Hi CobaltBlue; Re: "The Allies systematically bombed dozens of non-military targets for years? I don't think so."
Here's an official US Air Force history article on the subject, which is probably the most clumsy white washing that I've ever seen the military attempt:
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 14-15 FEBRUARY 1945
BOMBINGS OF DRESDEN
Prepared by:
USAF Historical Division
Research Studies Institute
Air University
...
a. Was Dresden a legitimate military target?
b. What strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and to the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden?
c. Did the Russians request that Dresden be bombed by allied air forces?
d. On whose recommendation, whether by an individual or by a committee, and by what authority were Allied air forces ordered to bomb Dresden?
e. Were the Russians officially informed by the Allies concerning the intended date of and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden?
f. With what forces and with what means did the Allied forces bomb Dresden?
g. What were the specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings?
h. What were the immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings on the physical structure and the populace of the city?
i. Were the Dresden bombings in any way a deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives?
j. Were the specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings similar to or different from the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany?
k. In what specific ways and to what degree did the bombings of Dresden achieve or support the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians?
...
36. As defined by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, area attacks were raids “intentionally directed against a city area by more than 100 bombers with a bomb weight in excess of 100 tons, which destroyed more than 2 per cent of the residential buildings in the city attacked.”78 Area raids had four principal characteristics: they were generally made at night; they were made against large cities; they were designed to spread destruction over a wide area rather than to knock out any specific factory or installations; and they were intended primarily to destroy morals, particularly the morals of industrial workers.79
...
Against at least 40 of the largest cities in Germany, the RAF conducted fire raids as a specific means of area bombing, and it conducted raids on at least eight other cities that were not among the 62 with populations of more than 100,000.82 Moreover, against certain of the largest cities in Germany the RAF conducted more than one fire raid; for example, at least six against Berlin, at least five each against Hamburg, Munich, and Essen, and at least two against Cologne.83
...
III. CONCLUSION
The foregoing historical analysis establishes the following definitive answers to the recurring questions concerning the February 1945 bombings of Dresden by Allied strategic air forces: a. Dresden was a legitimate military target. b. Strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, underlay the bombings of Dresden. c. The Russians requested that the Dresden area be bombed by Allied air forces. d. The Supreme Allied Commander, his Deputy Supreme Commander, and the key British and American operational air authorities recommended and ordered the bombing of Dresden. e. The Russians were officially informed by the Allies concerning the intended date of and the forces to be committed to the bombing of Dresden. f. The RAF Bomber Command employed 772 heavy bombers, 1477.7 tons of high explosive and 1181.6 tons of incendiary bombs, and American Eighth Air Force employed a total of 527 heavy bombers, 953.3 tons of high explosive and 294.3 tons of incendiary bombs, in the 14-15 February bombings of Dresden. g. The specific target objectives in the Dresden bombings were, for the RAF Bomber Command, the Dresden city area, including industrial plants, communications, military installations, and for the American Eighth Air Force, the Dresden Marshalling Yards and railway facilities. h. The immediate and actual consequences of the Dresden bombings were destruction or severe damage to at least 23 per cent of the city’s industrial buildings; severe damage to at least 56 per cent of the city’s non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings); destruction or severe damage to at least 50 percent of the residential units in the city’s non-industrial buildings (exclusive of dwellings); destruction or severe damage to at least 50 percent of the residential units in the city, and at least some damage to 80 per cent of the city’s dwellings; the total disruption of the city as a major communications center, in consequence of destruction and damage inflicted on its railway facilities; and death to probably 25,000 persons and serious injury to probably 30,000 others, virtually all of these casualties being the result of the RAF area raid. i. The Dresden bombings were in no way a deviation from established bombing policies set forth in official bombing directives. j. The specific forces and means employed in the Dresden bombings were in keeping with the forces and means employed by the Allies in other aerial attacks on comparable targets in Germany. k. The Dresden bombings achieved the strategic objectives that underlay the attack and were of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians.
...
airforcehistory.hq.af.mil
-- Carl |
