean leaders increasingly fear a US-led attack. The danger here is that as the North Korean leadership sees US actions in the war on terror, they may conclude that the United States intends to launch an attack to remove Kim Jong Il from power and decide to execute a preemptive surprise attack on South Korea. US initiation of military action against Iraq could prove to be the catalyst for a North Korean decision to go to war. While such an attack would be a gamble, the North Korean leadership could judge that the US focus on and concentration of military power in operations against Iraq would strengthen North Korea’s chances of success.
North Korea’s surprising admission to US Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly during talks in Pyongyang on 16 October 2002 that it has a secret ongoing nuclear weapons development program was probably prompted by increasing North Korean concerns about possible US military action.
Historical Background
Knowledge of the 20th-century history of Korea is essential to understanding North Korean national interests and goals. Until the end of World War II in 1945, Korea had remained a single, ethnically and culturally homogenous country for over a thousand years. Initially divided on a temporary basis by the United States and Soviet Union along the 38th parallel to facilitate the surrender and demobilization of Japanese forces stationed in Korea, this division quickly became permanent as US-Soviet relations cooled. By 1948, two governments, each claiming sovereignty over the entire peninsula, had been established: the Soviet-supported communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north, and the US-backed Republic of Korea in the south.18 The national policies of both Koreas have been shaped by the underlying aim of eventual reunification.
The all-encompassing impact on North Korea of the character, personality, life experiences, and thinking of its founder and first leader, Kim Il Sung, is probably unique among modern nations. The past and current history, nature, and direction of the country cannot be understood apart from Kim Il Sung; eight years after his death, his influence remains dominant.19 Kim’s perspective on the world and his view of the purpose of political power and the state were defined by his early education in Chinese schools and ideological training by Chinese Communists, his experience as a guerrilla fighter with the Chinese Communists against the Japanese in Manchuria, and his military training and further political education in the Soviet Union during World War II. The wartime Soviet state became the model on which the North Korean regime was created by Kim Il Sung.20
As a key element of his ideological models (Stalin, Mao), “militarism” had a defining impact on Kim’s thinking in his early formative years. The experience of the Korean War further strengthened this view. Kim, reflecting Maoist strategic thought, saw contradictory elements as driving history. Conflict did not require a solution; it was the solution to political problems. Hence, politics and international relations were processes by which contradictions were resolved through conflict, and the nature of that conflict was zero-sum. Accordingly, to Kim, the purpose of the state, like the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit, was to wage war effectively. In his view, economic activity produced the means to wage war, education produced soldiers to wage war, and ideology convinced the people of the sociological and historical inevitability of war.21 For Kim, war in the near-term meant reunifying the Korean peninsula on Pyongyang’s terms and, in the long-term, continuing the global struggle against US imperialism.
From this thinking and Kim’s early experiences evolved a unique North Korean nationalism that was not so much inspired by Korean history or past cultural achievements as by the Spartan outlook of the anti-Japanese guerrillas. This nationalism focused on imagined past wrongs and promises of retribution for “national leaders” (i.e., South Korean officials) and their foreign backers (i.e., the United States). The nationalism of Kim Il Sung capitalized on historic xenophobia, stressing the “purity” of all things Korean against the “contamination” of foreign ideas, and inculcating the population with a sense of fear and animosity toward the outside world. Most important, this nationalism emphasized “that the guerrilla ethos was not only supreme, but also the only legitimate basis on which to reconstitute a reunified Korea.”22
Militarism has remained an essential aspect of the character of the North Korean state since its founding in 1948; it constitutes a key element of the strategic culture of the regime. Accordingly, the maintenance of a powerful, offensive military force has always been and remains fundamental to the regime. This perspective was inculcated into the thinking of Kim’s son and heir apparent, Kim Jong Il, throughout his life and is reflected in the younger Kim’s policies, writings, and speeches. This militarism was the primary instrument to which he turned in order to deal with North Korea’s severe economic crisis of the 1990s. Kim adopted the “military-first political method” as the means to survive and overcome this crisis. Accordingly, “military-first politics”23 is the key element in the current theme of creating a “strong and prosperous nation” that is capable of realizing completion of the “socialist revolution”—i.e., reunification. “Military-first politics” is more than the employment of military terminology to describe organization, discipline, and perseverance in accomplishment of public tasks; it emphasizes the need for a strong military even at the sacrifice of daily public needs. The abolition of the post of state President and simultaneous elevation of the position of Chairman, National Defense Commission, to the “highest post of state” in 1998 further underscores Kim’s ideological commitment to militarism as the fundamental basis for regime survival. North Korea’s military strategy, as a component of national strategy, reflects this commitment.
Pyongyang’s Military Strategy
North Korea’s military strategy is offensive and is designed to provide a military option to achieve reunification by force employing surprise, overwhelming firepower, and speed. It is shaped by the regime’s militarist ideology and the strong influence of Soviet and Russian military thinking with historical roots in the Korean nationalist resistance against Japanese colonialism, the Korean experience in the Chinese Civil War, and international events of the early Cold War years as interpreted by the late Kim Il Sung. Continued emphasis on maintaining this strategy, despite severe economic decline, suggests that Pyongyang continues to perceive an offensive military strategy as a viable option for ensuring regime survival and realizing reunification on North Korean terms.
The offensive character of Pyongyang’s military strategy is demonstrated by the organization and deployment of its forces. The primary instrument of this strategy is North Korea’s armed forces, known collectively as the Korean People’s Army (KPA).
The KPA of 2003 is an imposing and formidable force of 1.17 million active personnel with a reserve force of over 5 million, making it the fifth largest military force in the world.24 The ground forces are organized into eight infantry corps, four mechanized corps, an armor corps, and two artillery corps. The KPA air force consists of 92,000 personnel, and is equipped with some 730 mostly older combat aircraft and 300 helicopters. The 46,000-man KPA navy is primarily a coastal force.25 Additionally, the KPA maintains the largest special operations force (SOF) in the world, consisting of approximately 100,000 highly trained, totally dedicated soldiers.26 A long history of bloody incursions into South Korea underscores the offensive mission of this force.
The overwhelming majority of active ground forces is deployed in three echelons—a forward operational echelon of four infantry corps; supported by a second operational echelon of two mechanized corps, the armor corps, and an artillery corps; and a strategic reserve of the two remaining mechanized corps and the other artillery corps. These forces are garrisoned along major north-south lines of communication that provide rapid, easy access to avenues of approach into South Korea. The KPA has positioned massive numbers of artillery pieces, especially its longer-range systems, close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the two Koreas.27
Soviet concepts of deep operations required the employment of air forces capable of achieving air superiority and air-deliverable ground forces; lacking the resources to produce or deploy such forces, the KPA compensated by greatly increasing deployment of conventional cannon and rocket artillery and tactical and strategic SOF.
Key elements of Pyongyang’s military strategy include the employment of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear (as recently revealed by Pyongyang), and missile systems including short- and medium-range and probably intercontinental missiles. The commander of US forces in Korea assesses that North Korea has large chemical weapon stockpiles, is self-sufficient in the production of chemical agents, and may have produced enough plutonium for at least two nuclear weapons.28 North Korea has now demonstrated the capability to strike targets throughout the entire territory of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, as well as large portions of China and Russia. In an attack on South Korea, Pyongyang could use its missiles in an attempt to isolate the peninsula from strategic reinforcement and intimidate or punish Japan. North Korea’s inventory of ballistic missiles includes over 500 SCUD short-range ballistic missiles that can hit any target in South Korea and medium-range No Dong missiles capable of reaching Japan and the US bases there. While they have not flight-tested long-range missiles—at least, in North Korea—they have continued research, development, and rocket engine testing.29
Although this is an offensive strategy, there are defensive aspects to it. An army must protect its flanks whether attacking or defending. This principle takes on added importance for a peninsular state such as Korea. Both geography and history have taught the North Koreans the vital necessity of protecting their coasts; during the Korean War, United Nations forces conducted two major amphibious operations in Korea, one on each coast.30 The KPA continues to improve coastal defenses, especially in the forward area. They have established or strengthened air defense positions around airfields, near major ports, and along the primary highway between Pyongyang and the DMZ. Additionally, there is a corps-size capital defense command responsible for the defense of Pyongyang.31 However, KPA force deployment lacks defensive depth at the operational level of war. The North Koreans have not constructed defensive belts across the peninsula similar to Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) Alfa, Bravo, and Charlie in South Korea.32 While there are local defensive positions along lines of communication and key intersections manned by local militia and reserve units, they have not established an operational-level network of defensive strong points interlocked with obstacles and planned defensive fires. The forward-deployed artillery is sufficiently close to the DMZ that, in a defensive role, it would be vulnerable to surprise and early destruction by attack from South Korea.33
Taken together, these facts strengthen the judgment that Pyongyang’s military strategy is not defensive but offensive. A strong argument can probably also be made that North Korean military strategy would remain offensive even if defense against a feared attack replaced reunification as the foremost goal of the regime. North Korea’s “militarist” culture advocates offense as the most effective means of defense.34
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