Engagement before Invasion
Michael Donovan, Ph.D., Research Analyst, mdonovan@cdi.org
On the eve of a possible war with Iraq, Americans should consider that the United States has the ability to change the strategic map of the Middle East without firing a shot. Washington should reinvest itself in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and explore an improved relationship with Iran. Meaningful re-engagement in the peace process would help to repair America’s beleaguered image in the Arab world and strike at the ideological center of gravity of Islamist terrorism. Iran represents the future of the Persian Gulf. Engaging Tehran would encourage the democratic evolution underway in that country and help define a brighter future for the region as a whole. Moreover, improvements in either relationship would mitigate the risks inherent in any invasion of Iraq.
Following Sept. 11, 2001, many believed that if the United States were to enlist the support of Arab states in the war on terrorism Washington would have to address the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon certainly believed this to be the case when he warned Washington not to "try to appease the Arabs at our expense…Israel will not be Czechoslovakia." The source of the prime minister’s ire was President George W. Bush’s endorsement in early October 2001 of the idea of a Palestinian state. Sharon’s unfortunate statement understandably riled the administration. But in the intervening months, the administration nevertheless abdicated its leadership role in promoting peace in favor of a dangerous over-identification with the interests of the Sharon government. In January 2002, President Bush equated the Palestinian rejectionist groups with al Qaeda. In June, the president put on the table a plan for a Palestinian state predicated on the conditions that Yasser Arafat be replaced by a more palatable figure. Of the Israelis, little more than patience has been asked. The administration’s approach to the crisis transformed a longstanding U.S. strategic priority into what Thomas Friedman has correctly called a policy of "benign neglect." In the meantime, the mutual bloodletting has continued. Little wonder that Washington has found so few enthusiastic supporters for regime change in Iraq.
Likewise, Washington missed a number of opportunities to improve relations with Tehran. After the events of Sept. 11, 2001 U.S. and Iranian interests converged, and there seemed to be a possibility for improved relations. Observances in sympathy for American victims of the attacks were held in a number of Iranian cities. Both conservatives and reformists immediately denounced the attacks and later offered to assist in the rescue of downed American pilots involved in military operations in Afghanistan. Iranian assistance played an important role in the successes in Afghanistan and the formation of an interim government. European governments argued that the time was ripe to strengthen Iranian reformers through engagement. Continued hostility, they said, played into the hands of hardliners who used it as an excuse for their own failure in governance. In January, however, Bush declared Iran a charter member of the "axis of evil." In July, the administration signaled that it no longer believed reformers in Iran were capable or serious about delivering constructive change. The shift in policy placed Iran in the "captive nations" category, and implied that Iranian democracy would come only by toppling the present order.
The administration’s inflexible approach to these problems no longer makes any sense. The overwhelming victory of reformers in the 2000 elections has changed the political landscape in Iran, perhaps permanently. Washington should take steps to encourage this transformation and the democratic aspirations of a population that is young, well educated, and surprisingly pro-American. Demographically, economically, and politically, Iran is destined to be the major player in the region, and it interests dovetail with those of the United States to a remarkable degree. For Tehran, economic considerations have assumed paramount importance and it has largely renounced its hostile revolutionary legacy in favor of improved relations with its neighbors and the West. To be sure, Iran’s support for Hezbollah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups remains a serious problem, but this policy serves the interest of a hard-line minority and is not representative of Iran’s politically sophisticated and reform-minded younger generations. Likewise, Iran’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction must be viewed within the context of its legitimate security concerns. Taking these concerns into account in deliberations about the future of Iraq and Afghanistan would help dampen Tehran’s appetite for such weapons, foster trust with Washington, and enhance prospects for success over the long term. Ignoring Iran’s security interests confirms the suspicions of hardliners and handicaps those in Tehran who would fully integrate the nation into the international community as a responsible member.
Serious attempts by Washington to revive the Middle East peace process, even at this late stage, would be universally welcomed. Internationally, the threat from Saddam is seen as a narrowly defined obsession of Washington’s. In contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis continues to be the number one concern of Arab and Muslim communities in the Middle East. The administration’s unconvincing argument that the road to peace leads through Baghdad is viewed abroad as cynically self-serving. Washington cannot impose a solution, even if it had one. However, a conditional approach that places the onus for progress simply on reform of the Palestinian Authority is unlikely to produce results. Leadership requires the courage to formulate both the outlines of a just settlement and a timetable for its implementation. Re-engagement would provide Arab leaders with the political cover they need to cooperate with the United States both in the war on terrorism and the disarmament or overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
Progress in the peace process and toward Iran would be mutually reinforcing. Iranians debate the wisdom of further obstructionism, with critics openly asking why Tehran should be "more Palestinian than the Palestinians." Meaningful progress that garnered the support of a majority of Palestinians would also find support among Arab states. It is likely that pragmatists in Iran would use this progress to leverage a reduction in material assistance to terrorist organizations. Closing the gap between American and European approaches to the region would allow a more unified response to problems and magnify the influence the West can bring to issues like terrorism and weapons proliferation. Most importantly, progress in the peace process and Iran would help to further isolate radicals who currently reject political solutions to the many problems facing the region. In this way, re-engagement will anchor stability in the region and foster the constructive change that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein cannot.
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